Nova Law Review 22, 2 by ,
Nova Law Review
Volume 22, Issue 2 1998 Article 1
Nova Law Review 22, 2
Nova Law Review∗
∗
Copyright c©1998 by the authors. Nova Law Review is produced by The Berkeley Electronic
Press (bepress). http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr
1: Nova Law Review 22, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1998
NOVA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 22 WINTER 1998 NUMBER2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ARTICLES
The Information Highway Patrol: Here Come the
Cybercops ............................................................................. ClaireAnn Koegler 513
Here Come the Cybercops 2: Who Should Police
Cybermarks? ............................................ . .. .. .. ... . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Claire Ann Koegler 531
Here Come the Cybercops 3: Betting on the Net .................. Claire Ann Koegler 545
NOTES AND COMMENTS
When Is Same-Gender Sexual Harassment Actionable
under Title VII? Fredette v. BVP Management
Associates .................................................................................... Linda K Davis 559
Convicted Sex Offenders: Where Do You Live?
Are We Entitled to Know? A Year's Retrospective of
Ex Post Facto Challenges to Sex Offender Community
Notification Laws .................................................................... Charles J. Dlabik 585
When Does the Loser Pay under Florida's Offer of
Judgment Laws? The Combination of Legislative and
Judicial Authority on Offers of Judgment has Undermined
the Goal of Facilitating Settlement ...................................... Jason R. Himschoot 645
2
Nova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol22/iss2/1
The Information Highway Patrol: Here Come the
Cybercops*
Claire Ann Koegler**
As communications on the Internet become more and more a part of
American culture, the law is evolving to regulate activities on the Internet
("Net"). Various government agencies and private entities are patrolling the
Net to crack down on tortious and criminal activities.
In substance, these cyberspace activities are no different than activities
in person, by mail, by telephone, by broadcast, or by print publication. Thus,
government agencies patrolling the Net are seeing garden variety fraud,
gambling, and securities violations, while private entities are seeing the
usual copyright and trademark infringement, libel, and the like.
The message is the same only the medium is different. Thus, the courts
have been applying preexisting substantive law to tortious and criminal
conduct in this new medium. In some cases, Congress has amended statutes
to include expressly Net activities.
A. An Introduction to the Net
The Net evolved from a computer system built a quarter of a century
ago by the Department of Defense to enable academic and military
researchers to continue to do government work even if part of the network
were taken out by a nuclear blast. From its inception, it steadily grew to link
universities, government facilities, and corporations around the world. The
people given access to it soon learned that it was useful for more than
official business, and thus e-mail and bulletin boards were born.1
From four host computers in 1969, the Net had grown to over one
2million computers by 1993 and was approaching ten million in 1996. There
* Paper presented at the Twenty-Sixth Popular Culture Association and Eighteenth
American Culture Association Annual Conference, Las Vegas, Nevada (Mar. 24-28, 1996).
Material updated prior to publication.
** Attorney-at-Law, West Orange, New Jersey. The author is in private practice,
concentrating in intellectual property and related matters.
1. Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Battle for the Soul of the Internet, TIME, July 25, 1994, at 50,
52.
2. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
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were an estimated forty million users worldwide as of 1996; that number is
expected to reach 200 million by 1999.
3
"The Internet is a vast international network of networks that enables
computers of all kinds to share services and communicate directly, as if they
were part of one giant, seamless, global computing machine. ' 4 The Net
might be analogized to the system of interstate highways-many different
routes to many different places. In this analogy, access providers are the
companies that operate entrance ramps to the Net, some with tollgates.
Content providers come in a variety of forms. 6 Some provide archives
of documents and operate much as newsstands, bookstores, or libraries.
Some provide bulletin board systems ("BBS") which permit subscribers to
post documents thereon; some provide chat rooms where subscribers can
"talk;" some sell goods over the Net. Content providers exercise varying
degrees of control over the material made available at their sites.
Since no one owns or controls the Net, activity thereon is determined by
the access providers, the content providers, and the subscribers and/or users.
While subscribers and users are typically liable for their own actions
(although possibly judgment proof), liability of access providers and content
providers depends upon the existing substantive law and the facts of each
case.
B. Common Carriers, Vendors, and Publishers
The rights and obligations of providers and of users under the law is
determined not only by the substantive law, but also by the characterization
of the parties, which can determine the duty owed by a certain defendant to a
certain plaintiff. For example, local telephone companies are considered
3. Id.
4. See Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 1, at 52. Congress has defined the Net as "the
international computer network of both Federal and non-Federal interoperable packet
switched data networks." 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(e)(1) (West Supp. 1998).
5. Congress defines an "access software provider" as "a provider of software (including
client or server software), or enabling tools that do any one or more of the following:
(A) filter, screen, allow, or disallow content; (B) pick, choose, analyze, or digest content; or
(C) transmit, receive, display, forward, cache, search, subset, organize, reorganize, or translate
content." Id. § 230(e)(4). Access software providers are also "interactive computer services,"
such a service being defined as: "any information service, system, or access software provider
that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including
specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated
or services offered by libraries or educational institutions." Id. § 230(e)(2).
6. Congress has defined an "information content provider" as "any person or entity that
is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided
through the Internet or any other interactive computer service." Id. § 230(e)(3).
[Vol. 22:513
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common carriers; they must provide access to those who want it. They have
neither the right nor the obligation to oversee how users use their phone
lines. Since they cannot control the content of telephone conversations or
facsimile transmissions, they cannot be held liable for customers' libelous,
infringing, fraudulent, or otherwise tortious or criminal conduct.
7
Publishers stand on a different footing. A newspaper is not required to
print every story, commentary, or letter submitted. Thus, it has an obligation
not to publish material that it knows or should know is tortious, such as
libelous, infringing a copyright or a trademark, or the like.8
Vendors, such as libraries, bookstores, and newsstands, cannot be held
to the same standards as publishers. They cannot be expected to review
material in their possession, nor is it in the public interest to have them act as
censors. Such would have a chilling effect on free speech. 9
7. The copyright act has a common carrier exemption:
The secondary transmission of. a primary transmission embodying a
performance or display of a work is not an infringement of copyright if-
the secondary transmission is made by any carrier who has no direct or
indirect control over the content or selection of the primary transmission or
over the particular recipients of the secondary transmission, and whose
activities with respect to the secondary transmission consist solely of
providing wires, cables, or other communications channels for the use of
others ....
17 U.S.C. § 11I(a)(3) (1994).
8. The trademark act does contain an exemption for innocent infringement by publishers
carrying paid advertisements:
Where the infringement or violation complained of is contained in or is part
of paid advertising matter in a newspaper, magazine, or other similar
periodical or in an electronic communication ... , the remedies ... shall be
limited to an injunction against the presentation [of such advertising matter in
future issues of] such newspapers, magazines, or other similar periodicals or
in future transmissions of such electronic communications. The limitations of
this subparagraph shall apply only to innocent infringers and innocent
violators.
15 U.S.C. § 11 14(2)(B) (1994).
9. In reversing a bookseller's conviction under an obscenity statute which had no
requirement of scienter, the United States Supreme Court explained:
By dispensing with any requirement of knowledge of the contents of the book
on the part of the seller, the ordinance tends to impose a severe limitation on
the public's access to constitutionally protected matter. For if the bookseller
is criminally liable without knowledge of the contents, ... he will tend to
restrict the books he sells to those he has inspected .... If the contents of
1998]
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C. Protected Speech and Unprotected Speech
While freedom of speech or expression is recognized as a fundamental
right, some types of expression-seditious, obscene, and tortious-are
subject to regulation or even prohibition. In regulating speech, the courts
look to both the content and the context: "The most stringent protection of
free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and
causing a panic."'
1
D. Obscenity
Federal law prohibits the importation, interstate transportation, mailing,
and broadcasting of obscene material." This prohibition includes
dissemination via the Net.
12
In 1978, the United States Supreme Court upheld the Federal
Communications Commission's ("FCC") regulation of indecent but not
obscene material in radio broadcasting. 3 The case involved the
midafternoon broadcast of George Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue,
preceded by a notice that the program would include language which might
be offensive to some.14 In a variation on the content/context analysis, the
FCC had likened offensive language to nuisance and determined that it
should be channeled, not prohibited . Specifically, words depicting sexual
and excretory activity should be aired at "'times of day when children most
likely would not be exposed to it."" 16 In upholding the regulation, the Court
stated:
We have long recognized that each medium of expression
presents special First Amendment problems. And of all forms of
communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most
bookshops and periodical stands were restricted to material of which their
proprietors had made an inspection, they might be depleted indeed.
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959).
10. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1994) (importation and transportation); 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1994)
(mailing); 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1994) (broadcasting).
12. Section 1462 was amended in 1996 to expressly include the use of an interactive
computer service to transfer such material. See 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1994). 'An interactive
computer service is defined in 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (1994), set forth in supra note 5.
13. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 751 (1978).
14. Id. at 729.
15. Id. at 726.
16. Id. at 733 (quoting In re Matter of a 'Petition for Clarification or Reconsideration,'
59 F.C.C. 2d 892 (1976)).
[Vol. 22:513
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limited First Amendment protection .... First, the broadcast media
have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all
Americans. Patently offensive, indecent material presented over
the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but also in
the privacy of the home, where the individual's right to be left
alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder.
Because the broadcast audience is constantly tuning in and out,
prior warnings cannot completely protect the listener or viewer
from unexpected program content.
Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even
those too young to read. Although Cohen's [sic] written message
might have been incomprehensible to a first grader, Pacifica's
broadcast could have enlarged a child's vocabulary in an instant.
Other forms of offensive expression may be withheld from the
young without restricting the expression at its source. Bookstores
and motion picture theaters, for example, may be prohibited from
making indecent material available to children.... The ease with
which children may obtain access to broadcast material ... amply
justif[ies] special treatment of indecent broadcasting. 17
In Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC,18 the Court
chronicled the attempts of the FCC and Congress to regulate dial-a-porn in
the wake of the Pacifica decision. In 1982, Congress amended the
Communications Act to criminalize providing, to those under eighteen years
of age, indecent as well as obscene commercial telephone messages. The
FCC promulgated regulations providing defenses based on time channeling
and credit card screening; the time channeling defense was set aside in
Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC ("Carlin T') as "'both overinclusive
and underinclusive.,' 20 The FCC promulgated new regulations keeping the
credit card screening defense and adding a user identification code defense;
these regulations were set aside in Carlin II for failure to consider exchange
blocking. 21 The FCC promulgated a new set of regulations keeping the two
prior defenses and adding as a defense message scrambling; these
regulations were upheld in Carlin I1.22 The court, however, struck down as
17. Id. at 748-50.
18. 492U.S. 115 (1989).
19. Id. at 120.
20. Id. at 121 (quoting Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 749 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.
1984) [hereinafter Carlin 1]).
21. Id. at 121-22 (citing Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 787 F.2d 846 (2d Cir.
1986) [hereinafter Carlin 11]).
22. Id. at 122 (citing Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 837 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 924 (1988) [hereinafter Carlin Ill]).
1998]
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unconstitutional the attempt to regulate "indecent" as opposed to "obscene"
speech.23 Thereafter, Congress amended the act to ban indecent as well as
obscene commercial telephone messages, without regard to the age of the
24
recipient, thus leading to the Sable case. The United States Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the statute as applied to obscene speech but
struck down as unconstitutional its application to indecent speech,
distinguishing the case before it from Pacifica:
The private commercial telephone communications at issue here
are substantially different from the public radio broadcast at issue
in Pacifica. In contrast to public displays, unsolicited mailings and
other means of expression which the recipient has no meaningful
opportunity to avoid, the dial-it medium requires the listener to
take affirmative steps to receive the communication .... Unlike an
unexpected outburst on a radio broadcast, the message received by
one who places a call to a dial-a-porn service is not so invasive or
surprising that it prevents an unwilling listener from avoiding
exposure to it.2
One might have thought that Congress would have learned something
from the Carlin and Sable cases. Apparently not. Since the terms
"indecent" and "patently offensive" were undefined in the statute, Congress
amended the act to restrict the dissemination of both obscene and "indecent"
material by telecommunications devices and of "patently offensive" material
by interactive computer services, to persons under eighteen years of
age. These provisions were found facially unconstitutional by a three-
judge district court, and their enforcement was preliminarily enjoined. 27 The
court distinguished accessing the Net from broadcasting: "Communications
over the Internet do not 'invade' an individual's home or appear on one's
computer screen unbidden. Users seldom encounter content 'by accident."'
28
The court rejected the act's defenses of credit card verification, adult access
codes, and adult personal identification numbers as not available for
cc . ,29
noncommercial, not-for-profit entities. The court also rejected the
government's proposal for "tagging" of indecent material to facilitate
blocking, as it was extremely burdensome to content providers such as
23. Sable, 492 U.S. at 122.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 127-28.
26. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a)(1)(B), (d)(1) (West Supp 1998). Liability was extended to
facilities providers who knowingly permitted such activities to occur. Id. § 223(a)(2), (d)(2).
27. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp 824, 849 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
28. Id. at 844.
29. Id. at 849.
[Vol. 22:513
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libraries, that might simply tag an entire site, thereby not reaching foreign
content providers.
The principles enunciated in the obscenity cases have been adapted and
applied in libel and infringement cases.
E. Defamation and Other Intentional Torts
31
Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc. was an action for libel, business
disparagement, and unfair competition. CompuServe included an online
forum called the Journalism Forum managed by an independent contractor
who agreed to "'manage, review, create, delete, edit and otherwise control
the contents' of the Journalism Forum 'in accordance with editorial and
technical standards and conventions of style as established by
CompuServe.'M33 The allegedly false and defamatory statements appeared in
a daily newsletter available on the Journalism Forum.34  Under the
applicable New York State law, "'one who repeats or otherwise republishes
defamatory matter is subject to liability as if he had originally published it,"'
however, "'vendors and distributors of defamatory publications are not liable
if they neither know nor have reason to know of the defamation. 105
The rationale for the distinction is the same as in the obscenity cases:
vendors and distributors cannot be expected to review all material in their
possession; imposing such a requirement would severely limit the material
available to the public, in contravention of the First Amendment.36 The
court found that CompuServe acted as a for-profit library, not a publisher:
"CompuServe has no more editorial control over such a publication than
does a public library, book store, or newsstand, and it would be no more
feasible for CompuServe to examine every publication it carries for
potentially defamatory statements than it would be for any other distributor
to do so.' '37 In addition, "[g]iven the relevant First Amendment
considerations, the appropriate standard of liability to be applied to
CompuServe is whether it knew or had reason to know of the allegedly
defamatory Rumorville statements."
38
30. Id. at 847-48.
31. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
32. Id. at 135.
33. Id. at 137.
34. Id. at 138.
35. Id. at 139 (citations omitted).
36. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 139-40.
37. Id. at 140.
38. Id. at 140-41. Since the plaintiffs failed to show an issue of fact regarding
CompuServe's knowledge, summary judgment was granted for CompuServe. Id. at 142.
1998]
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Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v PRODIGY Services Co.,39 was an action for
libel based on statements on a PRODIGY bulletin board "Money Talk,".. . ... .. 40
alleging fraud by the plaintiffs in the sale of an initial public offering. In
finding that PRODIGY acted as a publisher, the court noted: "PRODIGY
held itself out as an online service that exercised editorial control over the
content of messages posted on its computer bulletin boards, thereby
expressly differentiating itself from its competition and expressly likening
itself to a newspaper. ' 14 PRODIGY stated:
We make no apology for pursuing a value system that reflects the
culture of the millions of American families we aspire to serve.
Certainly no responsible newspaper does less when it chooses the
type of advertising it publishes, the letters it prints, the degree of
42
nudity and unsupported gossip its editors tolerate.
PRODIGY also promulgated content guidelines, electronically prescreened
bulletin board postings for offensive language, used board leaders to enforce
the guidelines, and provided board leaders with an emergency delete
function to remove inappropriate postings.43 In entering summary judgment
for the plaintiffs, the court distinguished Cubby:
Let it be clear that this Court is in full agreement with
Cubby .... Computer bulletin boards should generally be regarded
in the same context as bookstores, libraries and network affiliates.
PRODIGY's conscious choice, to gain the benefits of editorial
control, has opened it up to a greater liability than CompuServe
and other computer networks that make no such choice.44
F. Intellectual Property Rights
Numerous companies are patrolling the Net to enforce their intellectual
property rights. Paramount Pictures for years has been trying to stop the
proliferation of Star Trek photographs, Elvis Presley Enterprises has ordered
39. No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. May 24, 1995).
40. Id. at *1.
41 Id. at *2.
42. Id. (quoting Ex. J).
43. Id. at *2-3.
44. No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. May 24, 1995). The case was
settled in December of 1995 for a reported two-and-a-half million dollars. PRODIGY no
longer monitors its bulletin boards. See No. 3106/94, 1995 WL 805178 (N.Y. Supp. Dec. 11,
1995).
[Vol. 22:513
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the removal of sound clips of Presley's recordings and photographs of
Graceland from home pages, and Sony Music Entertainment has sent notices
to Web page owners using Pearl Jam images.45 Many publishers are pushing
for the passage of changes to the Copyright Act to define digital
transmission as a form of publication, to include electronic coding of
copyrighted material that would notify publishers when their material was
copied, and to impose criminal penalties.
6
Playboy Enterprises has complained to a number of universities about
students posting Playboy photographs.47 Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v.
Frena48 was an action for copyright infringement, trademark infringement,
and unfair competition, in which the court granted the plaintiffs motion for
summary judgment.49  The defendant provided a bulletin board for
subscribers to upload and download pictures from Playboy magazine.50 In
holding that the defendant infiinged the plaintiffs copyrights, including
distributing copies of and publicly displaying the works, the court rejected
Frena's defense that he was unaware of the copyright infringement, since
"[i]ntent or knowledge is not an element of infringement, and thus even an
innocent infringer is liable for infringement."51  The court also found
trademark infringement of the marks Playboy and Playmate used to identify
files, again rejecting Frena's defense that he did not intend to use the
plaintiff's mark, since "a showing of intent or bad faith is unnecessary to
establish a violation of § 1141(a).'
The Church of Scientology has been particularly vigilant in patrolling
the use of its material on the Internet, with varying results. In Religious
Technology Center ("RTC") v. Lerma,53 a former church member posted
allegedly stolen church documents through Digital Gateway Systems and
provided them to the Washington Post.5 4 After the court ordered return of
the documents and seizure of Defendant Lerma's computer equipment, the
Washington Post copied the documents from the court file, which was
45. Ross Kerber, On-Line: Vigilant Copyright Holders Patrol the Internet, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 13, 1995, atB1.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
49. Id. at 1563.
50. Id. at 1554.
51. Id. at 1556-57, 1559.
52. Id. at 1560-61. To the extent that Frena removed the Playboy trademarks and
substituted his own identification, the court found the intent necessary for the claim of unfair
competition based "on reverse passing off." Playboy, 839 F. Supp. at 1562.
53. 897 F. Supp. 260 (E.D. Va. 1995).
54. Id. at 261-62.
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subsequently sealed.55 The court rejected the Religious Technology Center's
request to restrain publication by the Washington Post of an article based on
the documents, stating that if "a threat to national security was insufficient
to warrant a prior restraint" in the "Pentagon Papers" case,56 "the threat to
plaintiff's copyrights and trade secrets is woefully inadequate. Moreover,
RTC was unlikely to succeed on the copyright claim, due to the fair use
exception,58 or on the trade secret claim, since the documents were in the
public domain, having found their way onto the Net from sources in addition
to the defendant.59 In a later opinion,60 the court rejected RTC's claim that
the failure to restrain the publication violated the Free Exercise Clause. The
court further declined to issue an injunction against Lerma or Digital
Gateway Systems, based in part on RTC's unclean hands in executing the
TRO against Lerma and, in part, on the decision of the Colorado District
Court in a related case.
6 1
The Colorado case was factually the same, with a different set of
defendants-FACTNET and two former church members who were
62
members of FACTNET's board. The defendant in the Virginia case,
Lerma, was also a member of FACTNET's board and had posted the
information from the court files in the Virginia case on the FACTNET
BBS.63 Like the Virginia court, the Colorado court found that the plaintiff
was unlikely to succeed on the copyright claim, due to the fair use
exception,64 or on the trade secret claim, since the documents were in the
55. Id. at 262.
56. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
57. Religious Tech. Cr., 897 F. Supp. at 263. In a rare case, the court restrained
publication of an article containing technical information regarding the construction of a
hydrogen bomb, accepting the government's claim that it posed a threat to the national
security: "A mistake in ruling against The Progressive will seriously infringe cherished First
Amendment ights .... A mistake in ruling against the United States could pave the way for
thermonuclear annihilation for us all. In that event, our right to life is extinguished and the
right to publish becomes moot." United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 996
(W.D. Wis. 1979). The issue apparently became moot when similar articles were published
elsewhere.
58. Religious Tech. Ctr., 897 F. Supp. at 263 (citing 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West Supp.
1995)).
59. Id. at 266.
60. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Va. 1995).
61. Id. at 1358, 1361 (citing Religious Tech. Ctr. v. F.A.C.T.NET, Inc., 901 F. Supp.
1519 (D. Colo. 1995)).
62. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. F.A.C.T.NET, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 1519, 1521-22 (D. Colo.
1995).
63. Id. at 1522.
64. Id. at 1525-26.
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public domain, having found their way onto the Net from sources other than
the defendant Lerma.
The Scientologists found a friendlier environment in California, where
a similar action for copyright infringement and trade secret misappropriation
was brought against Netcom and Erlich, a former minister of the church,
who had posted allegedly proprietary church documents on a Netcom
bulletin board.66  In issuing a preliminary injunction against Erhlich, the
court found a likelihood of success on the copyright claim, since the fair use
exception was not justified on the facts, 67 but that RTC was unlikely to
succeed on the trade secret claim, since the information had been posted on
the Net by others:
The court is troubled by the notion that any Internet user, including
those using "anonymous remailers" to protect their identity, can
destroy valuable intellectual property rights by posting them over
the Internet, especially given the fact that there is little opportunity
to screen postings before they are made.... While the court is
persuaded by the Church's evidence that those who made the
original postings likely gained the information through improper
means ... this does not negate the finding that, once posted, the
68works lost their secrecy.
In a later opinion,69 the court considered motions for summary judgment by
the access provider, Netcom, and the BBS operator Klemesrud. The court
rejected Netcom's attempts to use the common carrier exception to the
Copyright Act:
71
Netcom compares itself to a common carrier that merely acts as a
passive conduit for information. In a sense, a Usenet server that
forwards all messages acts like a common carrier, passively
retransmitting every message that gets sent through it. Netcom
would seem no more liable than the phone company for carrying an
infiinging facsimile transmission or storing an infringing audio
recording on its voice mail. As Netcom's counsel argued, holding
such a server liable would be like holding the owner of the
65. Id. at 1526.
66. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp.
1231 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
67. Id. at 1249-50.
68. Id. at 1256 (footnote omitted).
69. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
70. Id. at 1361.
71. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1994).
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highway, or at least the operator of a toll booth, liable for the
criminal activities that occur on its roads.
72
Nevertheless, the court found that Netcom could not be held liable as a direct
infringer:
The court does not find workable a theory of infringement that
would hold the entire Internet liable for activities that cannot
reasonably be deterred. Billions of bits of data flow through the
Internet and are necessarily stored on servers throughout the
network and it is thus practically impossible to screen out
infringing bits from noninfiinging bits. Because the court cannot
see any meaningful distinction (without regard to knowledge)
between what Netcom did and what every other Usenet server
does, the court finds that Netcom cannot be held liable for direct
infringement.
73
However, the court found that Netcom might still be liable for contributory
infringement or vicarious infringement, since RTC notified Netcom and
Klemesrud of the alleged infringement and Netcom took no action.
74
In Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Maphia,75 the court entered a preliminary
injunction against copyright infringement, trademark infringement, and
76
unfair competition. The defendant provided a bulletin board for
subscribers to upload and download SuperNintendo and Genesis games. In
some cases, subscribers were charged a fee for downloading games. 78 The
court found a prima facie case that the defendant directly and contributorily
infringed the plaintiff's copyrights including making copies of the works,
noting that the defendant had knowledge of the copying.7  The court further
found a prima facie case of trademark infringement and of false designation
72. Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp. at 1369 n.12.
73. Id. at 1372-73.
74. Id. at 1375. "Where a defendant has knowledge of the primary infringer's infringing
activities, it will be liable if it 'induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing
conduct of' the primary infringer." Id. "A defendant is liable for vicarious liability for the
actions of a primary infringer where the defendant (1) has the right and ability to control the
infringer's acts and (2) receives a direct financial benefit from the infringement." Id. As
against Klemesrud, the court found no direct infringement for the same reasons as Netcom, a
possibility of contributory infringement for the same reasons as Netcom, and insufficient
evidence on the issue of vicarious liability, due to a failure to allege a financial benefit.
Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp at 1381-82.
75. 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 683.
78. Id. at 683-684.
79. Id. at 686-87.
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of origin based on the use of Sega's trademark on files and in the programs
copied.80
United States v. LaMacchia8' was a criminal action against a student at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology ("MIT") who had created a
bulletin board in which correspondents were encouraged to upload popular
applications software and computer games, which LaMacchia transferred to
a second bulletin board from which subscribers could download the
software. Because there was no showing of any financial benefit to
LaMacchia, he could not be prosecuted under the criminal provisions of the
Copyright Act.83 Accordingly, he was indicted under the federal wire fraud
statute. 4 The court determined that in enacting the Copyright Felony Act in
1992, Congress made a conscious decision to limit the extension of the
felony provisions to criminal copyright infringement as defined in the
Copyright Act,85 so as not to accidentally bring "a large percentage of the
American people... into the gray area of criminal law."86 Accordingly, the
court declined to extend the reach of the wire fraud statute to reach
LaMacchia for fear of reaching "the myriad of home computer users who
succumb to the temptation to copy even a single software program for
private use."87
G. Fraud on the Net
Much of the attention to the Net in the popular press has been directed
to fraud on the Net. What makes fraud on the Net different from other
schemes is the large volume of potential dupes that can be reached at low
cost. Moreover, if the pitch is made on a bulletin board, rather than by e-
mail, the dupes come to the con artist, not the other way around. However,
unlike telephone solicitations, the Net leaves the equivalent of a paper trail,
so it is easier to police these fraud schemes.
At the federal level, the Department of Justice has a computer crimes
unit which investigates online crimes,88 the Federal Trade Commission
80. Religious Tech. Cr., 857 F. Supp. at 688.
81. 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994).
82. Id. at 536.
83. Id. at 539-40. See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994).
84. LaMacehia, 871 F. Supp. at 536, 540 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994)).
85. Id. at 540.
86. Id. at 544-45 n.18.
87. Id. at 544.
88. Julio Ojeda-Zapata, Computerized Sleuthing Becomes Virtual Reality, STAR-LEDGER
(Newark, N.J.), Dec. 17, 1995, at 52.
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("FTC") monitors online advertising and commercial services,89 the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") does not monitor advertising
but does watch financial chatter in cyberspace. 90 What they are finding are
the same old scams.
The FTC shut down an Internet-based pyramid scam that allegedly took
in six million based on a purported 2000 percent return on investment.
91
Fortuna Alliance of Bellingham, Washington, ran the operations for seven
months before the FTC obtained an injunction shutting down the scheme.
Some three-and-a-half million went into an Antiguan account, which the
injunction ordered Fortuna to return to the United States. 92
The SEC brought charges of fraud and sale of unregistered securities
against Telephone Information Systems, touted on CompuServe as a
telephone lottery, which the SEC considered to be a pyramid scheme.93 The
SEC was also investigating Biosonics, who claimed to have medical devices
that could cure everything from dry mouth to a dull sex life and was touted
on an investment news group.
The Minnesota Attorney General's Office, first by accident and later by
design, has become a leader in bringing lawsuits based on illegal business
activities on the Net and in organizing states attorney generals to do the
same.95 In one case, a Las Vegas company had been charged with illegal
bookmaking, by allowing bettors to place wagers on sporting events using
the Net.96 The company sought to avoid United States laws by setting up its
WagerNet bookmaking service in Belize.97 In another, a company was
charged with false advertising relating to health claims related to the sale of
germanium for acquired immune deficiency syndrome ("AIDS"), cancer, and
other diseases.98 In yet another case, they are trying to find a defendant who
offered bogus "credit repair" services over America Online and collected the
payments at a private post office box in Georgia.
99
The New Jersey Attorney General's Office was one of the first to create
a team of "cyber cops" who regularly log onto the Net and the various
89. Drag-Net 1995, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Aug. 13, 1995, at 1, 14.
90. Susan Antilla, Has Cyberspace Got a Deal for You, N.Y. TIMuES, Mar. 19, 1995, at
5.
91. Alleged Pyramid Scheme on Internet Shut by FTC, WALL ST. J., May 30, 1996, at
B10.
92. Id.
93. See Antilla, supra note 90, at 5.
94. Id.
95. See Ojeda-Zapata, supra note 88, at 52.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See Drag-Net 1995, supra note 89.
99. See Ojeda-Zapata, supra note 88.
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commercial online services to crack down on electronic pyramid schemes,
e-mail chain letters, false advertising, and illegal business offerings. 100 The
New Jersey Bureau of Securities went after questionable investment
opportunities on newsgroup bulletin boards and forums on PRODIGY,
CompuServe, and American OnLine, which led to cease and desist orders
against twenty individuals on PRODIGY for e-mail chain letters found to be
in violation of New Jersey's security laws.101
Programs to create fraudulent credit card numbers, such as Credit
Master, are circulating on America Online and numerous electronic bulletin
boards on the Net.l0 While less than five percent of the numbers they
generate correspond to valid card numbers, the increasing ability to charge
services by entering credit card numbers through phone or computer lines
without verification permits potential use of such numbers. However, it is
relatively easy for the police to find the users, since the merchandise ordered
by phone or computer must be shipped to an address, which is how Nassau
County New York police arrested four college students who went on a
$100,000 buying spree.10 4
H. Expanding Notions of Jurisdiction on the Net
While an in-depth analysis of jurisdiction is beyond the scope of this
paper, some consideration is necessary. General jurisdiction exists when the
defendant's activities in the state are such as to amount to doing business in
the state; specific jurisdiction exists when the cause of action sued upon
arises in the state. A cause of action can be based on acts in the state or acts
outside the state causing injury within the state, the latter being evaluated by
the "effects test." In any case, the defendant's contacts with the state must
be such that exercise of personal jurisdiction does not offend due
process. °5 These contacts can be evaluated by whether the defendant
purposefully availed to the forum.
0 6
Previous cases have found jurisdiction based on direct mail
solicitation10 7 and telemarketing' l 8  There are only a handful of cases
considering jurisdiction based on Net transactions and the authority is split.
100. See Drag-Net 1995, supra note 89.
101. Id.
102. On Line, and inside Credit Card Security, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1995, at 37, 44.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
106. Hanson v. Denekla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
107. See, e.g., United States Golf Ass'n v. United States Amateur Golf Ass'n, 690 F.
Supp. 317, 320 (D.N.J. 1988).
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In EDIAS Software International, L.L.C. v. BASIS International Ltd.,10 9
the plaintiff was an Arizona company who had contracted with the defendant
New Mexico company for distribution of software products."0 In addition
to the breach of contract claims, the plaintiffs alleged that the Internet
messages gave "rise to claims for libel, defamation, tortious interference
with contract" and unfair competition under the Lanham Act."' After
considering the extent of the defendant's sales in Arizona for the "purposeful
availment" test, the court considered the "effects test" in upholding
jurisdiction: "BASIS directed the e-mail, Web page, and forum message at
Arizona because Arizona is EDIAS' principle place of business. EDIAS
allegedly felt the economic effects of the defamatory statements in
Arizona."112
CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson113 was a declaratory judgment action for
non-infringement of common law trademarks. 1 4  The defendant was a
subscriber who provided shareware; he entered into an agreement with the
plaintiff by computer transmission from his home in Texas to their computer
in Ohio and thereafter transmitted software in a similar manner.115 The court
found that the "purposeful availment" prong of the jurisdiction test was
satisfied by the "stream-of-commerce" approach: "Patterson frequently
contacted Ohio to sell his computer software over CompuServe's Ohio-based
system. Patterson repeatedly sent his 'goods' to CompuServe in Ohio for
their ultimate sale. CompuServe, in effect, acted as Patterson's distributor,
albeit electronically and not physically."'"16
Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen"7 was a trademark
infringement and antidilution action based solely on registration of a domain
name for an Internet site." 8 The court analyzed the case under the "effects
test," found infringement at the plaintiff's principal place of business in
California, and concluded that such was sufficient to satisfy the "purposeful
108. See, e.g., AT&T Co. v. MCI Communications Corp., 736 F. Supp. 1294, 1304
(D.N.J. 1990).
109. 947 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ariz. 1996).
110. Id. at 414-15.
111. Id. at 415.
112. Id. at 420.
113. 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
114. Id. at 1259.
115. Id. at 1260-61.
116. Id. at 1265.
117. 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
118. Id. at 619.
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availment" prong of the jurisdiction test.1 19 The court denied that it was
finding jurisdiction based on doing business via the Net.1
20
In Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger,12 1 the magistrate recommended against
jurisdiction in a trademark infringement action based solely on a web site:
Where, as here, defendant has not contracted to sell or actually sold
any goods or services to New Yorkers, a finding of personal
jurisdiction in New York based on an Internet web site would mean
that there would be nationwide (indeed, worldwide) personal
jurisdiction over anyone and everyone who establishes an Internet
web site. Such nationwide jurisdiction is not consistent with
traditional personal jurisdiction case law nor acceptable to the
Court as a matter of policy."?
Jurisdiction is the most problematic issue regarding regulation of
activities on the Net. As recognized by the court in ACLUv. Reno:1
2
Once a provider posts content on the Internet, it is available to all
other Internet users worldwide.... For example, when the
UCR/California Museum of Photography posts to its Web site
nudes ... to announce that its new exhibit will travel to Baltimore
and New York City, those images are available not only in Los
Angeles, Baltimore, and New York City, but also in Cincinnati,
Mobile, or Beijing-wherever Internet users live. Similarly, the
safer sex instructions that Critical Path posts to its Web site ... are
available not just in Philadelphia, but also in Provo and Prague. A
chat room organized by the ACLU to discuss the United States
Supreme Court's decision in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation would
transmit George Carlin's seven dirty words to anyone who
enters.124
This concern is not theoretical. CompuServe ran afoul of German laws
against minors viewing sexually explicit material. 125 CompuServe reacted
by banning world wide access to such material, including access in the
119. Id. at 621-22.
120. Id. at 622.
121. No. CIV.3620-PKL-AJP, 1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997).
122. Id. at *1. See also Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295
(S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 126 F.3d 25 (2nd Cir. 1997). Notably, New York does not extend its
long-arm statute to the full extent of constitutional limits. Hearst, 1997 WL 97097, at *9.
123. 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996); aff'd, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
124. Id. at 844.
125. Jarel Sandberg, CompuServe Bans Its Internet Access to Sexual Material, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 29, 1995, at B2.
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United States; 126 thereafter, it reactivated the access and made blockingsoftware available to users in Germany. 127
I Conclusion
Because the intention of the Net was decentralization, there is no hub,
no control point, and no on/off switch. As such, it has been described as
"'the closest thing to true anarchy that ever existed.' ' 128 The thinking of the
old guard is "[a]ccess to computers should be unlimited and total," "[a]ll
information should be free," and "[m]istrust authority and promote
decentralization.' 29
The recent rumblings inside the Beltway about the possible creation of
an Internet Commerce Commission to regulate the Net is troubling to
newbies as well as the old guard. People tend to do the jobs they are given
to do. Thus, regulators regulate and legislators legislate.
Activities in cyberspace should receive neither less nor more protection
under the law. So far, the courts have been doing a fine job of applying
existing law to activities on the Net. Likewise, Congress has exercised
admirable self-restraint in not over-legislating in this area. A continued
wait-and-see approach as the law develops in the courts appears to be a wise
one.
126. Id.
127. Shailagh Murray & Richard L. Hudson, Europe Seeks to Regulate the Internet, As
Industry Fears Support for Controls, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 1996, at A7.
128. See e.g., Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 1, at 53.
129. Id.
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Here Come the Cybercops 2: Who Should Police Cyber-
marks?*
Claire Ann Koegler*
The growth of the Internet has led to an explosion in registration of do-
main names. A domain name allows a web site to be accessed by entering
the name (for example, "coke.com"). Without a domain name, a web site is
accessed by means of its address, a series of numbers such as
123.456.789.123, which is sometimes referred to as an "ugly" domain name.
Initially, domain names were issued on a first-come, first-serve basis.
Words corresponding to valuable trademarks were registered as domain
names by so-called trademark "pirates" and held for ransom. Many compa-
nies which were slow to apply for domain names were surprised to find that
the domain name they wanted had already been registered.
In response to the outcry from disappointed applicants, the organization
responsible for registering domain names in the United States established a
procedure by which a late-comer asserting trademark rights in a domain
name may challenge its use by the domain name registrant and, in many
cases, obtain the domain name for its own use. The courts have also rushed
to the aid of trademark owners, utilizing the newly enacted Federal Trade-
mark Dilution Act.1
Some Internet users have protested the assertion of rights to domain
names based on trademarks, feeling that the two are not the same, that big
business is bullying the small entrepreneur, and that governmental involve-
ment will spoil the Internet as they know it. Some attorneys also object to
the expansion of federal trademark law, by Congress and the courts, as con-
trary to the intended policy of the law and overly restrictive of free enter-
prise.
I. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO TRADEMARK LAW
A trademark is a symbol used to represent the source of goods.2 Under
the federal statute "[t]he term 'trademark' includes any word, name, symbol,
or device, or any combination thereof... used by a person.., to identify and
* Paper presented at the Twenty-Seventh Popular Culture Association and Nineteenth
American Culture Association Annual Conference, San Antonio, Tex. (Mar. 26-29, 1997).
** Attorney-at-Law, West Orange, New Jersey.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1995).
2. See BLACK'S LAwDICrioNARY 1493 (16th ed. 1990).
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distinguish his or her goods... from those manufactured or sold by others
and to indicate the source of the goods."
3
Trademarks are intended to protect consumers against confusion as to
the source of goods or services. They also protect the goodwill of the owner
of the mark in the goods or services. In the United States, a trademark can-
not exist in gross; it can only exist in conjunction with the goodwill of the
business.4 "An axiom of trademark law is: no trade, no trademark. The
right to register a mark depends upon actual use in trade."' It must be used
on the goods, that is, "placed in any manner on the goods or their containers
or the displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or
if the nature of the goods makes such placement impracticable, then on
documents associated with the goods or their sale."
6
A complaint for trademark infringement requires that the infringing use
be a trademark type use (e.g., use in connection with goods or services) and
that it gives rise to a likelihood of consumer confusion.7 Since domain
names are not per se used in connection with the sale of goods and services,
it is hard to see how the use, much less the mere registration, can give rise to
a claim of trademark infringement.
Under traditional trademark law, a registrant was entitled to a reason-
able zone of expansion, both in product line and geographical area, in which
a probability of confusion might exist.8 Thus, one could not adopt "Cadillac"
for automobile tires, since a reasonable consumer might assume that the car
company was now making tires. On the other hand, one could adopt "Cadil-
lac" for dog food, since a reasonable consumer would not assume that the car
company was now making dog food. For non-competing goods, relief might
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994). The Lanham Act distinguishes between trademarks used on
goods and service marks used in connection with services. In this paper, "trademarks" is used
generically to include both types of marks. Similarly, "goods" is used generically to include
both goods and services.
4. Society de Devs. et d'Innovations des Marches Agricoles & Alimentaires-Sodima-
Union de Cooperatives Agricoles v. International Yogurt Co., 662 F. Supp. 839, 849 (D. Or.
1987).
5. Id. at 847.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994). This section of the statute also requires that the goods be
sold or transported in interstate or international commerce. Id.
7. Id. § 1114 (1)(a), which provides in pertinent part:
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with
which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to de-
ceive... shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies
hereinafter provided.
8. See 15 U.S.C. § 1225 (1994).
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be available under the law of unfair competition. 9 Under the new law, nei-
ther competition nor confusion is required. 10
II. DOMAiN NAMES
The rapid growth of the Internet" has led to a proliferation of Internet
web sites, which has led to an exponential increase in registration of domain
names.12 A domain name comprises a first, top level domain name ("TLD"),
such as "coke" and a second extension, such as "com." A three-letter exten-
sion refers to a United States site and reflects the origin and nature of the site,
such as commercial, educational, governmental, organizational, or network.
Outside the United States, two-letter extensions are used to represent the
country. Such extensions generally comprise the country's internationally
recognized two-letter abbreviation. Thus, one could have: 1) coke.uk; 2)
coke.fr; 3) coke.de; 4) coke.ch; 5) coke.nl; etc.
Each country has appointed its own internal entity to manage addresses
and register domain names. In the United States, the Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority ("LANA") is the overall authority for Internet addresses.
JANA has delegated authority for the issuance of domain names to the Inter-
net Network Information Center ("InterNIC"), which is funded by the Na-
tional Science Foundation ("NSF"). In April of 1993, NSF contracted with
Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSI"), a private corporation, for the processing of
commercial domain name applications. To help keep track of names else-
where in the world, regional registries exist, namely RipeNCC in Europe and
APNIC for the Asia-Pacific Region.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (1994) which provides in pertinent part:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or de-
vice, or any combination thereof.., which-
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the af-
filiation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as
to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or com-
mercial activities by another person... shall be liable in a civil action by any
person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
10. Id. § 1127; see discussion infra pp. 19-20.
11. Information on the development of the Internet and figures on growth of host com-
puters and users are provided in "The Information Highway Patrol: Here Come the Cyber-
cops," a paper presented at the Twenty-Sixth Popular Culture Association and Eighteenth
American Culture Association Annual Conference, Las Vegas, Nev. (Mar. 24-28, 1996).
12. Registrations have increased from 100 a day in 1994 to over 1000 a day in 1996.
See Greg Miller, Cyber Squatters Give Carl's Jr., Others Net Loss, L.A. Tiass, July 12, 1996,
atAl.
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In the United States, TLDs initially were issued on a first-come, first-
serve basis. To make domain names available, to make web sites more easily
accessible, and to help get businesses up and running on the Internet, expedi-
tion in the issuance of TLDs was paramount. The only fact considered was
whether or not the identical word had previously been registered as a TLD.
Thus, the consideration in issuing TLDs was comparable to the consideration
of corporate names made by a Secretary of State when issuing a certificate of
incorporation.
As a result, companies with foresight got the domain names they
wanted, while late comers found that the domain names they wanted were in
the hands of entrepreneurs with foresight, who acquired the names in the
hope of eventually selling them. 13 These entrepreneurs were disparaged as
"pirates" seeking ransom for the captive names.14 Companies who report-
edly paid the ransom include McDonald's, Kentucky Fried Chicken, and
Taco Bell.1 5 Some of the more interesting disputes include: MTV, which
was registered by a former employee; 16 Kaplan, which was registered by its
competitor, Princeton Review; and MCI, which was registered by its com-
petitor, Sprint.' 8 Perhaps the most notorious pirate is Toeppen, who regis-
tered over 200 domain names.19
13. The initial fee for registration is $100 for two years. The annual maintenance fee
thereafter is $50. A cottage industry (from Internet Consulting Corporation to Hell's Kitchen)
has sprouted up to acquire and maintain domain names for companies who do not know how
to, or want to, do it themselves.
14. This practice is not without precedent. For years, enterprising speculators have reg-
istered famous trademarks in countries which do not require use prior to registration in antici-
pation of eventually licensing or selling their rights. For example, when the American trade-
mark the registrant's business expanded to that foreign country. Registration and maintenance
of trademarks is far more expensive than the costs incurred in registering and maintaining
domain names, but the eventual payoff could be a windfall for the speculator. Many Ameri-
can companies had to pay the price when they expanded abroad and denounced these foreign
trademark pirates. Had the roles been reversed, the practice might well have been chalked up
to "Yankee ingenuity" rather than piracy.
15. See Miller, supra note 12. E.T. Fingerhut's remarks and accompanying paper,
"Hammering out the Nuts and Bolts of Trademarks and the Internet" was presented at the
Current Intellectual Property Issues Symposium, New York City, N.Y. (Dec. 2, 1996).
16. MTV Networks, Div. of Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. Curry, 867 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y.
1994); see Fingerhut, supra note 15.
17. Id.
18. See Fingerhut, supra note 15.
19. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1996), [herein-
after Toeppen 1], later opinion, 945 F. Supp. 1296, (C.D. Cal. 1996); Intermatic, Inc. v. Toep-
pen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996) [hereinafter Toeppen I1].
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In response to the outcry from disappointed applicants, NSI changed its
application and instituted dispute resolution procedures in 1995.20 Now, ap-
plicants must represent inter alia that registration of the domain name does
not infringe or interfere with the rights of any third party.2 1 The current dis-
pute resolution policy requires that the trademark owner send a notice to the
domain name registrant and a copy of the notice to NSI of the dispute, to-
gether with a certified copy of a federal registration on the Principal Register
(or of a foreign registration) of a mark identical to the TLD.22 So now NSI
examines priority in addition to the identical nature of domain names.23 Pri-
ority is given to the holder of the trademark registration if the date of first use
on the trademark registration precedes the date of registration of the TLD.24
This procedure relies solely on the federal registration and ignores state reg-
istrations and common law rights.
25
More recently, Congress has enacted the Federal Trademark Dilution
Ace 6 as an amendment to the Lanham Act (Federal Trademark Statute)..2 7 In
the short time since it became law on January 16, 1996, courts have been lib-
erally interpreting this new law in its application to domain names to quash
the so-called piracy.
I. WHAT IS AND Is NOT A TRADEMARK
Corporate names are given out on a first-come, first-serve basis, without
reference to trademark rights. Secretaries of State generally consider only28
the identical nature when registering a cororate name. Mere registration
of a corporate name is not a trademark use.
Stock ticker symbols" are assigned by the exchanges upon request and
subject to availability. Some ticker symbols are, in fact, trademarks of the
companies they represent, such as GE, GM, IBM, and TWA. Others may
well be trademarks, but not of the companies they represent: RCA is not the
20. These documents are available from NSI Headquarters, 505 Huntmar, Herndon, Va,
22070.
21. See id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See supra note 20.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1995).
27. Id. § 1127.
28. 1 J. THOMAS McCARTHY, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 9.0113] at 9-25 (1996).
29. Id.
30. These are symbols that represent stocks on the market. A "ticker" is a "telegraghic
receiving instrument that automatically prints stock prices." WEasTER's ENCYLoPEDIC
UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1981 (1996).
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company acquired by GE, but rather the Retirement Care Associates; GAP is
not the clothing store, but rather the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company;
and CNBC is not the cable station that runs a ticker, but rather Center Ban-
corp. Nor are ticker symbols international. Athough NA on the New York
Stock Exchange is Nabisco Holdings, NA on the Toronto Stock Exchange is
the National Bank of Canada.31
In what may be the only case of its kind, Donna Karan (ticker symbol
DK) sued Donnkenny (ticker symbol DNKY) for infringement and unfair
competition based on Donna Karan's trademark DKNY.32 The case was set-
tled with Donnkenny keeping its DNKY ticker symbol but agreeing not to
promote in its advertising, promotion, or marketing.33
Local telephone numbers are given out on an availability basis, although
requesting a specific number may result in a fee. The same is true of "800"
numbers. 4 There are a handful of cases involving the protectability of "ci-
phers," which are telephone numbers that correspond to words.
For instance, consider the case of Dial-a-Mattress Franchise Corp. v.
Page 3 5 involving a mattress company in the metropolitan New York City
area.16 The company had acquired all of the local "MATTRES" (628-8737)
numbers in the tri-state metropolitan area, named itself "Dial-A-Mattress,"
and advertised for customers to "dial a mattress and leave off the last s for
savings. 37 They sought to acquire the corresponding "800" number but
were informed it was not available.38 Page sold sofa beds under the name
"Easy Bed" and had acquired "1-800-327-9233" ("EASY BED"). 39 When he
expanded into the mattress business, he sought to acuire the "1-800-
MATTRES" number and was told that it was unavailable. However, Page
by a series of purchases and exchanges, eventually acquired the desired
number.4' Initially, Page was allowed to keep the number, subject to certain
31. Stock ticker symbols are published in Barron's, Wall Street Journal, Value Line
Reports, and Standard and Poor's Reports.
32. Donna Karan Settles Case with DonnKenny over Trademark Law Use, WALL ST. J.,
May 28, 1997, at B5.
33. Id.
34. It seems odd, to say the least, that the companies did not learn from their experience
with foreign trademarks, see 15 U.S.C. § 1114, and did not plan ahead when "800" numbers
started to become popular. The introduction of "888" numbers is bound to raise a host of new
conflicts.
35. 880 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1989).
36. Id. at 675.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 676.
39. Id. at 677.
40. Dial-a-Mattress, 880 F.2d at 677.
41. Id.
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provisos reprised in the appellate decision.42 "The Magistrate recommended
that Page be permitted to use the number 'I-800-MATTRES(S),' but that he
be required to answer each telephone call received with the following greet-
ing: 'Easy Bed. We are not connected with Dial-A-Mattress which adver-
tises on radio and television.
'
"A3
The District Judge ordered Page to notify the telephone company
not to connect to Page's telephone any call placed "to the number
1-800-MATTRES(S) that originated from area codes 201, 212,
516, 203, and 718, and to pay any charges required for that pur-
pose." 44 The appellate court left unchanged the terms of the pre-
liminary injunction, despite making broad pronouncements about
the protectability of telephone numbers as trademarks.45
If you can dial a mattress, why not dial a lawyer? In Murrin v. Midco
Communications, Inc.,46 a Minnesota lawyer named Murrin had the local
phone number for "LAWYERS" (612-529-9377). 47 A New York lawyer
named Davis had his areas local phone number for "LAWYERS" (212-529-
9377), and like the Dial-A-Mattress Company, had acquired the local number
in five different area codes for the New York City metropolitan area.48 Davis
was the first to track down the "800" service provider who had been assigned
the number and to reserve the "800" number. In the meantime, Murrin reg-
istered "Dial LAWYERS" as a service mark.4 9 The preliminary injunction
permitted use of the number by Davis with the proviso that, outside metro-
politan New York City he could not use the word "DIAL" or dots or hyphens
between the letters of "LAWYERS." 50
Now, take the case of a personal injury law firm in southeastern Penn-
sylvania with the local telephone number "INJURY-1." 51 Add to this a per-
sonal injury lawyer in southeastern Pennsylvania with the local telephone
number "INJURY-9." Each party had filed an application to register its
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. The district judge's order prevents would-be customers of Dial-A-Mattress from
accidentally reaching Easy Bed. However, such a would-be customer instead of hearing Easy
Bed's disclaimer and knowing he reached the wrong number, would simply not be connected
at all and likely give up on calling Dial-A-Mattress.
45. Dial-a-Mattress, 880 F.2d at 678. There is no final opinion in the case, however, the
Dial-A-Mattress Company is now using the "I-800-MATTRES" number, which is displayed
on their trucks.
46. 726 F. Supp. 1195 (D. Minn. 1989).
47. Id. at 1196-97.
48. Id. at 1197.
49. Id. at 1196.
50. Id. at 1201.
51. Dranoff-Perlstein Assocs. v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852 (3d Cir. 1992).
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mnemonic phone number as a service mark.52 The district court granted
summary judgment for the INJURY-1 lawyers.5 3 The appellate court re-
versed and remanded on the issue of secondary meaning and likelihood of
confusion of the mark as a whole.54 However, the appellate court found that
the "INJURY" part of the mark was generic and specifically disagreed with
both the DIAL-A-MATTRESS and DIAL-LAWYERS cases on the grounds
that MATTRESS and LAWYERS were generic and not protectible as a
matter of law.
55
One of the first "800" cases involved a businessman who acquired and
promoted their use of "800" "ciphers," including "I-800-AMERICA" (1-
800-263-7422). 6 Some time after making a promotion to American Airlines,
who was not interested, he had his "800" line installed at a travel agency and
listed as "I-800-AMERICAN" (not "1-800-AMERICA") under "Airline
Companies" (not "Travel Agents") in a wide range of telephone directories.5 7
He then gave interviews to the press representing that he expected to get a lot
of booking calls for American. The court found that "[tihere can be no
doubt it was [defendant's] intention to contrive and promote 1-800's name in
a manner designed to confuse the public and to trade on American's goodwill
and substantial business and advertising," 59 and enjoined his use, inter alia,
of the telephone number.
60
A variation on ciphers are complementary numbers, which are predicta-
bly misdialed numbers.6 '
Because of this phenomena, some long distance carriers encourage
their clients to subscribe to both the vanity and complementary
numbers. Many companies, including hotel chains like Marriott
and Red Roof Inns, have done so. Others, like Holiday Inns, have
not. In the event that these complementary numbers are not as-
signed or are not in active use, callers who reach them will receive
a busy signal or a recorded message indicating the number is out of
52. Id. at 854.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 862-63.
55. Id. at 856-57.
56. American Airlines, Inc. v. A 1-800-A-M-E-R-I-C-A-N Corp., 622 F. Supp. 673
(N.D. Ill. 1985).
57. Id. at 674-75.
58. Id. at 676.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 686.
61. For example, substituting the number one for the letter I (four on the dial) and, more
commonly, substituting the number zero for the letter 0 (six on the dial). Holiday Inns, Inc. v.
800 Reservation, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 1247, 1250 (E.D. Tenn. 1993), aff'd in part and rev 'd in
part, 86 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 1996), and cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 770 (1997).
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service. Obviously, if the complementary number is assigned to
another user and is active, then callers will reach that entity.62
Enter the defendant service bureau who, among other things, provided
an answered "800" service for numerous customers. As a result of its own
experience and investigation, it discovered the "complementary" number
problem and recommended the use of complementary numbers to its custom-
ers.64 It then recognized that there could be a market for other users of "800"
numbers who might be interested in paying a service bureau to answer their
complementary numbers for them.65 At that time, Holiday Inn used "1-800-
HOLIDAY" (1-800-405-4329) for registrations. The complementary num-
ber for "HOLIDAY' is thus 405-4329, which was purchased by the service
bureau.66 Later, the service bureau created "800" Reservations to handle res-
ervations for a number of hotel chains.6 7 Holiday Inns paid 800 Reservations
a commission for reservations made through it, so both parties profited from
the use of the complementary number.68
The message received by customers when they reached "800" Reserva-
tions started with the following disclaimer:
Hello. You have misdialed and have not reached Holiday Inns or
any of its afliates. You have called 800 Reservations, America's
fastest growing independent computerized hotel reservations serv-
ice. One of our highly trained hotel reservations specialists will be
with you momentarily to provide the Holiday Inns number or to
assist you in finding the lowest rate at over 19,000 properties
worldwide, including such hotel chains as Holiday Inns, Guest
Quarters, Hampton Inn, Sheraton, Comfort Inn, and many more. 69
Moreover, at no time did the defendant ever advertise the complementary
number or mnemonic "HOLIDAY." 70  "The court agrees with defendants
that, in a traditional sense, they have made no use of a Holiday Inns' regis-
tered mark or of any similar name or logo." 71 These two factors notwith-
standing, the district court found the conduct so "nefarious," "insidious," and
62. Id. at 1250.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1251.
65. Id.
66. Holiday Inns, Inc., 838 F. Supp. at 1251.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1252.
69. Id. at 1253 (emphasis added); see also Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc.,
86 F.3d 619, 621 (6th Cir. 1996).
70. Holiday Inns, Inc., 838 F. Supp. at 1254.
71. Id. (emphasis added); see also Holiday Inns, Inc., 86 F.3d at 621.
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"parasitic" as to warrant relief.72 Fortunately, the appellate court recognized
the gravamen of a complaint under the Lanham Act:
Nevertheless, the defendants' use of a protected mark or their use
of a misleading representation is a prerequisite to the finding of a
Lanham Act violation.... Holiday Inns does not offer, and our
own research has not produced, a case in which the defendant nei-
ther used the offending mark nor created the confusion and yet
was deemed to have committed a trademark infringement. We be-
lieve that stretching the plain language of the Lanham Act to cover
the present dispute is unjustified. As a matter of law, therefore, we
hold that [defendants] did not violate §§ 32 and 43 of the Lanham
Act by the use of the 405 number.7
3
What one learns from this handful of cases is that courts are capable of
analyzing new issues, such as mnemonic telephone numbers, under the ex-
isting law of trademarks and unfair competition, although they may not agree
on what is or is not generic. And, despite the broad language in some of the
opinions about the protectability of telephone numbers, the only holding
which forced the defendant to give up his number was the American Airlines
case, where the defendant's advertisements in the yellow pages amounted to
infringement and unfair competition under existing law.74 Had the defendant
in American Airlines not actively advertised the number in a misleading and
infringing fashion, he could have presumably warehoused it indefinitely in
the hope of selling it to the highest bidder.
The treatment of domain names should not be sui generis. A name of a
company is not a trademark unless and until it is used to identify goods. A
stock ticker symbol is not a trademark unless and until it is used to identify
goods. A telephone number is not a trademark unless and until it is used to
identify goods. Therefore, a domain name should not be a trademark unless
and until it is used to identify goods. Mere acquisition of a domain name,
even if for speculative purposes, should not be condemned.
IV. THE EARLY DOMAIN NAME CASES
The parallel between "800" numbers and domain names was first noted
by the district court in the MTV case:
72. Holiday Inns, Inc., 838 F. Supp. at 1255.
73. Holiday Inns, Inc., 86 F.3d at 626. The Lanham Act § 32 (15 U.S.C. § 1114) covers
trademark infringement; section 43 of the Act (15 U.S.C. § 1125) covers unfair competition.
74. American Airlines, Inc. v. A 1-800-A-M-E-R-I-C-A-N Corp., 622 F. Supp. 673, 686
(N.D. Ill. 1985).
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Internet domain names are similar to telephone number mnemon-
ics, but they are of greater importance, since there is no satisfac-
tory Internet equivalent to a telephone company white pages or di-
rectory assistance, and domain names can often be guessed. A
domain name mirroring a corporate name may be a valuable corpo-
rate asset, as it facilitates communication with a customer base.
75
This note was cited to the district court in Agema Infrared Systems AB v. In-
frared Service Corp.,76 where the court went on to say:
I have previously in this case issued an injunction precluding the
defendants from using an 800 number with the name Agema in it,
holding that in that instance the trademark protection of the name
Agema would prevail. I have the same type of situation here.
In essence, as [another court] said.., the INTERNET system is
akin to a telephone. I think it is more dramatic than a telephone. It
is the way that people are going to start communicating with one
another. It seems to me if trademark protection does not go to that
kind of a listing, then I don't know what it would go to.
7 7
V. THE FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT
The Federal Trademark Dilution Act, which was signed into law on
January 16, 1996, to amend the Lanham Act, provides in part:
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the prin-
ciples of equity and upon such terms as the court deems reason-
able, to an injunction against another person's commercial use in
commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the
mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive
quality of the mark, and to obtain such other relief as is provided in
this subsection.78
75. MTV Networks, Div. of Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. Curry, 867 F. Supp. 202, 203-04 n.2
(S.D.N.Y. 1994). No substantive ruling was based on this factor, the case was before the court
on a motion to dismiss counterclaims. Id. The case was reportedly settled without a decision
on the merits.
76. On file with Nova Law Review.
77. Transcript of Proceedings, August 21, 1995, at 28-29. By an order dated nunc pro
tunc August 21, 1995, the defendant was ordered to contact InterNIC to arrange termination of
the AGEMA.COM name within seven days. A previous order dated January 27, 1995, had
required termination of the "800" number.
78. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1) (West 1998).
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The act makes clear that neither competition nor confusion is required: "The
term 'dilution' means the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to iden-
tify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence
of-(1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties,
or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.,, 79 Nothing in the act
eliminates the requirement of use in commerce.
VI. THE LATER DOMAIN NAME CASES
The first reported domain name case under the new federal statute ap-
pears to be Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entertainment Group, Ltd.80 The defen-
dant set up an internet site at candyland.com with sexually explicit material. 81
The district court entered a preliminary injunction against the use of the do-
main name citing federal and state antidilution statutes. 82 There was no dis-
cussion of whether a domain name identifying a web site was a trademark
use within the contemplation of the federal statute, leaving one to wonder
whether the court's interest was to prevent children from accidentally ac-
cessing sexually explicit material, which is not the purpose of the Act.
Once the floodgates were opened by the Hasbro case, latecomers seek-
ing to avoid ransoming domain names flooded the courts, and the courts ac-
commodated them under the new Act without regard to whether domain
names were being used as marks or whether the marks were "famous," as
required by the act. The act does not define "famous," but its common
meaning is "[w]ell or widely known. 83
Is "ActMedia" "widely known?" The district court in ActMedia, Inc. v.
Active Media International, Inc.84 apparently thought so. The case presents
the usual story. The plaintiff had a registered trademark and the defendant
owned the domain name.85 With little discussion, the court found the domain
name registration to be a violation of the Lanham Act and state common law,
and entered a final injunction against its use.8 6
Is "Intermatic" Famous? The court thought so in Toeppen II: "As a
matter of law the Court finds that the Intermatic mark is famous within the
meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)."87 As earlier noted, Toeppen was a master
79. Id. § 1127 (quoting Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1303-04
(C.D. Cal. 1996)).
80. No. C96-13OWD, 1996 WL 84853 at *1 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
81. Id. at *1.
82. Id.
83. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 414 (1977).
84. No. 96C3448, 1996 WL 466527 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
85. Id. at *1-2.
86. Id. at *2.
87. Toeppen 11, 947 F. Supp. at 1239.
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of registering famous domain names, some of which were set forth in Toep-
pen I and others in Toeppen L88 Among the airlines, he registered: 1) air-
canada.com; 2) deltaairlines.com; 3) flydelta.com; 4) northwestairlines.com;
5) luffhansa.com; 89 and 6) britishairways.com. 90 In the sports arena, he reg-
istered: 1) australiaopen.com; 2) frenchopen.com; 3) anaheimstadium.com;
4) camdenyards.com; and 5) yankeestadium.com. 91 In the retail sector, he
registered: 1) crateandbarrel.com, 2) eddiebauer.com, and 3) neiman-
marcus.com.92 Perhaps the court thought that since Toeppen had registered
the domain name, the trademark must be famous.
The next hurdle the court faced was use of the mark. Toeppen had tem-
porarily posted a Web page with some software on which he was working
and then replaced it with a map of Champaign-Urbana, Illinois.93 The court
recognized that Toeppen had never used "Intermatic" in a trademark sense:
"At no time did Toeppen use intermatic.com in connection with the sale
of any available goods or services. At no time has Toeppen advertised the
intermatic.com domain name in association with any goods or services.
' 94
Thus, the court was forced to find "use in commerce" based on Toeppen's
alleged "commercial use" of the domain name:
Toeppen's intention to arbitrage the "intermatic.com" domain
name constitutes a commercial use. At oral argument Toeppen's
counsel candidly conceded that one of Toeppen's intended uses for
registering the Intermatic mark was to eventually sell it back to
Intermatic or to some other party. Toeppen's desire to resell the
domain name is sufficient to meet the "commercial use" require-
ment of the Lanham Act.95
A similar result was obtained in Toeppen I, in which the court found
that plaintiff's "Panavision" and "Panaflex" were "famous." 96 The court also
found that Toeppen had used the mark in commerce because "Toeppen's
'business' is to register trademarks as domain names and then to sell the do-
main names to the trademarks' owners." 97 Here, the court focused on the "in
commerce" part of the requirement and ignored the "use" part of the re-
quirement.98
88. Toeppen I, 938 F. Supp. at 616.
89. Id. at 619.
90. Toeppen 11, 947 F. Supp. at 1230.
91. Toeppen I, 938 F. Supp. at 619.
92. Toeppen 1, 947 F. Supp. at 1230.
93. Id. at 1232.
94. Id. at 1233.
95. Id. at 1239.
96. Toeppen I, 945 F. Supp. at 1302-03.
97. Id. at 1303.
98. Id. at 1303 n.5.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Did we really need a Federal Trademark Dilution Statute? Protecting
marks that have become icons--or taken on a life of their own-is desirable.
A T-shirt with the signature Coca-Cola script or Budweiser label has a com-
mercial value just as a T-shirt with a picture of Mickey Mouse, the Three
Stooges, or The Rolling Stones. But consider this query: whether another
form of protection--copyright, right of publicity, protection against unfair
competition, or unjust enrichment-might not prove more suitable than
trademark law when the mark is not being used as a trademark.
Under the revised Lanham Act, a presidential candidate could not say
"Where's the Beef?" without fear of being hailed into court. The consumer
is no longer the focus of the protection afforded by the Act rather, it is the
owner of the "famous" mark-typically, big business.
Furthermore, if the intent of the revision to the Act was to protect fa-
mous marks, why has every mark considered been found to be famous?
ActMedia or Intermatic are simply not in the same class as Coca-Cola or
Budweiser. And why the total disregard as to whether the mark is being used
on or in connection with goods or services? Under the courts' interpretation
of the new Act, mere registration of corporate names, stock ticker symbols,
and telephone numbers would be subject to assertions of trademark dilution
and court-enforced forfeiture of the name, symbol, or number, without com-
pensation to the registrant.
To borrow a line from Judge Learned Hand: "[T]here is no part of the
law which is more plastic than unfair competition, and what was not reck-
oned an actionable wrong 25 years ago may have become such today."99 Can
one hope that what is reckoned an actionable wrong today may not be so in
the future?
99. Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1925), rev'd on
other grounds, 273 U.S. 132 (1927).
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Here Come the Cybercops 3: Betting on the Net*
Claire Ann Koegler'
As the Internet plays an increasing role in American culture, more and
more people are betting on the Net-everything from sports betting to casino
gambling, from playing the stock market, the world's largest crap game, to
falling for various get-rich-quick schemes. In this era of irrational
exuberance, who can resist? Who is betting on the Net? Who stands to
profit from it? Who wants to regulate it?
A wealth of federal and state law exists to regulate securities
transactions, but recently Congress has acted to limit the rights of states to
regulate securities transactions. Regulation of gambling has been the
exclusive province of the states, but some members of Congress would also
like that to change. In 1996, Congress commissioned a two-year multi-
million dollar study of the national impact of gambling, "whether conducted
in a casino, on a riverboat, on the Internet, on an Indian reservation, or
anywhere else in the United States."' The Commission's report is expected
to be released later this year. Without waiting for the Commission's
findings, members of Congress have already introduced legislation to
prohibit gambling on the Internet.
A. Cybercommerce and Cybercops
The exponential growth of the Internet has prompted governments
around the world to look at ways they might regulate and derive revenue
from cybercommerce. Worldwide, there are approximately ten million host
computers with forty million users.2 It is projected there will be 200 million
users by 1999.' Seventy percent of companies in the United States have web
sites to promote their products and ten percent sell their products online.
4
That number is expected to increase to forty percent within the next two
* Paper presented at the Twenty-Eighth Popular Culture Association and Twentieth
American Culture Association Annual Conference, Orlando, Fla. (Apr. 8-11, 1998).
** Attorney-at-Law, West Orange, New Jersey.
1. Statement by President Clinton upon Signing H.R. 497, Aug. 3, 1996, reprinted in
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1192, 1207-1.
2. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824,831 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
3. id.
4. CNBC television broadcast, Mar. 10, 1998 (similarly, Bloomberg News Radio, Mar.
10, 1998).
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5years. It has been estimated that new web sites are appearing at the rate of
665,000 per hour.
The United States is home to the greatest number of host computers;
about half of the total host computers are in the United States, followed by
Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, with Japan, Finland,
the Netherlands, Sweden, and France finishing in the top ten.7 It is estimated
that the annual worldwide revenue on the Internet will reach nearly eighty
billion dollars by the year 2000.8 It is no surprise that legislatures around the
world are considering regulating the Internet.9
In the United States, numerous federal and state agencies are
monitoring the Net to crack down on online fraud in connection with so-
called business opportunities and investments.'0  The Federal Trade
Commission's cyberspace sheriff receives between 100 and 200 complaints
a month." The Security Exchange Commission's ("SEC") cyberforce,
composed of sixty attorneys and accountants, receives between thirty andfo " •12
forty complaints per day from private cybersleuths. So far, the cyberforce
has prosecuted about a dozen complaints, including one against a teenager in
Ohio who had a web page with the "SEC's Top Ten Stockpicks."'3
Postings on legitimate bulletin boards on the Internet are no different
than those found in newspapers, heard on the radio, or promoted on
television; these include "make money at home," "own your own business,"
and "buy real estate for nothing down." Bulletin boards have also become a
new source for "pump and dump" operators-the old boiler room approach
of creating demand for a penny stock and then dumping when the created
demand pumps up the price.
Even though these slogans are typical fraud, consumers seem more
likely to fall for it on the Net. Perhaps it is a generation growing up in front
5. Id.
6. President Clinton, press conference, Mar. 12, 1998.
7. Shailagh Murray & Richard L. Hudson, Europe Seeks to Regulate Global Internet: As
European Union Joins Fray, Industry Fears Support for Controls, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 1996, at
A7.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Information on the various federal and state agencies and private entities patrolling the
Net is provided in 'The Information Highway Patrol: Here Come the Cybercops," paper
presented at the Twenty-Sixth Popular Culture Association and Eighteenth American Culture
Association Annual Conference, Las Vegas, Nev. (Mar. 24-28, 1996).
11. CNBC television broadcast, Feb. 10, 1998.
12. Sarah Hewitt, "Securities Law and the Internet," New York, N.Y. (Mar. 26, 1997).
13. Id.
14. E.g., Ted Sherman, Snake Oil '95: Swindlers, Hucksters Take to the Internet, STAR-
LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Jan. 8, 1995, at 1.
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of a television screen who believe all, not half, of what they see, even if they
believe none of what they hear. Perhaps it is a generation growing up with
calculators who believe what they see, even if the decimal point is in the
wrong place. Perhaps it is because one must take some positive action to
reach these web sites, and hence one's guard is not raised as it might be
when approached by a stranger in person or by telephone. But, we are more
gullible on line. For example, in the case of online pen pals, based on their
"friendship," one sent the other a check for ten thousand dollars to invest in
a nonexistent mutual fund.1
5
B. Security Online: Encryption
Security of transactions on the Net without public release of private
information generally involves some sort of encryption technique by which
the communications are scrambled and descrambled. For example, the
various Internet casinos and lotteries utilize secure transmissions; the host
computer and user computer use an encryption scheme to scramble the
communications." International transactions, and to a lesser extent,
interstate transactions on the Net have been handicapped by the United
States' restrictions on encryption software. 17 The Arms Export Control Act
("AECA") authorizes the President to control the import and export of
defense items by designating them to the United States Munitions List
('USML").' Encryption software has long been on the USML list. 9 Thus,
such software has to be submitted to the State Department in order to obtain
a license for export.
20
A mathematics Ph.D. candidate, who submitted a computer source code
and an explanatory academic paper and who was denied a license under the
AECA, brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the statute and the
associated regulations in Bernstein v. United States Department of State
("Bernstein 1").2' After the suit in Bernstein I was filed, the State
Department reevaluated its classification of the academic paper; as
recognized by the court: "The paper, an academic writing explaining
plaintiffs scientific work in the field of cryptography, is speech of the most
15. Susan Antilla, Has Cyberspace Got a Dealfor You, N.Y. TrMEs, Mar. 19, 1995, at 5.
16. Todd Copilevitz, Betting on the Net Old Vice, New Form: Casinos Beckon via Home
Computers, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Oct. 22, 1995, at IA.
17 See 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1994); 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (1997).
18. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (1994). This designation is not subject to judicial review. Id.
§ 2778(h).
19. 22 C.F.R § 121.1 (1997).
20. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(b)(1)(A) (1994).
21. 922 F. Supp. 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996) [hereinafter Bernstein 1].
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protected kind., 22 The court relied on copyright law in determining that
"source code is speech" for purposes of the First Amendment.
In Bernstein v. United States Department of State ("Bernstein IT'), the
court determined that the licensing scheme constituted a prior restraint on
speech and that the regulations provided no limits on discretion in
licensing. 24 The regulation failed to neither provide a certain time limit for
making a decision nor for judicial review; the burden was placed on the
licensor to support the denial.2 Thus, the court concluded that the licensing
system constituted "an unconstitutional prior restraint in violation of the
First Amendment." 26
Just before the decision was entered in Bernstein I, the President
signed an executive order transferring from the State Department to the
Commerce Department the authority to license the import and export of
nonmilitary encryption software as an exercise of his temporary national
emergency power. The order provided that "'the export of encryption
software, like the export of other encryption products described in this
section, must be controlled because of such software's functional capacity,
rather than because of any possible informational value of such
software."'2' Despite the President's express language, in Bernstein III, the
court adhered to its opinion that the encryption source code was speech and
determined, notwithstanding some differences in the new regulations before
the court, that the regulations still constituted an unconstitutional prior
restraint for substantially the same reasons as stated in Bernstein I.
29
During pendency of the Bernstein cases in 1996, forty-bit encryption
software was used by access providers on the Net, despite customers'
complaints that the forty-bit code had been cracked by hackers.0 United
States citizens could order 128-bit encryption code by mail, but could only
download forty-bit code from the Net because export of encryption code was
limited to forty-bit code.31  In mid-1996, the government approveddistribution of 128-bit encryption code over the Net to United States citizens
22. Id. at 1434.
23. Id. at 1436. Thus, the plaintiff stated a claim sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
Id.
24. 945 F. Supp. 1279, 1286-87, 1289 (N.D. Cal. 1996) [hereinafter Bernstein 11].
25. Id. at 1289.
26. Id. at 1290.
27. Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288, 1293 (N.D. Cal. 1997)
[hereinafter Bernstein III].
28. Id. at 1293-94 (quoting Exec. Order No. 13026, 61 Fed. Reg. 58768 (1996)).
29. Id. at 1308.
30. Joan Indiana Rigdoia, U.S. Lets Netscape Issue Encryption Tool over Internet, but
Only to Americans, WALL ST. J., July 16, 1996, at B2.
31. Id.
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through Netscape; however, each request for distribution was subject to
screening by Netscape because the State Department "fears foreign terrorists
or criminals could use the software to threaten national security." 32 In late
1996, the President signed an executive order to permit the export of the
128-bit code and computers containing such code, subject to providing
United States law enforcement with "keys" to intercept and decode
communications and subject to "licensing" of the seller.33 Time will tell
whether this new order will facilitate secure transactions on the Net.
C. Securities Online: One Way to Bet on the Net
For several years, brokerage companies have been offering online
investing. Television commercials depict the addictive nature of online
investing. More recently, television, radio, and newspaper advertisements
solicit people to train as online or day traders, to be their own boss, and not to
worry about job security. The number of brokerage companies offering online
trading has doubled from thirty-three in 1996 to sixty by the end of 1997, with
some fourteen million accounts predicted to be online by the end of 2002.
More recently, brokerage and research companies have begun offering a
wide variety of financial information online. The SEC now requires
electronic filing of some documents, including registration statements and
prospectuses. 36 Electronic filing of other documents, including annual
reports, is optional.37 Filings relating to exempt securities are still "paper
only.",3" All electronic filings since January of 1994 are contained in the
SEC's Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval System
("EDGAR") database. EDGAR was initially available online through
"Disclosure," a program on Lexis/Nexis, at a hefty cost, and hence was used
primarily by businesses.39 Temporary government funding made EDGAR
freely available over the Net, thus extending its availability to individuals
32. Id.
33. Dean Takahashi, Clinton Loosens Export Policy on Encryption, WALL ST. ., Nov. 18,
1996, at B3.
34. David Barboza, On-Line Trade Fees Falling off the Screen, N.Y. TnMES, Mar. 1, 1998,
at 1; Howard R. Gold, Deeper and Deeper: In 1997, the Internet Extended Its Reach into the
hzvesting World, BARRON'S, Jan. 5, 1998, at 52.
35. Sana Siwolop, Now, the Superhighway Leads to Mutual Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13,
1995, at 1.
36. 17 C.F.R. § 232.101(a) (1997).
37. Id. § 232.101(b).
38. Id. § 232.101(c).
39. G. Burgess Allison, THE LAWYER's GuETO THE INTERNEr (American Bar Associ-
ation, Section of Law Practice Management, 1995), at 93 n.25; Sana Siwolop, A Two-for-One
Stock Infonnation Split, N.Y. TIMEs, Sep. 17, 1995, at 1.
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through joint management by New York University and Internet
Multicasting Service. It proved so popular that the SEC arranged to keep
the program operating, prompting Disclosure to offer free Internet access to
EDGAR as well.41
The SEC also permits electronic delivery of mandated disclosure
documents to shareholders.42  The documents must be posted on the
company's web page, available until the annual meeting, and in accordance
with the following rules: a paper copy must be available on request; they
must have some way of confirming receipt by shareholders; and the
shareholder must have given informed consent.43 A shareholder who wishes
to receive annual reports and proxy statements via e-mail can contact the
appropriate web site and follow the instructions." Shareholders may also be
able to vote their proxies by e-mail.45
The birth of direct stock offering over the Net can be traced to Spring
Street Brewing Company. Spring Street first made the news when it went
public in March of 1995, without an underwriter, by advertising its shares on
the Net.4 Its founder, Andrew Klein, was a securities lawyer. The stock
was registered for sale in fifteen states. Since it was not listed on an
exchange and limited in size, it did not need to meet the stiffest requirement
of the SEC. Nor were there any investment bankers, brokers, or research
analysts reviewing, or touting, the offering. Nor, for that matter, was there
any market for the shares.47
Spring Street made news a year later in March of 1996, when it offered
its stock directly to purchasers over the Internet. After making two sales, it
voluntarily suspended trading pending a review by the SEC.4 The SEC
objected to the fact that Spring Street directly took the money in exchange
for the shares, since Spring Street was not a registered broker/dealer;
40. See Allison, supra note 39, at 93 n. 25.
41. See Siwolop, supra note 35, at 1.
42. See Hewitt, supra note 12.
43. Id.
44. E.g., Gateway 2000 notice, Jan. 27, 1998, directing shareholders to investorde-
livery.com. Caveat actor: electing this option for one company can result in electronic delivery
of information for other companies held in the same brokerage account. Id
45. IBMpress announcement (CNBC television broadcast, March 18, 1998).
46. Reed Abelson, Microbrew Stock Offer: Mostly Foam, N.Y. TwoS, Mar. 19, 1995, at
5.
47. Id.
48. SEC Halts Bid to Trade Brewer's Stock on Internet, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 1996, at
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therefore, Spring Street arranged for the money to go to an escrow agent.
The SEC allowed the Internet sales and a new industry was born.49
Its founder, Andrew Klein, has since gone on to found Wit Securities
which provides Internet stock offerings for other start-up companies.50 To
date, the company has done seven public offerings. According to Mr. Klein,
in the most recent offering, e-mail notification was sent to a million potential
purchasers, nineteen thousand of whom clicked on to the web site to get the
prospectus for the offering. 
5
Other direct stock offerings on the Internet include Destiny Pictures,
which made a public offering online in the spring of 1997, seeking to raise
half the equity in a new picture Intimate Stranger, which was considered an
"erotic thriller." Caveat emptor: The offering was not registered with any
state securities authority. 2 Caveat venditor: States are takin the position
that if it is downloaded in the state, it is an offering in the state.
However, states have considerably less authority to regulate securities
offerings than in the past. Although federal and state securities law had
existed side-by-side since the early 1930s, the Capital Markets Efficiency
Act of 1996 preempted certain state legislation. Federal registration for
nationally traded securities (those traded on the New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE"), American Stock Exchange ("AMEX"), or the National
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations ("NASDAQ") is
now exclusive; these securities are now exempt from state requirements.
Rules on broker/dealers were also limited to the federal rules, and a national
de minimis exception for dealing across state lines was enacted. The only
area not preempted, aside from local securities exempt from national
registration, was the state's right to investigate and prosecute fraud and
deceit in the sale of securities. 6
D. Gambling Online: A New Way to Bet on the Net
Licensed gaming has long been recognized as a matter reserved to the
states within the meaning of the Tenth Amendment.57  Forty-eight states
49. E.g., CNBC television broadcast, Mar. 25, 1996; Monty Wexler, Securities Law and
the Internet, New York, N.Y. (March 26, 1997).
50. Andrew Klein, personal commentary (CNBC television broadcast, Mar. 2, 1998).
51. Id.
52. MoneyWorld, Feb. 1998 at 36.
53. See Sherman, supra note 14, at 1.
54. 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1994).
55. Id. § 78o.
56. Id. § 77r.
57. E.g., Thomas v. Bible, 694 F. Supp. 750,760 (D. Nev. 1988), aff'd, 896 F.2d 555 (9th
Cir. 1990); State v. Rosenthal, 559 P.2d 830, 836 (Nev. 1977). Under the Constitution, "[t]he
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(every state except Hawaii and Utah) allow some form of gambling.'
Thirteen states have casino gambling; only one, Nevada, has sports
gambling Thirty-six states and the District of Columbia have state
lotteries. These figures neither include gambling on Native American lands
nor cruises to nowhere but international waters for the purpose of
gambling. The annual revenue casinos take in alone exceeds the combined
amount of money spent annually on movies, theater, and concerts. 6' It is
estimated that online betting will generate more than ten billion dollars per
year by the year 2000.62
Although regulation of gaming on Native American tribal lands falls to
63Congress under the Indian Commerce Clause of the Constitution, Congress
has ceded some authority to the states. In 1988, Congress enacted the Indian
Gaming Regulation Act ("IGRA")." The purposes of the Act include:
[T]o provide a statutory basis for the regulation of gaming by an
Indian tribe adequate to shield it from organized crime and other
corrupting influences, to ensure that the Indian tribe is the primary
beneficiary of the gaming operation, and to assure that gaming is
conducted fairly and honestly by both the operator and the
players ....
In other words, Congress decided that the Native American tribes are not
capable of running their own business. Congress also determined that "Indian
tribes have the exclusive right to regulate gaming activity on Indian lands if the
gaming activity is not specifically prohibited by federal law and is conducted
within a state which does not, as a matter of criminal law and public policy,
prohibit such gaming activity. ' " In essence, Native American tribes do not
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
58. H.R. REP. No. 104-440 at 4 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1192, 1193; Rep.
Bill McCollum, House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime, CNBC, Feb. 4, 1998.
59. See McCollum, supra note 58.
60. H.R. REP. No. 104-440 at 4, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1192, 1193.
61. James Sterngold, Imagine the Internet as Electronic Casino, N.Y. Tams, Oct. 22,
1995, at 3.
62. See Copilevitz, supra note 16, at IA; Greg Miller, World Wide Wagering, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 18, 1996, at D1.
63. The Constitution provides in pertinent part: "The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes." U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
64. Pub.L. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (Oct. 14, 1998) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721
(1994)).
65. 25 U.S.C. § 2702(2) (1994).
66. Id. § 2701(5).
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have the exclusive right to regulate their own gaming activity. Rather,
Congress limited such exclusivity to bingo and similar games; as to casino
gambling, slot machines, dog racing, lotteries, and the like, the tribes were
required to negotiate a compact with the state in which they were located.67
Under the IGRA, a state was required to negotiate in good faith and a
failure could subject the state to suit, only if the state agreed to be sued."
Even though the granting to the states of some measure of authority over
gaming on Native American lands "extends to the States a power withheld
from them by the Constitution,"" "the Eleventh Amendment prevents
congressional authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting
States."70 Hence, the right of a tribe to sue to compel good faith negotiation
depends on the state's consent to be sued. So, if a state has a lottery and
does not want competition on Native American lands, it can refuse to
negotiate the necessary compact and it can refuse to be sued. Nevertheless,
many states feel they do not have sufficient control over Native American
gaming within their jurisdiction or without.71
In June of 1997, the Coeur d'Alene's Indian tribe in Idaho opened what
is believed to be the first Internet gambling site based in the United States,
which reportedly has been denounced by the Governor of Idaho.7 The tribe
first opened bingo and casino gambling in 1993; the web site provides
scratch tickets, blackjack, and lotto games.73 Already, the Attorney General
of Missouri has brought suit against the Internet carriers seeking blocking of
the games; other attorney generals may rally to the call. 74
Private entities are also gearing up to offer Internet gambling. "'Think
about it. You're at your desk or in your home and all of a sudden you have
an urge to gamble. Just click an icon on your computer and next thing you
know you're at our casino,"' said the Chief Executive Officer of Internet
Casinos.75 Internet Casinos has no physical casino, only computers, based in
St. Marten, with additional operations in a half dozen other countries.76
Although Internet Casinos do not accept memberships from United States
67. Id. § 2710; § 2703(7)(A).
68. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,47 (1996) (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)
(1994)).
69. Id. at 58.
70. Id. at72.
71. H.R. REP. No. 104-440 at5, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1194.
72. Tribe Starts New Business: Gambling Site on Internet, N.Y. Tam, July 5, 1997, at 6.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Copilevitz, supra note 16, at 1A.
76. Id.
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residents, some users in the United States have reportedly been able to get
online. 7
Sports International, Ltd., based in Antigua and limited to sports
betting, has started accepting Internet wagers after years of accepting
telephone wagers. 8 Customers who find the web site can complete an
application, wire the money to Antigua, and start betting within a half-hour.7
VentureTech Inc. in Reston, Virginia planned to be online in 1997, but only
outside the United States, pending resolution of the legal issues.0
World Wide Web Casinos bases its betting in real casinos in Antigua
and in computer-based operations in South Africa.8' Potential customers can
fill out an online registration and set up an account by credit card online or
by mailing a check. 2 Customers can either receive a packet of CD-ROMs
with the necessary software by mail or directly download the necessary
software, and a Visa debit card reflects wins and losses.83
Betting on the Net is not confined to private offerings. New York
State's Off-track Betting ("OTB") is getting into the act. In late 1996, the
state announced that in addition to setting up accounts online, customers
soon would be able to place their bets online." Another example is the
country of Liechtenstein, which runs a lottery over the Internet-six
numbers cost six dollars for a chance to win one million dollars.8
Liechtenstein considers people coming to their web site as coming to
Liechtenstein and thus subject only to Liechtenstein's laws. 6
E. Regulating Betting on the Net
Over opposition that regulation of gaming is reserved to the states under
the Tenth Amendment, Congress has already commissioned a study of
gambling. 7 Proponents of the Commission, the House Judiciary Committee,
argue that "insofar as the bill relates to Indian gambling, it falls within the
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See Miller, supra note 62, at Dl.
81. See Copilevitz, supra note 16, at 1A.
82. Id.
83. See Miller, supra note 62, at Dl.
84. OTB Web Site to Let Bettors Play the Ponies On-Line, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 1996, at
11.
85. See Copilevitz, supra note 16, at 1A.
86. Id.
87. H.R. REP. No. 104-440 at 7-8, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1192, 1196-97
(1996).
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power of Congress to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes."88 Been
there, done that.
Proponents also argue that it falls within the commerce clause: 'For
example, many gamblers cross state lines to travel to gambling operations.
That alone is enough to bring gambling within the interstate commerce
clause."89 A lot of theater-goers cross state lines to travel to Broadway. That
alone is not enough to bring Broadway shows within the interstate commerce
clause.
And then they argue that: "Gambling, and the public corruption that
has come with it in some instances, implicate a variety of federal criminal
statu[t]es .... The Committee is not aware of any instance in which any of
these statutes has been held to exceed the power of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce." 90 This may be true, but the Commission is intended to
study the effects of legal gambling not illegal gambling.9'
Additionally, proponents of the Commission argue that "Congress can
look into any matter [at] least for the limited purpose of determining whether
it is properly within its legislative powers." For this, Congress needs two
years and millions of dollars? They argue that the legislation only empowers
the Commission to conduct a study and that "[flederal regulation of
gambling is not in issue at this time. '93 After two years and millions of
dollars, how likely is it that the Commission will not determine that
regulation is necessary?
In the meantime, the people both inside and outside the Washington
beltway, are not waiting for the Commission's study.94 In fact two
separate bills are currently being considered by Congress. In addition,
bills to regulate Internet gambling are under consideration in at least
eight states.
95
88. Id. at 1196.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1196-97.
91. Interestingly, the legislation was codified as a note to 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1994) in the
Chapter 95 on 'Racketeering," rather than in the Chapter 50 on "Gambling."
92. H.R. REP. No. 104-440 at 7-8, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1197.
93. Id. at 1196.
94. These include the 1997 House Bill No. 2380 (Goodlatte), which was sent to the
Judiciary Committee on Sept. 3, 1997, and 1997 Senate Bill No. 474 (Kyle), which was sent
to the Judiciary Committee on March 19, 1997, and reported out of committee on October 23,
1997, as amended.
95. At last count on March 13, 1998, bills were pending in Arizona, California,
Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, New York, and Pennsylvania.
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F. Conclusion
There is no need for the pending federal legislation. If offshore gaming
exists, money is going to flow overseas. Similarly, collecting taxes on
winnings will be more difficult, if not impossible, as long as the host site is
off-shore. Prohibiting Internet gambling is likely to do more harm than
good.
The Department of Justice already has the authority to prosecute illegal
interstate gambling, including betting on the Net. Title 18 prohibits the use
of
a wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate or
foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the
placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for
the transmission of a wire communication which entitles the
recipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets or wagers.9
The Department of Justice, of course, has no jurisdiction overseas: "If the
casinos are outside the United States, there's not a thing we can do about
it... ," and it is unlikely to prosecute individuals who gamble over the Net."
Those who want the federal government to prohibit Internet gambling
have raised a host of reasons that do not stand up to investigation.
Regarding the concern that individuals need protection from fraud or
pyramid schemes, such protection could be enforced more readily against
sites based in the United States or, at least, controlled by United States
companies. 99 For example, the FTC shut down an Internet-based pyramid
scam run by a company in Washington; the injunction ordered the company
to return to the United States approximately three-and-a-half million dollars
that had been transferred to an account in Antigua.1° In addition, the
Minnesota Attorney General is prosecuting a Nevada company for illegal
96. See McCollum, supra note 58; Copilevitz, supra note 16.
97. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (1994): "[A] wire communication facility" includes "any and all
instrumentalities, personnel, and services... used or useful in the transmission of writings, signs,
pictures, and sounds of all kinds by aid of wire, cable, or other like connection." Id.
98. See Copilevitz, supra note 16, at IA (quoting John Russell, spokesman for the
Department of Justice); see McCollum, supra note 58.
99. Hom, National Coalition against Gambling, (CNBC television broadcast, Feb. 5,
1998).
100. Alleged Pyramid Scheme on Internet Shut by FTC, WALL ST. J., May 30, 1996, at
B10.
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bookmaking, even though the company sought to avoid United States laws
by setting up its WagerNet bookmaking service in Belize. 1
One commonly cited issue is the restriction of access to prevent
children from betting online.'02 One needs to take active steps to create,
fund, and access, a gambling account, just as one needs to take such steps
with regard to an investment account. In the years since companies have
permitted trading online, the media have been devoid of any stories of
children trading in their parents' accounts. There is no reason to believe that
casinos will not be equally protective of their accounts. Moreover, the
necessary steps to prevent access to gambling by minors have already been
vetted in the development of the regulations relating to preventing access to
obscenity by minors.
Another issue commonly raised is compulsive gamblers: "'The person
never has to get up from their chair and[,] in no time at all, can lose a lot of
money."' '  It has been argued that at-home electronic wagering removes too
many necessary controls, such as urging gamblers to take a break.'0 Losses
will, of course, be limited to what customers have in their accounts. Do we
need to tell high rollers how to spend their money? We do not tell investors
how much or how to spend money online. More problematic is the issue
raised by New York's OTB going online; can state lotteries be far behind?
Lottery players are not high rollers. Yet, it is unlikely the federal
government could, or should, interfere with state lotteries.
The states should retain the right to regulate gambling within their own
jurisdiction. Thus, if New York wishes to permit online betting, it can; if
Missouri wishes to prohibit it, it can.
[T]he thrust of the legislation clearly reflects a view that the states
have chosen unwisely by allowing their private citizens to spend
too much of their own funds on gambling. The notion that the
federal government should rebuke the states for allowing private
citizens to gamble with their own money in privately run gambling
101. See Humprey v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. 1997); Julio
Ojeda-Zapata, Computerized Sleuthing Becomes Virtual Reality, STAR-LEDGR (Newark, N.J.),
Dec. 17, 1995, at 52. It is thought to be the first criminal case with jurisdiction based on the
ability of state residents to access the site through the Internet. Id.
102. See Copilevitz, supra note 16 (citing Sue Cox, Director of the Texas Council on
Problem and Compulsive Gambling); McCollum, supra note 58; Horn, supra note 99.
103. See generally Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2339 (1997); see also discussion in 'The
Information Highway Patrol: Here Come the Cybercops," supra note 10.
104. See OTB Web Site to Let Bettors Play the Ponies On-Line, supra note 84 (quoting
Laura Letson, director of the New York Council on Problem Gambling).
105. See Copilevitz, supra note 16, at IA (citing Sue Cox, Director of the Texas Council
on Problem and Compulsive Gambling).
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enterprises seems to me to be the antithesis of a respect both for the
rights of states and for individual choices about how they should
spend their own money.106
Do we need federal regulation of Internet gambling? No.
106. Hon. Barney Frank's Dissenting Views, H.R. REP. No. 104-440 at 18, reprinted in
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1207.
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When Is Same-Gender Sexual Harassment Actionable under
Title VII? Fredette v. B VP Management Associates
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine your supervisor at work, Chris, makes sexual advances towards
you. Chris tells you life at work will be much better for you if you just give
in to Chris's demands for sex. You might even get a promotion, and
certainly, extra perks will come your way. Chris's "requests" occur on a
daily basis and make you feel uncomfortable. You ask Chris to stop, but
Chris persists. You complain to Chris's supervisor and nothing happens;
Chris's lewd comments and sexual suggestions continue. Are you
experiencing sexual harassment that is prohibited by federal law? Maybe. If
Chris is a man, and you are a woman, then, yes, you are experiencing classic
sexual harassment on the job, and Chris's behavior is illegal. Even if Chris is
a woman and you are a man, though less common, Chris's behavior is still
considered to be illegal sexual harassment. But, what if Chris is a man and
you are a man? Or, Chris is a woman and you are a woman? Then, whether
Chris's behavior is illegal sexual harassment depends primarily upon where
you live. It also might depend upon Chris's sexual orientation. This
discrepancy in the courts' interpretation and application of federal law in
same-gender sexual harassment actions is the subject of this article. This
article also explores, in depth, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recent
first impression decision in Fredette v. BVP Management Associates,1
regarding the issue of whether same-gender sexual harassment is actionable
under federal law.
II. SEXUAL HARASSMENT AS A FoRM OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 makes it unlawful for an
employer "to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."3  It is
generally accepted that the congressional intent of Title VII was to hinder
1. 112 F.3d 1503 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied 118 S. Ct. 1184 (1998).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
3. Id
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racial discrimination. One day before the House of Representatives voted
and approved the Civil Rights Act, the word "sex" was added as a floor
amendment.5 It has been suggested that this last-minute addition was an
attempt to prevent passage of the bill as a whole.6 However, the attempt
failed, and the bill passed with the sex discrimination amendment included
without significant discussion of its meaning or intent prior to its passage.7
The United State Supreme Court first recognized traditional male-on-
female sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination actionable under
Title VII in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson 8 in 1986. In Vinson, the
Supreme Court recognized two types of actionable sexual harassment: 1)
quid pro quo harassment; and 2) harassment that results in a hostile or
offensive work environment. 9 In quid pro quo harassment, a supervisor
promises and/or gives specific employment benefits to a subordinate in
exchange for sexual favors.10 In a hostile work environment claim, the
sexual harassment "must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the
conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working
environment."' 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") is the
administrative agency given the authority to enforce Title VII. 2 The EEOC
guidelines define sexual harassment as any unwelcomed behavior of a sexual
nature where: 1) the person's compliance affects some term or condition of
his/her employment; 2) the person exhibiting the unwelcomed sexual
behavior uses the other person's compliance, or refusal to comply, in making
decisions that affect the other's employment; or 3) the unwelcomed behavior
excessively interferes with the person's work or creates an environment that
is "intimidating, hostile, or offensive.' '
4. 110 CONG. REc. 2581 (1964).
5. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984).
6. 110 CONG. REc. 2577-84 (1964).
7. Id.
8. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
9. Id. at 62.
10. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
11. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (1 1th Cir.
1982) (alteration in original)).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1994).
13. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1997).
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Im. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE APPLICABILITY OF TITLE VII WHEN
THE HARASSER AND VICTIM ARE THE SAME SEX
A. United States Supreme Court
To date, the United States Supreme Court has not reviewed the issue of
whether same-gender sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII.
However, on June 9, 1997, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari on a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case, Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc.14 In Oncale, Mr. Oncale alleged quid pro quo and
hostile work environment sexual harassment by his male supervisor and two
male co-workers. Employed on an offshore oil rig, Mr. Oncale claimed that
the three men sexually assaulted him on at least three separate occasions and
that two of the men threatened to rape him.15 Reluctantly relying upon
"binding precedent 16 established by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America,17 the appeals court refused to
recognize Mr. Oncale's claim as viable under Title VII.18
B. Circuit Courts ofAppeals
In 1977, in the case of Barnes v. Costle,19 the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals became the first appellate level court to recognize
the cognizability of same-gender sexual harassment as discrimination under
Title VII.20 Although the case dealt with traditional male-on-female sexual
harassment, the court, in a footnote, commented:
It is no answer to say that a similar condition could be imposed on
a male subordinate by a heterosexual female superior, or upon a
subordinate of either gender by a homosexual superior of the same-
gender. In each instance, the legal problem would be identical to
that confronting us now-the exaction of a condition which, but
for his or her sex, the employee would not have faced.21
14. 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct 2430 (1997), rev'd. 118 S. Ct.
998 (1998).
15. Id. at 118-19.
16. Id. at 120.
17. 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994).
18. Oncale, 83 F.3d at 120 (while this book was in the process of being published, the
United States Supreme Court rendered its opinion, which is discussed in the addendum).
19. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
20. Id. at 984.
21. Id at 990 n.55 (emphasis added).
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Later that same year, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals commented on the
same-sex sexual harassment issue parenthetically in Tomkins v. Public
Service Electric & Gas Co.:22
It is not necessary to a finding of a Title VII violation that the
discriminatory practice depend on a characteristic "peculiar to one
of the genders,"' ' or that the discrimination be directed at all
members of a sex. It is only necessary to show that gender is a
substantial factor in the discrimination, and that if the plaintiff
"had been a man she would not have been treated in the same
manner."
24
To date, only five circuit courts have specifically heard and ruled on the
issue of whether same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII,
with conflicting results. The Eleventh Circuit was the first appeals court to
address the issue, albeit without a published opinion, in Joyner v. AAA
Cooper Transportation.25 In that case, a male employee alleged quid pro quo
sexual harassment by a homosexual male supervisor.26 The appeals court
affirmed the district court's holding that "unwelcomed homosexual
harassment... states a violation of Title VII. 27 The court applied the five
elements of quid pro quo harassment as established in Henson v. City of
Dundee:28  "1) the employee belongs to a protected group ..., 2) the
employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment . . . ; 3) the
harassment complained of was based upon sex . .. ; 4) the harassment
complained of affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment... ;
and 5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment in
question and failed to take prompt remedial action., 29 Regarding the critical
third element, i.e., that the harassment complained of was based on sex, the
court stated: "[S]ince the evidence established the terminal manager's
homosexual proclivities, the harassment to which plaintiff complained was
based upon sex."30 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals had not heard
another case on this issue until Fredette v. BVP Management Associates, the
subject of this article.
22. 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
23. Id. at 1047 n.4 (quoting Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 658 (D.D.C. 1976)).
24. Id. (quoting Skelton v. Blazano, 424 F. Supp. 1231, 1235 (D.D.C. 1976)).
25. 749 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1984) (unpublished table decision).
26. Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537, 541 (M.D. Ala. 1983), afl'd, 749
F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1984) (emphasis in original).
27. Id. at 541 (emphasis in original).
28. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
29. Id. at 903-05.
30. Joyner, 597 F. Supp. at 542.
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Nine years passed after the Joyner case before another circuit court of
appeals heard the issue again. In 1993, the Fifth Circuit in Giddens v. Shell
Oil Co.31 affirmed, without a published opinion, the district court's holding
that same-sex sexual harassment does not state a claim under Title VII. s2
Although the district court's opinion was unpublished, it was
subsequently relied upon by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and quoted in
Garcia:33  "'Harassment by a male supervisor against a male subordinate
does not state a claim under Title VII even though the harassment has sexual
overtones. Title VII addresses gender discrimination."' 34 As noted above, in
1996, the Fifth Circuit, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,
relied upon Giddens and Garcia in affirming that same-sex sexual
harassment is not cognizable under Title VIIIY
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals first heard the issue in 1996, in
McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of Supervisors.3 6 In McWilliams, a
male employee alleged hostile work environment sexual harassment by
several of his male co-workers.3 7 The circuit court of appeals affirmed the
district court's granting of summary judgment for the defendants stating:
As a purely semantic matter, we do not believe that in common
understanding the kind of shameful heterosexual-male-on-
heterosexual-male conduct alleged here (nor comparable female-
on-female conduct) is considered to be "because of the [target's]
'sex."' Perhaps "because of' the victim's known or believed
prudery, or shyness, or other form of vulnerability to sexually-
focussed [sic] speech or conduct. Perhaps "because of' the
perpetrators' own sexual perversion, or obsession, or insecurity.
Certainly, "because of' their vulgarity and insensitivity and
meanness of spirit. But not specifically "because of' the victim's
sex
38
In his dissent, Judge Michael noted: "It is too early to write this case off to
meanness and horseplay. For now there is a material factual issue whether
McWilliams was discriminated against because of his sex."39 The Fourth
Circuit again considered the issue two months later in Hopkins v. Baltimore
31. 12F.3d208 (5th Cir. 1993).
32 Id. at 208.
33. 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994).
34. Id. at 451-52 (citation omitted).
35. 83 F.3d 118, 119 (5th Cir. 1996).
36. 72F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996).
37. Id. at 1194.
38. Id. at 1195-96 (emphasis in original).
39. Id. at 1198 (Michaels, J., dissenting) (arguing that same sex harassment in the
workplace should be actionable under Title VII).
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Gas & Electric Co.,40 but gave no opinion about this issue. In August of
1996, the Fourth Circuit relied upon its holding in McWilliams to affirm a
district court's dismissal of a same-gender sex discrimination action in Mayo
v. Kiwest Corp.41  Most recently, in October of 1996, the Fourth Circuit
refined its holding on the issue by recognizing the possibility of same-sex
sexual harassment of a male by other male co-workers who were
homosexuals, resulting in a hostile work environment.42 In Wrightson v.
Pizza Hut ofAmerica, Inc.,43 the court stated:
An employee is harassed or otherwise discriminated against
"because of' his or her sex if, "but-for" the employee's sex, he or
she would not have been the victim of the discrimination
.... There is... simply no "logical connection" between Title
VII's requirement that the discrimination be "because of' the
employee's sex and a requirement that a harasser and victim be of
different sexes.44
In Quick v. Donaldson Co. Inc.,45 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed a district court's granting of summary judgment for the
defendant/employer in a situation where a male employee was subjected to
over 100 incidents of "bagging ' ' 6 by his male co-workers.47 Applying the
test established in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,48 the court established:
"The proper inquiry for determining whether discrimination was based on
sex is whether 'members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or
conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not
exposed. ' '49 The court determined that a material issue of fact existed as to
whether the treatment of Quick was based on his gender.50
Prior to the Eleventh Circuit's recent holding in Fredette, the Sixth
Circuit was the latest appeals court to weigh in on the same-gender sexual
harassment issue. In Yeary v. Goodwill Industries-Knoxville, Inc.,51 a male
alleged sexual harassment by a male co-worker who was known to be
40. 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir. 1996).
41. 94 F.3d 641 (4th Cir. 1996).
42. Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996).
43. Id. at 138.
44. Id. at 142.
45. 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996).
46. Id. at 1374 (the court defined "bagging" as the intentional grabbing and squeezing of
a male's testicles).
47. Id.
48. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
49. Quick, 90 F.3d at 1379 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993)).
50. Id. at 1379.
51. 107 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 1997).
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homosexual. The court reversed the district court's granting of the
defendants' motion to dismiss noting: "[W]hen a male sexually propositions
another male because of sexual attraction, there can be little question that the
behavior is a form of harassment that occurs because the propositioned male
is a male-that is, 'because of... sex.' 
53
While not specifically addressing the issue, both the Seventh and Ninth
Circuit Courts of Appeals have acknowledged, in dicta, the cognizability of
same-gender sexual harassment as an actionable claim under Title VII. In
Baskerville v. Culligan International Co.,54 Judge Posner stated, as an aside:
"Sexual harassment of women by men is the most common kind, but we do
not mean to exclude the possibility that sexual harassment of men by women,
or men by other men, or women by other women would not also be
actionable in appropriate cases., 55 Also, in Steiner v. Showboat Operating
Co.,56 the court stated: "[A]lthough words from a man to a man are
differently received than words from a man to a woman, we do not rule out
the possibility that both men and women working at Showboat have viable
claims against [the male supervisor] for sexual harassment." 57
C. District Courts
The remaining seven circuits courts of appeals 58 have not ruled on the
issue of whether same-gender sexual harassment is actionable under Title
VII, but all have district courts that have heard and ruled on the issue.
District courts in the First, Second, and District of Columbia Circuits have
consistently held that same-gender sexual harassment is actionable under
Title VII, but with a limited number of judicial opinions to support their
holdings.59 District courts in the Third and Tenth Circuits have also
consistently allowed same-gender sexual harassment claims under Title VII,
both with slightly more supportive case law than the First, Second, and
52. Id. at 444.
53. Id. at 448 (emphasis in original).
54. 50 F.3d 428 (7th Cir. 1995).
55. Id. at 430.
56. 25 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1994).
57. Id. at 1464 (emphasis in original).
58. Specifically, the First, Second, Third, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and District of
Columbia Courts.
59. King v. Town of Hanover, 959 F. Supp. 62 (D.N.H. 1996); Williams v. District of
Columbia, 916 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1996); Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, 69 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283 (D.D.C.
1995); Nogueras v. University of P. R., 890 F. Supp. 60 (D.P.R. 1995).
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District of Columbia Circuits.60 The decisions of the district courts in the
Seventh and Ninth Circuits that have heard the issue can only be described as
contradictory.
District courts in the Seventh Circuit have heard eighteen cases on the
issue of same-gender sexual harassment since 198 1.61 This is equal to the
number of cases on the issue heard by district courts in all other circuits
combined. The first case on point in the Seventh Circuit, Wright v.
Methodist Youth Services, Inc. ,62 was decided in 1981. The court
unequivocally recognized the actionability of Mr. Wright's claim under Title
VII when he was terminated from his job because he refused the homosexual
advances of his male supervisor.63  The court relied on dicta in Barnes v.
Costle,64 a 1977 decision, from the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals.
Seven years later, Judge Williams refused to recognize a Title VII claim
in Goluszek v. Smith.65  Mr. Goluszek alleged hostile work environment
60. Caldwell v. KFC Corp., 958 F. Supp. 962 (D.N.J. 1997); Eschbach v. County of
Lehigh, No. CIV.A. 95-7276, 1997 WL 109611 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 1997); Wiley v. Burger
King, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 500 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Ward v. Ridley Sch. Dist., 940 F.
Supp. 810 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Gerd v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 934 F. Supp. 357 (D. Colo.
1996); Swage v. Inn Philadelphia, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 438 (E.D. Pa. 1996);
Wehrle v. Office Depot, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. Okl. 1996); Johnson v. Community
Nursing Serv., 932 F. Supp. 269 (D. Utah 1996); Ladd v. Sertoma Handicapped Opportunity
Program, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 766 (N.D. Okla. 1995); King v. M.R. Brown, Inc., 911 F. Supp.
161 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
61. Harris v. National Precision Blanking, No. 95-C6022, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7740
(N.D. Ill. May 27, 1997); Miller v. Vesta, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Wis. 1996); Torres v.
National Precision Blanking, 943 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. 111. 1996); Schoiber v. Emro Mktg. Co.,
941 F. Supp. 730 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1403 (E.D. Wis.
1996) affd, 125 F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 1997); Peric v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 71 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1760 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Shermer v. Illinois Dep't of Transp., 937 F.
Supp. 781 (C.D. Ill. 1996); Rushing v. United Airlines, 919 F. Supp. 1101 (N.D. Ill. 1996);
Kaplan v. Dacomed Corp., No. 95-C6987, 1996 WL 89148 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 1996); Ton v.
Information Resources, Inc., 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 355 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Wenner v.
C.G. Bretting Mfg. Co., Inc., 917 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Wis. 1995); Vandeventer v. Wabash
Nat'l Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ind. 1995); Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 F.
Supp. 1133 (C.D. Ill. 1995); Blozis v. Mike Raisor Ford, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 805 (N.D. Ind.
1995); Boyd v. Vormahmen, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1769 (S.D. II. 1995); Parrish v.
Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., No. 89-C 4515, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13934 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16,
1990); Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Wright v. Methodist
Youth Serv., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
62. 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
63. Id. at 310.
64. 561 F.2d 983 (D.D.C. 1977).
65. 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
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sexual harassment by several male machine operators at H.P. Smith.66
Relying, in part, on a Harvard Law Review article, written by a student
Judge Williams stated that the behavior Mr. Goluszek had been subjected to
was not the type Congress intended to prohibit under Title VI.67 Rather,
according to Judge Williams, Congress enacted Title VII to protect
vulnerable persons from those more powerful, who exploit their power by
inflicting sexual demands upon the weaker group.68  Finding that Mr.
Goluszek worked in a male-dominated environment, Judge Williams wrote:
"In fact Goluszek may have been harassed 'because' he is a male, but that
harassment was not of a kind which created an anti-male environment in the
workplace."6 9 Judge Williams's opinion in Goluszek has been occasionally
relied upon; sometimes openly criticized, 70 and often distinguished or
ignored by judges,71 including other district court judges within the Seventh
66. Id. at 1453.
67. Id. at 1456.
68. Id.
69. Id. (citation omitted).
70. See Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996); Fleenor v.
Hewitt Soap Co., 81 F.3d 48 (6th Cir. 1996); Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446 (5th
Cir. 1994); Ashworth v. Roundup Co., 897 F. Supp. 489 (W.D. Wash. 1995); Vandeventer v.
Wabash Nat'l Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ind. 1995); Benekritis v. Johnson, 882 F. Supp.
521 (D.S.C. 1995); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822 (D. Md. 1994),
aff'd, 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir. 1996); Polly v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 803 F. Supp. 1
(S.D. Tex. 1992).
71. Miller v. Vesta, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 697, 704 (E.D. Wis. 1996) ("Reliance on
Goluszek is misplaced.... [IThe Goluszek court built its understanding of Congressional
intent upon a foundation of quicksand.... [Tihe Goluszek court had no basis for its gloss on
Title VII's legislative history. Not only is it inappropriate to delve into Congressional intent
when the statute's language is clear, Goluszek is simply not persuasive or reliable authority for
interpreting Title VII's provisions on sex discrimination."); Waag v. Thomas Pontiac, Buick,
GMC, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 393, 400 (D. Minn. 1996) ("We are not persuaded by the rationale
articulated in Goluszek"); Kaplan v. Dacomed Corp., No. 95-C6987, 1996 WL 89148, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 1996) ("[Tjhis Court has disagreed sharply with Goluszek from the
beginning-in this Court's view, that decision and others like it represent a kind of social
judgment about Congress' purposes in enacting Title VII that is at odds with what Congress
actually said."); Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 351, 354 (D. Nev. 1996)
('Notwithstanding the Goluszek court's sweeping statements regarding Congressional intent,
its analysis is unsupported by any legislative history.... Moreover, the additional requirement
imposed by Goluszek on a sexual harassment plaintiff is an unwarranted extension of the
elements of proof set forth by the Supreme Court .... "); Ton v. Information Resources, Inc.,
70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 355, 360 (N.D. Ill. 1996) ("Goluszek has... developed into a
favored target ofjurisprudential criticism, most of which makes sense."); Easton v. Crossland
Mortgage Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1368, 1379 (C.D. Cal. 1995) ("In Goluszek, the court explored
the 'underlying concerns of Congress' to determine that Title VII did not apply to a male
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Circuit.72 The other sixteen cases heard within the district courts of the
Seventh Circuit have, for the most part, recognized a claim for same-gender
sexual harassment under Title VII. 3 The exceptions consist of three cases
versus male hostile environment claim .... As logically appealing [as] this argument may be,
it does not reflect the current state of anti-discrimination jurisprudence."); King v M.R.
Brown, 911 F. Supp. 161, 167 (E.D. Pa. 1995) ("This Court respectfully declines to follow
the reasoning of Goluszek... that the only sex discrimination Title VII endeavors to prevent is
that 'stemming from an imbalance of power and an abuse of that imbalance by the powerful
which results in discrimination against a discrete and vulnerable group."') (quoting Goluszek
v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Ill. 1988)); Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F.
Supp. 283, 287 (D.D.C. 1995) ("Unfortunately, the district court in Goluszek did not support
its view of Congress's intent with any citations to the legislative record."); Prescott v.
Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1545, 1550 (M.D. Ala. 1995) ("While
[the] argument [in Goluszek] may be logically appealing, it is not the current state of anti-
discrimination jurisprudence.").
72. Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir. 1996); Harris v.
National Precision Blanking, No. 95-C6022, 1997 WL 709653 (N.D. Ill. May 30, 1997);
Torres v. National Precision Blanking, 943 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. I11. 1996); Schoiber v. Emro
Mktg. Co., 941 F. Supp. 730 (N.D. II. 1996); Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1403
(E.D. Wis. 1996); Peric v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of II1., 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1760 (N.D. I1l. 1996); Shermer v. Illinois Dep't of Transp., 937 F. Supp. 781 (C.D. Il. 1996);
Tietgen v. Brown's Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495 (E.D. Va. 1996); Rushing v.
United Airlines, 919 F. Supp. 1101 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, 69 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Ecklund v. Fuisz Tech., Ltd., 905 F. Supp. 335
(E.D. Va. 1995); Wenner v. C.G. Bretting Mfg. Co., Inc., 917 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Wis. 1995);
Dixon v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., No. CIV.A.4:94cv165, 1995 WL 810016 (E.D. Va.
Aug. 23, 1995); EEOC v. Walden Book Co., Inc., 885 F. Supp. 1100 (M.D. Tenn. 1995);
Blozis v. Mike Raisor Ford, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 805 (N.D. Ind. 1995); Boyd v. Vonnahmen, 67
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1769 (S.D. Ill. 1995); Parrish v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., No.
89C4515, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13934 (N.D. III. Oct. 16, 1990).
73. Harris v. National Precision Blanking, No. 95-C6022, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7740
(N.D. Ill. May 27, 1997); Miller v. Vesta, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Wis. 1996); Torres v.
National Precision Blanking, 943 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Schoiber v. Emro Mktg. Co.,
941 F. Supp. 730 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1403 (E.D. Wis.
1996) affid, 125 F. 3d 408 (7th Cir. 1997); Peric v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 71 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1760 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Shermer v. Illinois Dep't of Transp., 937 F.
Supp. 781 (C.D. I1l. 1996); Rushing v. United Airlines, 919 F. Supp. 1101 (N.D. I11. 1996);
Kaplan v. Dacomed Corp., No. 95-C6987, 1996 WL 89148 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 1996); Ton v.
Information Resources, Inc., 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 355 (N.D. II1. 1996); Wenner v.
C.G. Bretting Mfg. Co., Inc., 917 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Wis. 1995); Vandeventer v. Wabash
Nat'l Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ind. 1995); Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 F.
Supp. 1133 (C.D. Ill. 1995); Blozis v. Mike Raisor Ford, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 805 (N.D. Ind.
1995); Boyd v. Vonnahmen, 67 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1769 (S.D. Ill. 1995); Parrish v.
Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., No. 89-C 4515, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13934 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16,
1990).
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heard before Judge Norgle, who gives a thoughtful and thorough analysis of
his reasoning for not allowing same-gender sexual harassment claims in two
of his three opinions on the issue.74 Referring to Judge Posner's affirmation
of the possibility of same-gender sexual harassment in dicta in Baskerville,
and relying, ultimately, upon his own interpretation of Congress's intent in
passing Title VII, Judge Norgle states:
[T]he court agrees with Chief Judge Posner that sexual harassment
occurs in male-on-male and female-on-female formats, though less
frequently than in the prevalent male-on-female harassment cases.
Yet, Title VII's drafters did not intend to protect one gender from
the sexual conduct of those of the same-gender, and therefore, Title
VII cannot be a vehicle for sexual harassment litigation between
individuals of the identical gender. No matter whether the predator
is a homosexual or heterosexual, and no matter whether the prey is
sexually attracted to men or women, Title VII does not allow for
claims alleging same-gender sexual harassment.
75
Finally, in Blozis v. Mike Raisor Ford, Inc.,76 and Vandeventer v.
Wabash National Corp.,7 Judge Sharp appears to come out on both sides of
the question, but his opinions are, in fact, consistent. While the opinion in
Blozis is dated before that in Vandeventer, Judge Sharp obviously wrote the
Vandeventer opinion first, as he distinguishes it in the Blozis opinion.78 In
Vandeventer, the plaintiff, Douglas Feltner, alleged he had been sexually
harassed by a male co-worker who had called him a "dick sucker" and a
homosexual.79 Judge Sharp stated: "[A] man can state a claim under Title
VII for sexual harassment by another man only if he is being harassed
because he is a man."
80
While the epithet used and the taunting had a 'sexual' component,
as do most expletives, the crucial point is that the 'harasser' was
not aiming expletives at the victim because of the victim's
maleness. He was taunting the victim because he did not like him;
Mr. Feltner's gender was irrelevant.... Thus, [his claim is] not
actionable under Title VII.81
74. Harris, No. 95-C6022, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 7740; Torres, 943 F. Supp. at 952;
Schoiber v. Emro Mktg. Co., 941 F. Supp. 730 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
75. Schoiber, 941 F. Supp. at 739.
76. 896 F. Supp. 805 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
77. 887 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
78. Blozis v. Mike Raisor Ford, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 805, 806 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
79. Id. at 1181 n.2.
80. Id. (emphasis in original).
81. Id.
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In Blozis, Judge Sharp allowed the claim of same-gender sexual harassment
to go forward, refusing to grant the defendant's motion to dismiss.82 He
distinguished his decision here from his summary judgment ruling in
Vandeventer, noting courts' general reluctance to grant motions to dismiss
and the fact that the plaintiff in Vandeventer produced no evidence that he
was harassed because he was a male.83 In Blozis, Judge Sharp found that it
was the existence of a male or female bias that was protected by Title VII
and not just being subjected to sexual comments or actions. Though he
expressed some doubt about the cognizability of male bias between
heterosexual men, he acknowledged that it might be possible to prove and
allowed Mr. Blozis' claim to proceed.
84
Finally, the district courts in the Ninth Circuit are also conflicted on the
issue of whether same-gender sexual harassment is actionable under Title
VII, but with very little case support on either side. 5 In Ashworth v.
Roundup Co.,86 the court refused to recognize the possibility of same-gender
sexual harassment under Title VII, relying upon the decision in Goluszek and
Garcia.7 In Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp.,88 and Tanner v. Prima
Donna Resorts, Inc., 9 the judges were critical of the Goluszek decision and
allowed the claim.
IV. FREDETTE V. BVP MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES
A. Background of the Case
Robert Fredette, a male heterosexual, worked from 1988 until 1994 as a
waiter at Arthur's 27, a restaurant in the Buena Vista Palace Hotel in
Orlando, Florida. BVP Management Associates owned and operated
Arthur's 27 during the time of Mr. Fredette's employment. Dana Sunshine, a
male homosexual, was the maitre d'/manager of the restaurant during the
time of Mr. Fredette's employment. As manager, Mr. Sunshine had the
authority to hire, fire, and schedule the servers.90
82. Id. at 808.
83. Blozis, 896 F. Supp. at 806.
84. Id. at 808.
85. Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 351 (D. Nev. 1996); Easton v.
Crossland Mortgage Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1368 (C.D. Cal. 1995), rev'd, 114 F.3d 979 (9th Cir.
1997); Ashworth v. Roundup Co., 897 F. Supp. 489 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
86. 897 F. Supp. 489 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
87. Ashworth, 897 F. Supp. at 489.
88. 905 F. Supp. 1368 (C.D. Cal. 1995), rev'd, 114 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 1997).
89. 919 F. Supp. 351 (D. Nev. 1996).
90. Brief for Appellant at 4, Fredette, (No. 95-3242) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant].
[Vol. 22:559
60
Nova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol22/iss2/1
1998]
Mr. Fredette alleged that Mr. Sunshine sexually harassed him over the
course of several years. The alleged harassment began shortly after Mr.
Fredette began to work at Arthur's 27. He claimed that Mr. Sunshine told
him of an easy way for him to get promoted, and he should see him on his
day off so they could discuss it. Mr. Fredette told Mr. Sunshine he preferred
to be promoted through his hard work. Mr. Sunshine then, allegedly,
grabbed his crotch, shook it at Mr. Fredette, and said that being "'hard is
exactly what it takes."' 91 Mr. Fredette alleged that Mr. Sunshine repeatedly
sexually propositioned him and that some of these propositions were made
with the promise of a raise or a promotion.
92
Other male servers at the restaurant some homosexual and some
heterosexual, testified to Mr. Sunshine's sexual harassment of them. Mr.
Fredette also alleged that one male homosexual waiter, with no fine dining
experience, was promoted by Mr. Sunshine after providing Mr. Sunshine
with sexual favors. This waiter allegedly told Fredette: "'[U]se your
imagination, you don't have to know how to wait tables to get what you want
around here.' 93 Allegedly, Mr. Sunshine's sexual partner told Mr. Fredette
and other servers that they could get better table assignments by giving in to
Mr. Sunshine's requests. Z Despite his refusals of Mr. Sunshine's requests,
Mr. Fredette was promoted to captain in November of 1989, six months after
beginning work. He retained that position until his resignation in February of
1993. 9'
In January of 1993, Mr. Fredette became intoxicated at the restaurant's
bar and caused a disturbance.96 As a result of his drunken behavior, he was
suspended for three days, required to obtain counseling for alcohol abuse,
and subjected to random drug testing. Upon returning to work, Mr. Fredette
met with the Human Resource Manager of the hotel and, for the first time,
complained of Mr. Sunshine's sexual harassment. The Director of Human
Resources met with Mr. Sunshine who denied most of the allegations. Mr.
Sunshine was given a written warning as a result of that meeting.17
Following his meeting with human resources personnel, Mr. Fredette
was no longer sexually harassed by Mr. Sunshine. However, Mr. Fredette
claims that Mr. Sunshine subjected him to retaliatory actions by
reprimanding him for minor infractions, assigning him to fewer or lower-
91. Brief for EEOC at 3, Fredette, (No. 95-3242) (quoting Fredette deposition)
[hereinafter Brief for EEOC].
92. Brief for Appellant, supra note 90, at 4.
93. Brief for EEOC, supra note 91, at 4-5 (quoting Fredette deposition).
94. Brief for Appellant, supra note 90, at 5.
95. Id. at 4.
96. Brief for Appellee at 7, Fredette, (No. 95-3242) [hereinafter Brief for Appellee].
97. Brief for Appellant, supra note 90, at 5-6.
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tipping tables, and by having other employees complain about him.98 On the
advice of his doctor, Mr. Fredette resigned from his position on February 6,
1993. 99
B. Procedural History
On March 17, 1994, Mr. Fredette filed suit against Mr. Sunshine, BVP
Management Associates, Royal Palace Hotel Associates, and Buena Vista
Hospitality Group.100 In his complaint, Mr. Fredette alleged violations of
Title VII, the Florida Human Rights Act, and the Fair Labor Standards
Act.10' Specifically, Mr. Fredette alleged hostile work environment and
"quidpro quo sexual harassment."' 0 2
On July 6, 1994, Mr. Sunshine filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds
that he could not be held individually liable for sexual harassment. A
magistrate judge reviewed the motion and recommended its denial. 0 3 On
October 26, 1994, the United States District Judge agreed with the Magistrate
Judge's recommendation and denied Mr. Sunshine's motion to dismiss.10 4
On February 16, 1995, Mr. Sunshine filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, again claiming he could not be held individually liable for sexual
harassment. Mr. Fredette filed his opposition to Mr. Sunshine's motion on
March 17, 1995. On May 1, 1995, Mr. Sunshine filed a motion for summary
judgment. On May 10, 1995, the magistrate issued a report regarding Mr.
Sunshine's motions. 05 In his report, he recommended that Mr. Sunshine's
motion for judgment on the pleadings be granted as Mr. Sunshine was not a
proper defendant under Title VII or the Florida Human Rights Act.10 6 On
June 19, 1995, the district judge approved the magistrate's report and
dismissed all claims against Mr. Sunshine.
10 7
On April 19, 1995, Mr. Fredette voluntarily dismissed his claims against
Royal Palace Hotel Associates and Buena Vista Hospitality Group.'0 On
May 9, 1995, BVP filed a motion for summary judgment stating that Title
VII does not prohibit same-gender sexual harassment. BVP claimed that
98. Id. at 6.
99. Id.
100. Brief for Appellee, supra note 96, at 2.
101. Brief for EEOC, supra note 91, at 2.
102. Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503, 1504 (11th Cir. 1997)
(emphasis added).
103. Brief for Appellee, supra note 96, at 3.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id..
107. Id.
108. Brief for Appellee, supra note 96, at 3.
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Congress did not intend to protect men in a male-dominated work
environment and that Mr. Fredette may have been discriminated against, but
the discrimination was due to his sexual preference and not because of his
gender. Title VII, BVP claimed, does not protect against discrimination
based on sexual orientation. 1 9  On June 5, 1995, Mr. Fredette filed
opposition to BVP's motion for summary judgment. 10 Mr. Fredette claimed
that Title VII does protect against same-gender sexual harassment when the
harassment is an attempt to extract sexual favors because he is a male."'
On June 30, 1995, the magistrate issued a report and recommended that
the district judge deny BVP's motion for summary judgment." 2  The
magistrate relied on his interpretation of the plain language of the applicable
statutes, prohibiting discrimination based on sex regardless of the gender of
the alleged harasser or the victim." 3 He noted that, if the harassment would
not have happened but for the victim's gender, then Title VII protections
would apply.
n4
On September 11, 1995, the district judge refused to accept the
magistrate's recommendations and issued an order granting BVP's motion
for summary judgment under Title VII and the Florida Human Rights Act.1 15
The judge adopted the magistrate's recommendation regarding the denial of
BVP's motion on the Fair Labor Standards Act claim, stating a genuine issue
of fact remained to be resolved." 6
In granting BVP's motion on the Title VII and Florida Human Rights
Act claims, the district judge agreed with BVP that the alleged discrimination
of Mr. Fredette was based on his sexual orientation and was not, therefore,
actionable under Title VII.17  "[T]he determinative factor is that the
discrimination or harassment would not have occurred 'but for the fact of
[the plaintiffs] sex.""'18 But, the judge added, "[T]he term 'sex' as used in
Title VII is not synonymous with 'sexual preference."" 19 Quoting from
Garcia,120 the judge wrote: "'[H]arassment by a male supervisor against a
109. Brief for EEOC, supra note 91, at 5.
110. Brief for Appellant, supra note 90, at 2.
111. Brief for EEOC, supra note 91, at 5-6.
112. Brief for Appellee, supra note 96, at 4.
113. Brief for EEOC, supra note 91, at 6.
114. Id.
115. Brief for Appellee, supra note 96, at 4.
116. Id.
117. Brief for EEOC, supra note 91, at 7.
118. Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 905 F. Supp. 1034, 1037 (M.D. Fla. 1995)
(quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (1lth Cir. 1982)) (alteration made by
Fredette court).
119. Id.
120. 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994).
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male subordinate does not [necessarily] state a claim under Title VII even
though the harassment has sexual overtones. Title VII addresses gender
discrimination."",12' The judge justified his decision by claiming that Mr.
Fredette would not have suffered the discrimination if he had given in to Mr.
Sunshine's requests.
Thus, if Fredette suffered the claimed harassment or discrimination
at the hands of the restaurant manager, it stemmed not from the
fact that Fredette was a man, but rather from the fact that Fredette
refused the manager's propositions and did not share the same
sexual orientation or preferences as the manager. Title VII does
not provide a cause of action for discrimination or harassment
levied because of one's sexual orientation or preference. Any
expansion of Title VII... that would include such a cause of
action is for... Congress... and not this court, to make. 12
On September 21, 1995, Mr. Fredette filed a notice of appeal of the
district court's judgments in favor of Mr. Sunshine and BVP.123 The parties
agreed to dismiss the Fair Labor Standards Act claims and, in December of
1995, Mr. Fredette dismissed the claims against Mr. Sunshine.124 The case
proceeded on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals on Mr.
Fredette's claim against BVP Management Associates for discrimination in
violation of Title VII and the Florida Human Rights Act.
121
C. Appeals Court's Holding and Rationale
The court narrowly defined the legal issue in Fredette: "[W]hether,
under the circumstances of this case, the sexual harassment of a male
employee by a homosexual male supervisor is actionable under Title V.'
126
In deciding that Mr. Fredette's claim was actionable under Title VII, the
court considered five areas: 1) the language of Title VII; 2) the statute's
causation requirement, that the discrimination occurred "because of" the
person's sex; 3) the legislative history of Title VII; 4) the EEOC's
interpretation of Title VII; and 5) relevant case law. 127
First, the court quoted and reviewed the wording of the statute itself.
Focusing on Congress's use of such gender neutral terms as "employer" and
121. Fredette, 905 F. Supp. at 1037 (quoting Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d
446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994)) (alteration made by the Fredette court).
122. Id. at 1037-38 (citations omitted).
123. Brief for Appellee, supra note 96, at 4.
124. Id.
125. Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503, 1504 (11th Cir. 1997).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1504-06.
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"any individual," the court said, "[t]here is simply no suggestion in these
statutory terms that the cause of action is limited to opposite gender
contexts."
128
Many courts have used, to some extent, a similar interpretation of the
statute's plain language and relied on it in finding same-gender sexual
harassment claims actionable under Title VII. 129 The court in Easton v.
Crossland Mortgage Corp.130 established: "Where the statutory language is
clear, our sole function is to enforce it, according to its terms."'
3
The Fredette appeals court then looked to the statute's causation
requirement, that the alleged discrimination be "because of" the person's sex.
Comparing Mr. Fredette's male-on-male sexual harassment by Mr. Sunshine
to a traditional male-on-female situation, the court noted that "[t]he
128. Iae at 1505.
129. See Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 142 (4th Cir. 1996)
("Through its proscription of 'employer' discrimination against 'individual' employees, the
statute obviously places no gender limitation whatsoever on the perpetrator or the target of the
harassment"); Miller v. Vesta, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 697, 702 (E.D. Wis. 1996) ("Title ViI's
plain language is broad and does not limit its prohibition on sex discrimination to
discrimination of one sex by the other."); Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1403, 1409
(E.D. Wis. 1996) aff'd, 125 F. 3d 408 (7th Cir. 1997) ("The statutory language of Title VII is
non-exclusive and protects all employees from gender discrimination inflicted by an
'employer.' The gender of the harasser is irrelevant."); Peric v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of
IIl., 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1760, 1762 (N.D. Ill. 1996) ("The statute is clearly
worded in gender neutral terms, and no legislative history exists to contradict a gender neutral
reading."); Gerd v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 934 F. Supp. 357, 361 (D. Colo. 1996) ("[Title
VII [does not] refer to the sex of the offending party or the sex of the victim."); King v. Town
of Hanover, 959 F. Supp. 62, 66 (D.N.H. 1996) ("liThe text of Title VII [does not place] a
restriction on the gender of the discriminator."); Wang v. Thomas Pontiac, Buick, GMC, Inc.,
930 F. Supp. 393, 400 (D. Minn. 1996) ("[Tihe language [of Title VII] is gender neutral.");
Williams v. District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1996) ("The text of [Title VII] is
gender neutral and contains no suggestion that the sex of either gender is a prerequisite to
maintaining a claim under Title VII."); Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 705, 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("[Tjhere is nothing in the language of Title VII to support a
finding that same sex harassment is not prohibited."); Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp.,
905 F. Supp. 1368, 1378 (C.D. Cal. 1995) rev'd, 114 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[Tihe plain
language of Title VII... does not preclude a same-gender sexual harassment claim for
relief."); King v. M.R. Brown, Inc., 911 F. Supp. 161, 167 (E.D. Pa. 1995) ("[N]othing in the
text of the statute indicates that Title VII's protections extend only to individuals who are
harassed by members of the opposite sex."); Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 F. Supp.
1133, 1136-37 (C.D. Ill. 1995) ("The plain language of Title VII simply does not restrict its
prohibition against discrimination to employees of the opposite sex."); McCoy v. Johnson
Controls World Servs., Inc., 878 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D. Ga. 1995) ("UIhe plain language of
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 does not limit Title VII to heterosexual harassment.").
130. 905 F. Supp. 1368 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
131. Id. at 1378 (quoting Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S 64 (1993)).
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reasonably inferred motives of the homosexual harasser are identical to those
of the heterosexual harasser-i.e., the harasser makes advances towards the
victim because the victim is a member of the gender the harasser prefers."'132
Also, the court found, that since the alleged harassment experienced by Mr.
Fredette was not experienced by women at the restaurant, this supported Mr.
Fredette's claim that he was harassed because of his gender, in other words,
because he was a man.
133
In Yeary v. Goodwill Industries-Knoxville, Inc.,3 a male employee
alleged sexual harassment by a male co-worker, a known homosexual. 135 In
Yeary, the court held: "[W]hen a male sexually propositions another male
because of sexual attraction, there can be little question that the behavior is a
form of harassment that occurs because the propositioned male is a male--
that is, 'because of... sex."' 136 Two other courts have allowed Title VII
causes of action where the alleged harasser was known to be homosexual,
finding the fact that the harasser was a homosexual as support of the
plaintiff's position that he/she was harassed because of his/her sex.137 Other
courts have found the homosexuality of the harasser persuasive, but not
conclusive, in determining that the plaintiff was harassed because of his/her
sex.
138
Next, the appeals court looked to the legislative history and intent of
Title VII. The court said, "we find nothing in the legislative history that
132. Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503, 1505 (1 Ith Cir. 1997).
133. Id.
134. 107 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 1997).
135. Id. at 445.
136. Id. at 448 (emphasis in original).
137. Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996) ("[W]e hold
that a same-sex 'hostile work environment' sexual harassment claim may lie under Title VII
where a homosexual male (or female) employer discriminates against an employee of the
same sex or permits such discrimination against an employee by homosexual employees of the
same sex."); EEOC v. Walden Book Co., Inc., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1102-03 (M.D. Tenn. 1995)
("[I]t is obvious that sexual harassment by a homosexual supervisor of the same sex is
exaction of a condition of employment which, but for his or her sex, an employee would not
have faced.").
138. See McCoy v. Macon Water Auth., 966 F. Supp. 1209, 1217 (M.D. Ga. 1997)
("[Specific courts] have held that Title VII provides a cause of action for same-sex harassment
if the harasser is homosexual, but not if the harasser is heterosexual.... This Court finds
[these holdings] more consistent with the language of Title VII and the judicially-created
doctrine of sexual harassment."); Caldwell v. KFC Corp., 958 F. Supp. 962, 969 (D.N.J. 1997)
("Like any other sexual-harassment plaintiff, plaintiff must still prove that the sexual
harassment he suffered was "because of' his sex'-that had he been a woman, he would not
have been subjected to Mr. Worley's sexual harassment."); Swage v. Inn Philadelphia, 72 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 438, 441 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("[P]laintiff must still prove that the alleged
harassment was 'because of his sex.").
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suggests an express legislative intent to exclude same-sex harassment claims
from the purview of Title VII.
139
Many courts have lamented about the lack of congressional intent
regarding Title VII.140 Most of those courts have overcome the lack of intent
and found same-gender sexual harassment claims actionable under Title
VII.141 However, Judge Mumaghan, in Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America,
Inc., gave this critical dissent:
The majority treats the absence of legislative history as a license to
'legislate' and impermissibly to rewrite Title VII to include claims
never intended, nor contemplated, by Congress. The majority's
approach ignores the context within which Congress enacted Title
VII. The absence of legislative history to guide the courts can be
read in either of two ways. Either, as the majority argues,
Congress's failure to exclude the possibility of same sex claims
should be interpreted as allowing for such claims. Or, Congress
simply never fathomed that Title VII would be used in the manner
in which the majority today holds, and hence, Congress, not the
courts, should address, in the first instance, whether Title VII's
'sex' language should apply when a heterosexual male alleges that
he was harassed by a homosexual male. The instant case
demonstrates the wisdom of the Constitution's three branches of
139. Fredette v. BVP Management Assoc., 112 F.3d 1503, 1505 (11th Cir. 1997).
140. See Wrightson v. Pizza Hut Am. Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 142 n.3 (4th Cir. 1996) ("[W]e
are left with little legislative history to guide us in interpreting the Act's prohibition against
discrimination based on 'sex."') (quoting Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986);
Caldwell v. KFC Corp., 958 F. Supp. 962, 968 (D.N.J. 1997) ("[Tjhere is no legislative history
on the meaning of 'sex discrimination."'); Swage v. Inn Philadelphia, 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 438, 440 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("There is no legislative history on the meaning of 'sex
discrimination."'); Johnson v. Community Nursing Servs., 932 F. Supp. 269, 272 (D. Utah
1996) ("Legislative history is silent"); Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 351,
354 (D. Nev. 1996) ("[T]here is little legislative history regarding the scope of the sex
discrimination prohibition."); King v. M.R. Brown, Inc., 911 F. Supp. 161, 167 (E.D. Pa.
1995) ("[N]o legislative history exists on this issue."); Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 887
F. Supp. 1133, 1137 n.3 (C.D. II. 1995) ("The Court also notes that little legislative history
exists on Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination."); EEOC v. Walden Book Co.,
Inc., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1103 (M.D. Tenn. 1995) ("Virtually no legislative history is available
to guide the courts in interpreting Title VII's interpretation against discrimination based on
sex.") Fox v. Sierra Dev. Co., 876 F. Supp. 1169, 1171 (D. Nev. 1995) ("The result is a
paucity of legislative history to inform the courts what Congress intended.").
141. Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 138; Caldwell, 958 F. Supp. at 962; Swage, 72 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. at 438; Johnson, 932 F. Supp. at 269; Tanner, 919 F. Supp. at 351; King, 911 F.
Supp. at 161; Griffith, 887 F. Supp. at 1133; Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. at 100.
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government, which leaves to the legislative branch, not the
judiciary, the task of making the law. 112
Like the appeals court in Fredette, at least three other courts have found that
the lack of legislative intent does not negate the possibility of same-gender
actions."43
Also regarding congressional intent, the Fredette court noted: "The
obvious Congressional focus on discrimination against women has not
precluded the courts from extending the protections of Title VII to men." 144
This reverse discrimination analogy used in same-gender actions was relied
upon by the courts in EEOC v. Walden Books,145 and Sardinia v. DellwoodFoods. 41
Next, the court considered the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII. In a
footnote, the court recognized the EEOC's expertise that, while not binding
on courts, can be useful for interpretation of and guidance in Title VII
actions. 147 The court quoted the EEOC's Compliance Manual that explicitly
states that sexual harassment can exist even if the harasser and victim are not
of opposite genders."48 Instead, the EEOC recommends that the focus be on
the disparate treatment of one person by another and sexual harassment based
on a person's sex.149 The court quotes a specific example in the EEOC
Compliance Manual of sexual harassment where the harasser and victim are,
in fact, the same sex.150  Many other courts have relied, in part, on the
142. Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 145.
143. See Peric v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of II1., 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1760, 1762 (N.D. Ill. 1996) ("[N]o legislative history exists to contradict a gender neutral
reading."); Williams v. District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 1, 9 (D.D.C. 1996) ("There is no
legislative history that suggests that victims of sexual harassment must be sexually harassed
by harassers of the opposite sex before they may invoke the protections of Title VII.");
Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 705, 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
("[Tlhere is little legislative history to support such a claim [that same sex harassment is not
prohibited under Title VII].").
144. Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503, 1505 (1 Ith Cir. 1997).
145. 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1103 (M.D. Tenn. 1995) ("It would be untenable to allow
reverse discrimination cases but not same-sex sexual harassment cases to proceed under Title
VII.").
146. 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 705, 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("I agree with those
courts... which finds [sic] it 'untenable to allow reverse discrimination cases but not same-
sex sexual harassment cases to proceed under Title VII.") (quoting EEOC v. Walden Book
Co., Inc., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1103 (M.D. Tenn. 1995)).
147. Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1505 n.4.
148. Id. at 1505.
149. Id. at 1505-06.
150. Id.
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EEOC's recognition of the possibility of same-gender sexual harassment in
finding for a plaintiff in a same-gender Title VII action.
151
Finally, the Fredette appeals court looked for guidance from case law
precedent in making its decision. It noted that the United States Supreme
Court has not explicitly ruled on the same-gender sexual harassment issue.
152
However, the appeals court stated that the United States Supreme Court did
rule on a case of reverse employment discrimination. In Johnson v.
Transportation Agency,153 a male supervisor's decision to promote a female
over a male employee was analyzed by the Court for possible discrimination
under Title VII. 54 The appeals court found that the United States Supreme
Court's acknowledgment of this type of reverse discrimination claim with
same-gender undertones was enough, at least implicitly, to support the idea
of same-gender sexual harassment claims.
155
The Fredette court then looked at cases beyond the Eleventh Circuit,
relying especially upon the decisions of the Sixth and Fourth Circuit Courts
of Appeal in Yeary and Wrightson. The court found both of those cases
factually similar to Fredette as the male victims had been sexually harassed
by a male homosexual. In both Yeary and Wrightson, the courts allowed the
plaintiffs' claims to continue. The Fredette court also noted supportive dicta
in Barnes v. Costle, Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co.,
Baskerville v. Culligan International Co., and Steiner v. Showboat Operating
151. See Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 1997);
Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas
& Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir. 1996); Caldwell v. KFC Corp., 958 F. Supp. 962 (D.N.J.
1997); McCoy v. Macon Water Auth., 966 F. Supp 1209 (M.D. Ga. 1997); Miller v. Vesta,
Inc., 946 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Wis. 1996); Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1403 (E.D.
Wis. 1996); Peric v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 71 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1760
(N.D. I1l. 1996); Gerd v. United Parcel Serv., 934 F. Supp. 357 (D. Colo. 1996); Swage v. Inn
Philadelphia, 72 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 438 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Wehrle v. Office Depot
Inc., 954 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. Okl. 1996); Johnson v. Community Nursing Servs. 932 F. Supp.
269 (D. Utah 1996); Wang v. Thomas Pontiac, Buick, GMC, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 393 (D. Minn.
1996); Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 351 (D. Nev. 1996); Ton v.
Information Resources, Inc., 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 355 (N.D. Il1. 1996); Ladd v.
Sertoma Handicapped Opportunity Program, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 766 (N.D. Olk. 1995);
Sardinia v. Dellwood, 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 705, 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Ecklund v.
Fuisz Tech., Ltd., 905 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Va. 1995); Dixon v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co.,
No. CIV.A.4:94cv165, 1995 WL 810016 (E.D. Va. Aug. 23, 1995); Raney v. District of
Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283 (D.D.C. 1995); Roe v. K-Mart Corp., No. CIV.A.2:93-2372-
18AJ, 1995 WL 316783 (D.S.C. Mar. 28, 1995).
152. Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503, 1505 (11th Cir. 1997).
153. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
154. Id. at 616.
155. Id.
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Co.,156 and cited, in a footnote, to several district court cases that have
recognized the cognizability of same-gender sexual harassment under Title
VII.
I57
The Fredette court criticized the decisions of the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Oncale and Garcia. First, the court examined what it determined
to be those courts' lack of reasoning in reaching a decision that all same-
gender sexual harassment claims are not actionable. The Fredette court then
went on to factually distinguish Oncale, where the behavior was "teasing and
harassment with sexually-focused speech or conduct' 158 between coworkers
and not a supervisor's request for sexual favors from a subordinate. The
Fredette court was also critical of the district court's decision to not
recognize a same-gender sexual harassment claim in Goluszek v. H.P. Smith.
Again, finding the court's reasoning flawed, and relying upon judicial
acceptance of reverse discrimination actions, the Fredette court noted that
there is no need to demonstrate a male dominated environment, as required in
Goluszek.
Both the lower district court and BVP Management Associates asserted
that the harassment suffered by Mr. Fredette was based upon sexual
orientation, and not upon gender. The appeals court concluded that its
decision to allow Mr. Fredette's claim for same-gender sexual harassment
was, in no way, an endorsement of sexual harassment claims based upon
sexual orientation. Specifically, the court stated: "[W]e hold today that
when a homosexual male supervisor solicits sexual favors from a male
subordinate and conditions work benefits or detriment on receiving such
favors, the male subordinate can state a viable Title VII claim for gender
discrimination.' 59
156. Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1508.
157. Id.; McCoy v. Macon Water Auth., 966 F. Supp. 1209 (M.D. Ga. 1997); Williams
v. District of Columbia, 916 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996); Waag v. Thomas Pontiac, Buick,
GMC, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 393 (D. Minn. 1996); Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F.
Supp. 351 (D. Nev. 1996); McCoy v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 878 F. Supp. 229
(S.D. Ga. 1995); Prescott v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1545 (M.D.
Ala. 1995); Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283 (D.D.C. 1995); Griffith v.
Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 F. Supp. 1133 (C.D. I11. 1995); Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, 69
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); King v. M.R. Brown, Inc., 911 F. Supp.
161 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Nogueras v. University of P.R., 890 F. Supp. 60 (D.P.R. 1995); EEOC v.
Walden Book Co., Inc., 885 F. Supp. 1100 (M.D. Tenn. 1995); Ecklund v. Fuisz Tech., Ltd.,
905 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Va. 1995); Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537 (M.D.
Ala. 1983), Wright v. Methodist Youth Servs., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
158. Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1508 (1lth Cir. 1997).
159. Id. at 1510 (emphasis in original).
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Davis
V. CONCLUSION
The significant trend by courts is to find sexual harassment claims
actionable under Title VII. Title VII's obvious intent, regardless of the lack
of specific legislative history, is to protect against discrimination in the work
place based upon, among other things, a person's "sex." If a plaintiff can
show that the sexual harassment he or she has experienced was directed to
him/her because of sex, then a Title VII claim exists. In same-gender claims,
the homosexuality of the harasser, though persuasive, should not be the sole
determining factor in deciding whether the harassment was based on sex.
Nor should the heterosexuality of the harasser rule out the possibility of a
viable Title VII claim. Whether the harassment was based on the victim's
sex is a question of fact to be decided by the fact finder. Judge Lawson, in
McCoy v. Macon Water Authority, put it aptly: "Proving that the harassment
was directed at the plaintiff because of sex, rather than for some other reason,
may be an unpleasant and difficult affair, but it is the duty of courts, and
especially of juries, to sort out such things." 160
Linda K. Davis
ADDENDUM
On March 4, 1998, the United States Supreme Court published its
decision of Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.161 At long last, the
issue of whether a sexual harassment claim under Title VII is viable when the
harasser and victim are the same sex has been answered affirmatively.162
The unanimous Court, in an opinion written by Justice Scalia, seemed
genuinely confused by the "bewildering variety of stances" taken by courts
that have previously addressed the issue. 163
Not unlike many circuit courts of appeals that have faced this question,
the United States Supreme Court looked for case law precedent on related
issues to support its position that same-gender harassment claims are
actionable under Title VII. For example, the Court referenced its decision in
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC,164 which extended
Title VII's protection to men as well as women.1 65 The Court observed that it
had previously rejected the notion that individuals do not discriminate
160. McCoy v. Macon Water Auth., 966 F. Supp. 1209 (M.D. Ga. 1997).
161. No. 96-568, 1998 WL 88039 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1998).
162. Id. at *5.
163. Id. at *3.
164. 464 U.S. 669 (1983).
165. Id. at 685.
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against members of their own race in Castaneda v. Partida.'" Finally, the
Court cited favorably to Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara
County,167 where a man filed a claim for sex discrimination against his
employer when a promotion for which he applied was given to a female
employee by his male supervisor.'68
The Court relied most heavily upon the statutory language and its
interpretation of broad Congressional intent for its decision that same-sex
harassment claims are not precluded from Title VII actions. Even though
same-gender claims were not the "principal evil" considered by the
legislature when it enacted Title VII, "statutory prohibitions often go beyond
the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately
the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators
by which we are governed." '169 Since the language of Title VII prohibits
"discriminat[ion] ... because of... sex,"17 the Court extended the statute's
coverage to include any sexual harassment that meets the statutory
requirements.' 7' This includes same-gender claims.
Thankfully, the Court went beyond its mere holding, giving guidelines
for plaintiffs wishing to prove same-gender sexual harassment claims under
Title VII. 172 Harassment by a homosexual of another of his/her same-gender
was compared by the Court to traditional male-on-female sexual harassment
claims.'73 One can assume, the Court reasoned, that the harassment in that
situation is likely due to the person's sex, thus, meeting Title VII's
requirement that the discrimination be because of sex. 74 However, the Court
did not restrict legitimate discriminatory harassment to that based on sexual
desire. If a plaintiff can show that the harasser demonstrated general hostility
toward the presence of the particular gender in the workplace, the because of
sex requirement will be satisfied. 175 Proof of disparate treatment of one sex
in a mixed sex work environment would also constitute legitimate proof that
the harassment met the statutory requirement." Finally, the Court
emphasized that "[w]hatever evidentiary route the plaintiff chooses to follow,
he or she must always prove that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged
166. 430 U.S. 482, 499 (1977).
167. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
168. Id. at 641-42.
169. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., No. 96-568, 1998 WL 88039 (U.S.
Mar. 4, 1998).
170. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(a) (1994).
171. Oncale, 1998 WL 88039, at *3.
172. Id. at *4.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Onacle, 1998 WL 88039, at4.
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with offensive sexual connotations, but actually constituted 'discrimina[tion]
because of... sex."'
177
While some may construe this decision by the Court to open the gate to
the slippery slope of sexual harassment lawsuits, the Court was quick to
reinforce what it considers a "crucial" requirement of Title VII.' The
conduct must be so offensive, the Court reminded readers, that it either: 1)
alters the conditions of the victim's employment; or 2) is "severe or
pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work
environment-an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or
abusive. ' 179 Normal social behavior in the workplace ("such as male-on-
male horseplay or intersexual flirtation")... is not enough to meet this
standard.' The Court cautioned that factf'mders must look to the context of
the behavior and use common sense in their determination of what
constitutes actionable sexual harassment under Title VII.182
Although the Court, with its decision in Oncale, has relieved some of
the confusion about same-general sexual harassment claims under Title VII,
questions still remain. For example, what of plaintiffs like Joseph Oncale?
How does Mr. Oncale prove that the sexually humiliating treatment he
received from three male heterosexual co-workers in an all-male work
environment constituted discriminatory treatment because of his sex? Is
sexual harassment in his situation legally possible, even given the arguably
lenient evidentiary guidelines delineated by the Court?
And, what of Mr. Fredette in his same-gender sexual harassment claim
against BVP Management Associates? As of this writing, his claim has not
been reheard by the trial court. Given the Supreme Court's ruling in Oncale,
Mr. Fredette's claim, unlike Mr. Oncale's, may be easier to prove. His
harasser was a known homosexual, thus easing his burden of proving that the
harassment was because of his sex. However, like all sexual harassment
plaintiffs, Mr. Fredette will still need to prove that the harassment he
experienced altered the conditions of his employment in some way and/or
was so abusive or hostile as to offend the "objective" reasonable person.
At least the Supreme Court has now made clear that whether Mr.
Fredette, Mr. Oncale, and other plaintiffs like them, experienced
discriminatory treatment because of their sex is not a legal question, but one
of fact, to be decided by the factfinder.
177. Id.
178. ld
179. Id (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 50 U.S. 17 (1993)).
180. lad
181. Oncale, 1998 WL 88039, at *4.
182. Id.
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Convicted Sex Offenders: Where Do You Live? Are We
Entitled to Know? A Year's Retrospective of Ex Post Facto
Challenges to Sex Offender Community Notification Laws
I. INTRODUCTION
Jesse Timmendequas has been sentenced to death for the July 29, 1994
kidnapping, rape, sodomy, and murder of seven-year-old Megan Kanka.
The thirty-six-year-old pedophile, whose crime stunned the nation and
sparked dozens of laws aimed at protecting children and the public from
sexual predators, had previously been convicted and sentenced to ten years
in a New Jersey state prison for sexual offenders for two sexual assaults
against both a five and a seven-year-old girl.2 Timmendequas, along with
two other men who also had been convicted of child sex crimes, lived across
the street from the Kanka family.3  The Kankas had no idea of
Timmendequas's violent past.4 Perhaps if they had, the tragedy of Megan's
death could have been prevented.
Turning their personal loss into a positive campaign to protect other
children, Richard and Maureen Kanka led the fight for legislation to better
protect families and communities from becoming victims of violent sexual
predators.5 As a result of their efforts, New Jersey Governor Christine Todd
Whitman signed a package of bills known as "Megan's Law" on October 31,,6
1994, just three months after Megan's death. This legislation requires
convicted sex offenders to register with local authorities upon their release
from prison. The law goes even further to allow authorities to noti ' the
public if a potentially dangerous sex offender lives or works in the area.
Unfortunately, despite the effectiveness of sex offender laws,8 civil
rights and civil liberties lawyers have led a crusade on behalf of sex
1. Lisa L. Colangelo, Jury Sentences Megan Kanka's Killer to Death, ASBURY PARK
PRESS, June 21, 1997, at Al.
2. Joel Bewley, Chief Criticizes Middlesex, TIMES, June 21, 1997, at A4.
3. Colangelo, supra note 1, at A4.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Kirsten R. Bredlie, Keeping Children Out of Double Jeopardy: An Assessment of
Punishment and Megan's Law in Doe v. Poritz, 81 MiNN. L. REV. 501, 512 (1996). A study
of Washington's Community Protection Act, a statute similar to "Megan's Law," concluded
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offenders, challenging the constitutionality of "Megan's Law" and similar
sex offender statutes across the country. They have argued that the
registration and public notification laws violate the prohibitions against
Double Jeopardy, Bills of Attainder, invade sex offenders' constitutional
rights to privacy, and do not adhere to the provisions of the Constitution's
Due Process Clause.9 Because legislatures have applied their sex offender
statutes to offenders convicted before the passage of these statutes, the
attorneys contend that the laws also impose impermissible punishments on
previously convicted sex offenders, thus violating the United States
Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause. 10
II. Ex POST FACTO LAWS
According to the United States Constitution, neither the federal
government nor any state shall make an ex post facto law." The Ex Post
Facto Clause prohibits legislatures and judiciaries from punishing as a crime
an act which was innocent when it occurred, because it occurred before the
enactment of the new legislation.12 In order to determine if a law is an ex
post facto law, courts must determine if the law is being applied
retroactively, in addition to whether the law is merely a regulation or an
unconstitutional second form of punishment. 13 The Framers passed the Ex
that sex 'offenders who were subject[ed] to community notification were arrested for new
crimes much more quickly than comparable offenders who were released without
notification."' Id. at 512 (citations omitted). Law enforcement authorities in Hamilton
Township, New Jersey, the hometown of the Kanka family, credit "Megan's Law" with
helping police departments to better protect citizens against sex offenders. Bewley, supra note
2, at A4.
9. Ronald K. Chen, Constitutional Challenges to Megan's Law: A Year's Retrospective,
6 B.U. PuB. INT. L.J. 57, 58-59 (1996). "[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits 'a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction and multiple punishments for the same
offense."' Id. at 60 (quoting United States v. Haper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989)). The Bill of
Attainder Clause prohibits legislatures from enacting "'[l]egislative acts, no matter what their
form, that apply either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in
such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial."' Id. at 59-60 (quoting
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 448-49 (1965)).
10. John Gibeaut, Defining Punishment: Courts Split on Notification Provisions of Sex
Offender Law, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1997, at 36.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 An ex post facto law is defined as "[a] law passed
after the occurrence of a fact or commission of an act, which retrospectively changes the legal
consequences or relations of such fact or deed." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 580 (6th ed.
1990).
12. Ryan A. Boland, Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification:
Protection, Not Punishment, 30 NEw ENG. L. REv. 183, 198 (1995).
13. Id.
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Post Facto Clause because they were apprehensive about "'the violent acts
which might grow out of the feelings of the moment, ... the people of the
United States, in adopting that instrument, have manifested a determination
to shield themselves and their property from the effects of those sudden and
strong passions to which men are exposed."' 14 The Ex Post Facto Clause
aims to ensure that legislatures give citizens notice of the law, so that they
may know what the law is before they act.15 The Clause also aims to inhibit
legislatures from succumbing to political pressure by passing legislation that
is vengeful toward unpopular individuals or groups.
III. Ex POST FACTO CHALLENGES TO STATE SEX OFFENDER LAWS
The requirement of convicted sex offenders to register with local police
upon their release from prison or treatment facilities has almost unanimously
been upheld against ex post facto challenges because courts view the
registration requirement as merely a regulation, not a second form of
punishment.17  However, many state legislatures have gone further than
requiring registration with police. More than forty states, including New
Jersey, have adopted additional community notification provisions to their
sex offender laws which allow authorities to notify the public of a convicted
sex offender's presence in the community. 18 Such notification provisions,
when applied retroactively, are continuously being challenged as violative of
the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution.
The proponents of public notification provisions contend that the
legislation aims to protect the public, not to punish those sex offenders who
have already served their court imposed sentences. 19 Opponents of the
provision argue that when applied, the laws impose an unconstitutional,
additional form of punishment by publicly humiliating sex offenders and
14. W.P. v. Porit7, 931 F. Supp. 1199, 1211 (D.N.J. 1996) (quoting Cummings v.
Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Vall.) 277,322 (1866)), rev'd, W.P. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1039 (1998). While this case was reversed, this reversal does
not effect the substance of this article. For further analysis see addendum.
15. Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994).
16. Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd in part, rev'd in part,
120 F.3d 1263 (2nd Cir. N.Y. 1997), and cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1066 (1998). While this
case was reversed, this reversal does not effect the substance of this article. For further
analysis see addendum.
17. Id. at 629.
18. Daniel L. Feldman, The Scarlet Letter Laws of the 1990's: A Response to Critics,
60 ALB. L. REv. 1081, 1083 (1997).
19. Bredlie, supra note 8, at 510. Proponents of the notification provision contend that
the laws have increased public awareness about sex crimes and have led to the deterrence of
sex crimes and apprehension of reoffenders. Id at 512.
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leaving them susceptible to public vengeance.20  Since most states' sex
offender laws apply to acts committed prior to their effective date, courts
must examine whether the enforcement of such laws adds a more
burdensome punishment to convicted sex offenders to determine whether
there is an ex post facto violation.21 Thus, if courts determine that informing
the public that a sex offender is living or working in the community does not
constitute punishment, there can be no ex post facto violation.22 A court's
finding that public notification violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, however,
does not make the statute unconstitutional; the statute can still be applied to
those convicted of sexual crimes after the statute's effective date.
IV. IS COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION A FORM OF
PUNISHMENT? SPLIT DECISION
The problem for courts facing ex post facto challenges to sex offender
laws' public notification provisions is that the United States Supreme Court
has yet to establish a definitive test to apply in determining whether such
laws are punitive.23  Consequently, this lack of certainty adds to the
disagreement among lower courts on the legal standard to be used in
evaluating whether public notification provisions have a punitive effect.24 In
one of the Court's more recent decisions regarding whether government
action constituted punishment, United States v. Ursery,25 the Court seemed
to give lower courts even more flexibility in deciding ex post facto
challenges to notification provisions of state sex offender laws. 26  Thus,
20. Id. at 542. Sex offenders in Louisiana whose victims were under 18 years old must
send postcards to their neighbors notifying them of their crimes and presence in the
community. Id. at 508. In addition, sex offenders may be required to place "Sex Offender On
Board" bumper stickers on their cars. Id. Enforcement of the public notification provision
will lead to harassment, ostracism and vigilantism. These results make the public notification
provision punitive, rather than remedial or regulatory. Bredlie, supra note 8, at 542.
21. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 326 (1866); see also Calder v. Bull,
3 U.S. 386, 389 (1798) ("With very few exceptions, the advocates of such laws were
stimulated by ambition, or personal resentment, and vindictive malice.").
22. See W.P. v. Poritz, 931 F. Supp. 1199, 1211 (D.N.J. 1996).
23. See Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
24. Id.
25. 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
26. Id. The United States Supreme Court heard two separate double jeopardy
challenges to civil forfeiture statutes 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) and (7) (1994). Id. at 2147. The
Court ruled that civil drug-asset forfeitures are not punishment under the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Constitution. Id. The Justices indicated that other courts have incorrectly
interpreted United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989), and Austin v. United States, 509
U.S. 602 (1993), to arrive at a universal definition of punishment. Id. Ursery expressly
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since the Ursery decision, court opinions regarding ex post facto
constitutional challenges to sex offender notification laws have continued to
be inconsistent.
2 7
Given the importance of the issue, the increasing number of convicted
sex offenders who will be affected by community notification laws across
the United States, and the growing division among the lower courts, the
Supreme Court needs to address the ex post facto question. Within the past
year alone, from July 1996 through July 1997, at least nine ex post facto
challenges against the application of community notification provisions have
been heard by state supreme courts, United States District Courts, and
United States Courts of Appeal. 28  The score: four courts have held that
public notification is punishment and, is thus unconstitutional. Five others
have ruled that notification is not punishment and upheld the provision.
Such courts have found themselves in disagreement on the essential question
of whether public notification is considered a second form of punishment, or
rejects the notion that a definition of punishment can be derived through a synthesis of the
Supreme Court's recent decisions in Halper andAustin. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2147.
In its decision, the Court looked at both the legislative intent of the civil forfeiture statute
and also determined whether the statute was deemed punitive in either its purpose or effect.
Id. at 2142. First, the Court concluded that civil forfeiture has historically not been viewed as
punishment. Id. at 2149. Also, the Court emphasized that civil forfeiture was an in rem
proceeding brought against property. Id. at 2147. The Court contrasted in rem forfeiture
proceedings with punitive or potentially punitive in personam proceedings. Id. at 2140-42,
2147. Inpersonam is defined as an "[a]ction seeking judgment against a person involving his
personal rights." BLACK'S LAW DICnONARY 791 (6th ed. 1990). In rem is defined as "actions
instituted against the thing, in contradistinction to personal actions, which are said to be in
personam." Id at 793. Finally, the Court concluded that while civil forfeiture had certain
punitive aspects, it also served more important nonpunitive goals. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2148.
Although Ursery was based on a Double Jeopardy Clause challenge, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals held that Ursery's analysis was "equally applicable" to ex post facto
challenges. U.S. v. Certain Funds, 96 F.3d 20, 26 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, Ko v. United
States, 117 S. Ct. 954 (1997).
Despite leaving courts with a more flexible analytical framework for future cases
involving dual forms of punishment, the Ursery decisions instructs courts to find precedent
more closely related to the factual scenarios of the cases before them. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at
2146; see also W.P., 931 F. Supp. at 1209 (stating the tests used by courts to determine
punishment will vary from case to case depending on the nature of the provision challenged).
27. Gibeaut, supra note 10, at 37.
28. See Doe v. Kelley, 961 F. Supp. 1105 (W.D. Mich. 1997); Doe v. Gregoire, 960 F.
Supp. 1478 (W.D. Wash. 1997); State v. Pickens, 558 N.W.2d 396 (Iowa 1997); Doe v. Weld,
954 F. Supp. 425 (D. Mass. 1996); Lee v. Louisiana, 681 So. 2d 1020 (La. Ct. App. 1996);
Doe, 940 F. Supp. at 603; Roe v. Office of Adult Probation, 938 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Conn.
1996); Kansas v. Myers, 923 P.2d 1024 (Kan. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2508 (1997);
W.P. v. Poritz, 931 F. Supp. at 1199.
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merely serving a legitimate public service-public safety.29 Now that the
line has been drawn, it is time for the United States Supreme Court to
declare a winner.
This Note critically examines a year's retrospective of the judicial
trends regarding ex post facto challenges to the community notification and
public disclosure provisions of state sex offender laws. The Note concludes
by advocating that the Supreme Court should uphold the provisions, even if
to a limited extent.
V. W.P V. PORITZ
W.P. v. Poritz3° was one of the first decisions to declare that the public
notification provision of New Jersey's sex offender statute did not impose
"punishment" within the meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the
Constitution. 31  The court used both an objective and subjective test to
determine whether the state's statute was punitive, thus, violating the Ex
Post Facto Clause.32 In analyzing whether the law's community notification
provision was punitive, the court examined such factors as: 1) the expressed
subjective legislative intent; 2) the objective purpose of the legislation,
including the balancing of remedial and punitive goals; 3) the historical
analysis of community notification laws; and 4) the effects of such
legislation. 33  34
Also known as "Megan's Law," New Jersey's sex offender statute
forces convicted sex offenders to register with local governmental
authorities. 35  After registering, the sex offenders are then categorized
depending on their degree of dangerousness and their likelihood of
committing another sexual offense.36 "Megan's Law" classifies convicted
sex offenders into three levels of dangerousness: Tier I is for low-risk
29. Gibeaut, supra note 10, at 36.
30. 931 F. Supp. 1199 (D.N.J. 1996), rev'd, W.P. v. Vemiero, 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1039 (1998). While this case was reversed, this reversal does
not effect the substance of this article. For further analysis see addendum.
31. Id. at 1219. Sex offenders who, as required by law, had registered with local
authorities upon their release from treatment facilities, brought a class action suit challenging
the public notification provisions of New Jersey's Registration and Community Notification
Laws. The suit alleged that the notification provision was violative of their due process rights
and/or of the prohibition against ex post facto laws and double jeopardy. Id. at 1203.
32. Id. at 1213.
33. Id. at 1209; see also United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996) (suggesting
that purpose and effect of a statute should be considered in ex post facto analysis).
34. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997).
35. W.P., 931 F. Supp. at 1204.
36. Id.
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offenders; Tier II is for moderate risk offenders; and Tier I is for those with
the highest risk of recidivism.37 Under Tier I, only law enforcement officials
are notified of a sex offender's presence in the community.38 However, if
classified under Tier II, law enforcement officials notify certain community
organizations who may come into contact with the Tier II sex offender,
including local schools, child day care centers, summer camps, community
groups, and other organizations that work with children and battered
women. 9 Finally, if classified as a Tier III sex offender, officials must
inform all members of the community, including specific individuals who
are likely to come in contact with the sex offender.40
When the New Jersey Legislature passed "Megan's Law" in response to
the public's fears and reports indicating that sex offenders pose a danger to
the community, it declared "[t]he danger of recidivism posed by sex
offenders... require[s] a system of registration that will permit law
enforcement officials to identify and alert the public when necessary for the
public safety."41 The court accepted the legislature's sentiments as sufficient
evidence of the legislature's subjective intent for the statute.42 Clearly,
according to the court, the subjective intent of the legislature revealed a
public safety concern for the community, rather than an intent to punish
convicted sex offenders.
43
In analyzing the second element, the objective purpose of the
legislation, the court paid close attention to the history of the statute to
determine if "Megan's Law" was enacted out of the "sudden and strong
passions" which the Framers specifically designed the Ex Post Facto Clause
to combat.44 Such analysis included whether "Megan's Law" was passed for
a remedial, retributive, or a deterrent purpose.45 The court concluded that
the statute served the remedial purpose of protecting the community,
especially children, from convicted sexual predators who have a statistically-
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. W.P., 931 F. Supp. at 1204.
41. Id. at 1213 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997)).
42. .P., 931 F. Supp. at 1213.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1214. The court defined such terms as remedial, retributive, and deterrent as
it thought the United States Supreme Court would use them. Id. Remedial measures "seek to
solve a problem, for instance by removing the likely perpetrators of future corruption instead
of threatening them (De Veau), or compensating the government for costs incurred (Halper)."
W.P., 931 F. Supp. at 1214. Retribution is "vengeance for its own sake." Id. Finally,
deterrent measures serve as a "threat of negative repercussions to discourage people from
engaging in certain behavior." Id.
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proven risk of committing sexual crimes again in the future.46 However, the
court also noted that the statute served a deterrent purpose as well.47
Nonetheless, in the court's opinion, this complement of both a remedial and
a deterrent purpose did not make the notification provision of "Megan's
Law" a second form of punishment.48 The community notification provision
did not suggest a retributive purpose, rather its goal was to prevent or reduce
the likelihood of similar sexual offenses.: Therefore, the court ruled that
the legislature's motivation behind the passage of "Megan's Law" was not
punitive, but remedial. °
The court's historical analysis of the community notification provision
focused on whether the impact of the law is one that could historically be
regarded as punitive.51 Throughout American history, public humiliation has
often been used to punish wrongdoers. 2 Although "Megan's Law" aims to
inform communities about potentially dangerous sex offenders, communit
notification arguably results in public humiliation for such offenders.
Thus, the impact of "Megan's Law" may be similar to other forms of
colonial punishment. 4 Nonetheless, although public humiliation could be an
anticipated result of "Megan's Law," the court ruled that public shame or
embarrassment was not enough to deem the notification provision a form of
punishment.55
Noting the differences between historical punishments and "Megan's
Law," the court first concluded that public humiliation and community
ostracism was not a certain result, unlike the procedures used in colonial
times.56 Second, essential to the historical forms of punishment was the
physical participation of the offender.57 On the contrary, "Megan's Law"
only requires sex offenders to register with authorities. 8  Modem
46. Id. at 1214.
47. Id.
48. W.P., 931 F. Supp. at 1214.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1215.
52. Id. Throughout colonial times, criminals, as well as religious sinners were often
required to stand in public with signs notifying the public of their offenses. W.P., 931 F.
Supp. at 1215. An example of public humiliation as a form of punishment can best be seen in
Nathaniel Hawthorne's novel Scarlet Letter, where Puritans forced Hester Pryne to wear the
letter "A" on her clothing to symbolize her adultery. Id.
53. See id. at 1216.
54. Id.
55. See id.
56. W.P., 931 F. Supp. at 1217.
57. Id. at 1216.
58. Id.
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technology, such as photographs, are used to notify the public and require no
physical participation by sex offenders.59 Third, unlike historical public
forms of punishment whose primary purpose was to chastise, "Megan's
Law" was not intended to punish sex offenders, but to protect the public and
deter similar crimes from reoccurring.60 Finally, the court noted that the
historical public humiliation forms of punishment were the criminal's or
sinner's primary sentence.61 However, from the days of the United States'
origin, the government has informed the community about wanted dangerous
criminals and their presence in the community without violating the United
States Constitution. Through the use of "wanted" posters and the FBI's
most wanted list, the government has been able to both inform and protect
the public as well as solicit the public's assistance in apprehending such
criminals. 3 The use of these procedures has never been characterized as
devices used to punish the criminals, but have been viewed as means for
public protection and safetyi 4 Therefore, the court concluded that although
"Megan's Law" has some similarities to historical forms of punishment, the
notification provision was designed and used to protect the public, rather
than punish sex offenders.
65
Turning to the final element, the effects of "Megan's Law" on the lives
of sex offenders, the court found that the effects of the community
notification provision did not constitute a form of punishment.66 Looking to
the precedent of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the court stated that
"[i]f the negative repercussions-regardless of how they are justified-are
great enough, the measure must be considered punishment." 67  With the
enactment of "Megan's Law" and similar sex offender statutes across the
country, sex offenders have often been targets of vigilantism.
68
59. Id.
60. Id
61. W.P., 931 F. Supp. at 1217.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1218.
66. W.P., 931 F. Supp. at 1219.
67. Id. at 1218 (quoting Artway v. Attorney General, 81 F.3d 1235, 1263 (3d Cir.
1996)).
68. Id. at 1211-12. In New Jersey, an innocent man was severely beaten by two
assailants who mistakenly believed him to be a sex offender. Id. at 1211, n. 11. The innocent
man happened to live at the address that was given to members of the community through the
implementation of "Megan's Law." Id In Washington, the enforcement of community
notification led to a sex offender's house being burned to the ground. WP., 931 F. Supp. at
1211, n. 11. Furthermore, when the Guardian Angels received information regarding a sex
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Acknowledging the existence of such vigilantism, the court was nevertheless
satisfied that the criminal activity directed toward sex offenders was neither
condoned nor promoted by the courts or the state.69 The court noted that
when authorities notify the public of a sex offender's presence in the
community, they specifically inform the public that any criminal activity
directed toward sex offenders will not be tolerated and vigorously
prosecuted.70
Although the defendants did not condone the public vigilantism, they
successfully argued that the public is entitled to take legally-justified action
to protect themselves from sex offenders and to further achieve the remedial
goals of "Megan's Law., 71 Such legally-justified action includes avoiding
contact with sex offenders, warning children about the sex offender's
presence, boycotting a registrant's place of business, refusing to hire the sex
offender or purchase his or her property, and taking steps to further
disseminate information about the registrant through local talk radio and
newspapers.72 While neither condoning nor disapproving these actions, the
court concluded that such behavior, along with criminal vigilantism, could
not be equated to additional forms of "punishment" under the law.73
Therefore, the court entered summary judgment for the defendants, declaring
that the notification provision did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the
United States Constitution.
74
VI. STATE V. MYERS
Shortly after the W.P. v. Poritz decision, the Supreme Court of Kansas
decided otherwise in State v. Myers.75 In that case, the court held that the
retroactive application of Kansas's Sex Offender Registration Act's
("KSORA) 7 public disclosure provision violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Additionally, the court ruled that the provision imposed an additional form
of punishment on convicted sex offenders.77  In finding the public
notification provision of KSORA unconstitutional, the court considered the
factors used by the United States Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-
offender's presence in the community, they organized a manhunt to discover the person's true
identity. Id. at 1213.
69. Id. at 1212.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. W.P., 931 F. Supp. at 1212.
73. Id. at 1209.
74. Id. at 1224.
75. 923 P.2d 1024 (Kan. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2508 (1997).
76. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4901 (1995).
77. Myers, 923 P.2d at 1027.
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Martinez. The court examined such factors as: 1) whether KSORA's
public notification provision placed an affirmative disability or restraint on a
plaintiff; 2) whether the provision could historically be viewed as
punishment; 3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter; 4)
whether its application promotes traditional punishment-deterrence and
retribution; 5) whether it applies to behavior which is already a crime; 6)
whether the provision serves another purpose; and 7) whether KSORA's
public notification provision is excessive in relation to its alternate
purpose.
79
However, some contend that the Mendoza-Martinez factors are
inapplicable in determining whether a public notification provision of a sex
offender law is punitive and therefore, their use conflicts with the Supreme
Court's decision in Ursery.80 Nonetheless, beginning with the decision in
Myers, the next three ex post facto challenges to sex offender public
notification provisions in 1996 would all favor the side of convicted sex
offenders.
Unlike the community notification laws of states like New Jersey and
New York, which only provide for the public dissemination of information
regarding those sex offenders who pose a high risk of recidivism, KSORA
78. Id. at 1040; see Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). In Mendoza-
Martinez, the Court declared that the provisions in the Nationality Act of 1940 and the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which strip Americans of their citizenship for
evading the draft, are unconstitutional because of their punitive nature and due to the fact that
they fal to provide the procedural safeguards required by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of
the Constitution. Id. at 186. However, the Supreme Court also stated that the Mendoza-
Martinez factors should be used to determine whether a law is punitive only when there is no
conclusive evidence of the legislature's purpose for a statute. Id at 168-69; see also People
v. Adams, 581 N.E.2d 637, 641-42 (Ill. 1991) (noting that the Mendoza-Martinez factors
should only apply when the legislative purpose for a sex offender statute is unclear or when
the purpose of the statute is regulatory rather than punitive). Clearly, in Myers the legislature
stated a public safety purpose for KSORA. See Myers, 923 P.2d at 1032.
79. Id. at 1033; see Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69. The court in Myers stated
that the Mendoza-Martinez factors are helpful in considering the plaintiff's ex post facto
claim. However, the court ruled that the Mendoza-Martinez factors should not be applied as a
"pass/fail test or in a checklist fashion." Myers, 923 P.2d at 1033. The court believed some of
the factors are more important and significant than others in determining whether KSORA's
public notification provision has a punitive effect. Id.
80. See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 400-01 (N.J. 1995); see also Artway v. New
Jersey, 81 F.3d 1235, 1262 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that the Mendoza-Martinez test cannot be
used with "Megan's Law" because the "Supreme Court has made [it] clear that the Mendoza-
Martinez test is not controlling for the issue in this case.").
However, according to the court in Myers, the Supreme Court in Ursery advocated the
use of the Mendoza-Martinez factors in deciding whether a statute has a punitive or a
nonpunitive effect. See Myers, 923 P.2d at 1036.
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permits complete public access to information regarding all registered sex
offenders.8 1  Keeping this in mind, the Supreme Court of Kansas was
convinced that both the application and effects of KSORA's broad public
notification provision were extreme.82
As required by KSORA, the defendant Kym E. Myers registered with
the local sheriff's office upon his release from prison. As a result of his
registration, local television and newspapers provided the public with
information about Myers, including his name and address, and branded him83
as a convicted sex offender. During his hearing regarding his motion to
challenge the enforcement of KSORA, the judge allowed Myers to tell the
court about his life since registering with authorities as a sex offender under
KSORA. 4 Myers spoke of how he would rather have remained in prison
than face the ostracism that he had experienced since registering as a
convicted sex offender.8 ' Having been evicted from his mother's apartment,
Myers, a disbarred lawyer, claimed that no one would hire him or rent him a
place to live. Myers claimed that he was forced to live in a halfway house
with twelve other convicted criminals.86 Myers said, "'I can't live like this
and every morning I get up to look at the paper - I'm paranoid .... I have no
money. I don't know what I'm going to do. At least in prison I knew I had a
place to sleep.',
8 7
Although the legislature intended KSORA's public notification
provision to protect the public by serving as a deterrent to sexual predators,
81. Myers, 923 P.2d at 1029. Besides Kansas, only Georgia and South Dakota have sex
offender laws that provide unrestricted public access to information regarding sex offenders.
New York, New Jersey, Iowa, North Carolina, and Vermont have all begun to limit the
disclosure of information to the public regarding sex offenders. Id. 1028-29. In order to
avoid ex post facto challenges, the State of Pennsylvania has gone even further by applying its
community notification provision only to sex offenders who have committed their crimes after
the effective date of their statute. Id. at 1029. The Kansas Legislature passed KSORA after
the murder of Stephanie Schmidt. Id. at 1031. She was killed by her co-worker Donald Ray
Gideon how had previously been convicted of rape and aggravated sodomy. Myers, 923 P.2d
at 1031.
82. Id. at 1043.
83. Id. at 1027. The defendant in the case, Kym E. Meyers, was convicted of sexual
battery and rape in 1991. Id. However, the conviction was reversed by the Court of Appeals
and remanded for a new trial. Id. Upon remand, he pled no contest to the aggravated sexual
battery of a seventeen-year-old female. Myers, 923 P.2d at 1027. Sentenced from two to five
years, Myers was given credit for his time served in prison and received only one year
probation. Id.
84. Id. at 1027-28.
85. Id. at 1028.
86. Id.
87. Myers, 923 P.2d at 1028.
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the court believed the unlimited public disclosure of information would lead
to retributive or punitive results. 8 Upholding KSORA's registration
provision, the court stated that the unlimited public access to information
about sex offenders far exceeded what is necessary to "promote public
safety."89 Not persuaded by the W.P. v. Poritz decision, the court feared that
unlimited access would allow television and radio stations, as well as
newspapers, to disseminate information about sex offenders on a daily basis,
forcing the offenders to become victims of public disgrace, ostracism, and
potential vigilantism.90 Although the court thought that public access should
be provided in limited circumstances, unlike "Megan's Law," KSORA does
not provide for limited access. 91 Thus, finding the scope of disclosure
excessive and punitive in nature, the court ruled that KSORA was
unconstitutional as applied to the defendant, Myers.92 Furthermore, the court
ordered sheriff's offices across the state to prevent the disclosure of
information pertaining to sex offenders who committed offenses prior to
KSORA's effective date.93
VII. ROE V. OFFICE OF ADULT PROBATION
Just four days after the Kansas Supreme Court's decision in Myers, the
United States District Court of Connecticut, in Roe v. Office of Adult
Probation,94 granted a convicted sex offender a preliminary injunction that
prohibited authorities from notifying the public that a sex offender was in the
community.95 The court found that Connecticut's Sex Offender Notification
Policy constituted punishment, when applied retroactively to the plaintiff, a
88. Id. at 1041-42. Even though the legislature pointed to public safety as its purpose
for KSORA, the court analyzed the effects of the statute to determine if they would negate the
legislature's nonpunitive purpose. Id. at 1032. The court noted that the hardship on a sex
offender in finding a job, housing, or maintaining stable relationships, as a result of KSORA's
notification provision, imposed an "affirmative disability" on the lives of sex offenders. Id. at
1041.
89. Id. at 1043.
90. Myers, 923 P.2d at 1042. The court noted that unlimited public disclosure would
lead to a situation like that in the novel The Scarlet Letter and other forms of punishment like
"shame" and "ignominy." Id. at 1042.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1044.
93. Id.
94. 938 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Conn. 1996), vacated, 125 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1997). While
this case was vacated on appeal, it did not effect the substance of this article. For further
analysis see addendum.
95. Id. at 1094.
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previously convicted sex offender.96 Therefore, the court ruled that the
notification policy violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States
Constitution.
In contrast to Kansas's sex offender statute, which called for unlimited
public access, Connecticut's Sex Offender Notification Policy has two levels
of notification, depending upon a sex offender's risk of danger.98 If a sex
offender is classified under the first level, authorities will notify the
offender's victims, victims' parents, local police, as well as the offender's
immediate family and those who reside with the offender.99 If after a clinical
evaluation, a sex offender is considered extremely dangerous, such as being
deemed a pedophile or predatory rapist, authorities will notify the offender's
neighbors, the offender's employer, local elementary schools and child day
care facilities, and others who might be in danger because of the sex
offender's close proximity. 00 Authorities, however, are not bound by the
sex offender notification policy guidelines. In fact, they may exceed the
notification requirements, if they believe others need to be notified about a
sex offender in order to help prevent another sexual crime.
10
'
Upon his release from prison, after serving six years for six counts of
second degree sexual assault of a minor, the plaintiff was deemed a "high
risk" sexual offender who posed an extreme danger to minors.102 As a result
of the plaintiff's classification, authorities intended to notify the plaintiffs
neighbors, employer, and others in his community about his criminal
history.10 3 Alleging that public notification of his criminal history violated
his constitutional rights by subjecting him to a second form of punishment-
public stigma and ostracism-the plaintiff filed suit.1 4 The court ordered
that before authorities could release information about the plaintiff to the
community, Connecticut's Office of Adult Probation needed to review the
plaintiffs classification as a "high risk" sexual offender.105 Unfortunately,
before such a review could take place, the plaintiff's probation officer had
already informed the plaintiff's family, employer, landlord, and his victims
about the plaintiff's criminal past. In addition to the details of his criminal
history, these individuals were also given information regarding the
plaintiff's address, age, height, weight, build, hair and eye color, skin color,
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1084.
99. Roe, 938 F. Supp. at 1084.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1083.
102. Id. at 1085.
103. Id.
104. Roe, 938 F. Supp. at 1085.
105. Id.
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and a description of his car.10 6 Regardless of the outcome of the plaintiff's
legal action, the damage to the plaintiff had already been done.
To determine whether the public notification provision would inflict a
greater punishment on the plaintiff, the State advocated that the court look
only to the legislative intent of Connecticut's sex offender law in deciding if
it serves a remedial or punitive purpose.10 7 Rejecting the State's argument,
the court found that the legislative intent is but one factor to consider in its
analysis. 10 8  Considering the tests applied by other courts in their
determination of whether state action constitutes punishment,10 9 the court
adopted the Mendoza-Martinez test for its ex post facto analysis, despite the
State's objections.110 The court found that this test was closely related to the
test used by the United States Supreme Court in its recent Ursery decision.1
After analyzing the first element of the Mendoza-Martinez test, the
court found that the effects of Connecticut's public notification provision
placed an affirmative disability on sex offenders.1 2  The court found the
provision would inevitably lead to unlimited negative consequences, such as
restricting a sex offender's ability to move from place to place1 13 According
to the court, notifying a sex offender's neighbors, employers, landlords, and
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1089 (relying on Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958)).
108. Id. at 1090.
109. Roe, 938 F. Supp. at 1090-91; see United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996);
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610 n.6 (1993); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435,
447 n.7 (1989).
110. Roe, 938 F. Supp. at 1090; see Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-
69 (1963). The Supreme Court in Mendoza-Martinez considered: 1) whether the sanction
involves an affirmative disability or restraint; 2) whether its operation will promote the
traditional aims of punishment; 3) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime;
4) whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it;
and 5) whether the sanction appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.
Id.
The State in Roe unsuccessfully argued that the Mendoza-Martinez factors should not be
used in deciding whether an additional form of punishment is being imposed. Roe, 938 F.
Supp. at 1090.
111. Id. In Ursery, an in rem forfeiture proceeding, the Supreme Court looked at both
the legislative intent and punitive effects of the forfeiture proceedings. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at
2147. Other considerations used by the Supreme Court included: 1) a historical analysis of
forfeiture; 2) whether the government must show scienter as a prerequisite to the sanction; 3)
whether the sanction serves a criminal goal; and 4) whether the sanction is tied to criminal
activity. Id. at 2149. The court in Roe found the factors considered by the Supreme Court in
Ursery "bear a substantial similarity to those enumerated in Mendoza-Martinez." Roe, 938 F.
Supp. at 1091.
112. Id at 1092.
113. Id
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others who reside with the sexual offender, of his or her violent, criminal
past would adversely affect all areas of a sex offender's life.1l4 The public
notification provision would force both sex offenders and others who come
in contact with the offender to change their behavior. 115 The court felt that
this modification of behavior indicated that the public notification provision
served punitive goals.
1 16
Along with finding that the public notification provision was analogous
to historical forms of punishment, the court concluded that the provision was
designed to deter people, including convicted sex offenders, from
committing sexual crimes.1 7 The provision's deterrent purpose helped the
court to find that the sanction was punitive.118 Moreover, because the
community notification provision applied to the plaintiff solely because of
his prior criminal sexual behavior, the court found this factor also supported
its view of the provision as punishment.
119
Next, the court considered whether the community notification
provision served a legitimate purpose, other than punishing a sex offender
for their criminal past.120  Secondly, the court examined whether the
provision seemed excessive in relation to the alternate non-punitive purpose
that the State advocated. 121 Although the court agreed with the State that
community notification aims to protect the public from heinous crimes, it
found the punitive effects of notification outweighed the State's non-
punitive intentions for the statute. 122 In addition, the court was not satisfied
with the link between the State's non-punitive goals-public safety and the
prevention of sex offenders committing similar crimes-and the means used
by the State-community notification-to carry out these goals.
123
In order to find Connecticut's Sex Offender Notification Policy
constitutional in the present case, the court said that the State needed to
show a "tight fit" between the means, community notification, and the ends,
public safety and reduction of recidivism. 24 According to the State, the use
of two levels of community notification demonstrated a close link between
the means and their remedial goals. 125 However, based on the testimony
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Roe, 938 F. Supp. at 1092.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Roe, 938 F. Supp. at 1092.
122. Id. at 1092-93.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1093.
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presented, the court found no distinction between the two levels of public
notification.126 The court concluded that the public notification provision
does nothing more than to single out and punish sex offenders for their prior
conduct.
127
When the plaintiff has both committed his crimes and been sentenced,
the plaintiff could not be subjected to the community notification provision
because the plaintiff did not have notice of the potential punishment for his
crimes. 128 According to the court, under the Constitution, the plaintiff was
entitled to such notice.129 Since the community notification subjected the
plaintiff to a second form of punishment, and the plaintiff was not given
notice of the potential governmental sanction, the court concluded that
Connecticut's sex offender notification policy offended the Ex Post Facto
Clause. 30 Therefore, the court granted the plaintiff a preliminary injunction
enjoining the Office of Adult Probation from enforcing its community
notification policy.
13
'
VIII. DOE V. PATAKI
A month after the Roe decision, the United States District Court of New
York held in Doe v. Pataki,132 that retroactive application of the New York
State Sex Offender Registration Act's 33 public notification and disclosure
provisions violated the Constitution's prohibition against ex post facto
laws.13 4 Groups of sex offenders who committed sexual crimes before the
statute took effect, brought suit to enjoin the state from notifying the public
of their release and disclosing information about their criminal pasts.
The New York State Sex Offender Registration Act, like similar
statutes in other states, classifies sex offenders based on their danger and
likelihood of recidivism. 36 New York's statute calls for three levels of
126. Roe, 938 F. Supp. at 1093.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1094.
129. Id. at 1093-94.
130. Id. at 1091, 1093-94.
131. Roe, 938 F. Supp. at 1094.
132. 940 F. Supp. 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd inpart, rev'd inpart, 120 F.3d 1263 (2nd
Cir. N.Y. 1997), and cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1066 (1998). While this case was reversed, this
reversal does not effect the substance of this article. For further analysis see addendum.
133. N.Y. CoRREcT. LAW § 168 (McKinney Supp. 1996).
134. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 605.
135. Id. at 604.
136. Id. at 607. The statute also requires sex offenders to register with the Division of
Criminal Justice Services within 10 days after discharge, parole, or release. Sex offenders
must register annually for a period of 10 years. Id. To register, sex offenders must provide
19981
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classification-low, moderate, and high. 137 If the Board of Examiners of Sex
Offenders finds that there is a low risk of a sex offender repeating a sexual
offense, only law enforcement officials are notified of an offender's release
from prison and presence in the community. 118 However, if a sex offender is
considered a moderate risk, authorities can notify "'any entity with
vulnerable populations."'' 139  Authorities are permitted to release a sex
offender's zip code, a photo of the sex offender, and information about the
sex offender's criminal history.140 If classified as a high risk sex offender
authorities can also provide the public with a sex offender's address.14
f
Furthermore, a high risk sex offender's registry information, including the
offender's address, physical description, and photograph, is placed in a
special violent sex offender directory.1 42 The directory is sent to local police
stations across the state and is accessible to the public. 143 Regardless of a
sex offender's classification, information about all registered sex offenders
is also made available to the public via a "900" telephone number.
144
Though the legislature intended for these measures to protect, the court
believed the legislature also intended to punish.145
The statistics for sexually violent crimes in the United States are
astounding. Nearly 133,000 females ages twelve and older fall victim to
rapes or attempted rapes each year.146 According to Department of Justice,
more than 17,000 girls under the age of twelve were raped in 1992.147 The
defendants also presented evidence revealing "high rates of recidivism
among sex offenders, particularly those who prey on children and that sex
offenders are significantly more likely than other repeat offenders to
such information as their name, birthday, sex, race, height, weight, eye color, driver's license
number, home address, description of their offense, date of conviction, sentence imposed, a
photograph of themselves, and their fingerprints. Id.
137. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 607.
138. Id.
139. Id. (quoting N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-1(6)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1996)).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 607.
143. Id.
144. Id. Before receiving information about sex offenders through the "900" number,
callers must be able to provide "some identifying information that reasonably identifies the
person in question." Id. at 607-08. Callers will also have to identify themselves. Id. at 608.
However, once a person receives information about a sex offender, they can further disclose
this information at their discretion. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 607.
145. Id. at 622.
146. Id. at 606.
147. Id.
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reoffend with sex offenses or other violent crimes. 148  Furthermore,
according to statistics, sex offenders are more likely than other criminals "to
go for long periods of time between offenses (thereby giving the false
impression of having been successfully rehabilitated). 149
Despite accepting the defendants' statistics as accurate and being
horrified by the circumstances of the Megan Kanka case,150 the court held
that the Constitution does not allow courts to balance the rights of children
and others with those of convicted sex offenders.51 Unfortunately, the Ex
Post Facto Clause does not provide exceptions to laws that will protect
society from becoming victims of rape, murder, or sexual abuse.
152
Looking to other court decisions regarding ex post facto challenges to
sex offender statutes, as well as United States Supreme Court decisions
regarding whether government action constitutes punishment, the Pataki
court formulated its own test for deciding the constitutionality of New
York's version of "Megan's Law."153 Because the Supreme Court had not
formulated a definitive test for whether government action constitutes
punishment for deciding ex post facto cases, the court in Pataki decided to
look at the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding New York's sex
offender public notification provision to determine if it constituted
punishment.15 4  Noting that other courts have had difficulty in deciding
whether to use the Mendoza-Martinez factors in their ex post facto analysis
the Pataki court stated that the factors are indeed helpful in such cases. 15
Thus, the court decided to look at the statute's: 1) legislative intent; 2)
design; 3) history; and 4) the effects of the notification statute, to determine
148. Id.
149. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 606.
150. Id. at 605.
151. Id.
152. Id
153. Id. at 620. The Pataki court looked to such decisions as United States v. Ursery,
116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); Artway v.
Attorney Gen., 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996); Roe v. Office of Adult Probation, 938 F. Supp.
1080 (D. Conn. 1996); W.P. v. Poritz, 931 F. Supp. 1199 (D.N.J. 1996); State v. Myers, 923
P.2d 1024 (Kan. 1996); Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995); and State v. Ward, 869 P.2d
1062 (Wash. 1994), to help formulate its own test for deciding the plaintiff's ex post facto
challenge to the public notification provision of New York's Sex Offender Registration Act.
Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 615-20. The court found that virtually all of the cases looked at such
factors as legislative intent, whether the statute is designed to punish, historical treatment, and
whether the law has the effects of punishing. Id. at 616.
154. Id. at 620.
155. Id The court noted that the Supreme Court actually used some of the Mendoza-
Martinez factors to reach its decision in United States v. Ursery. Id.
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if public notification imposes additional punishment on convicted sex
offenders.
15 6
Similar to the court in W.P. v. Poritz, the Pataki court analyzed the
legislative intent behind the passage of New York's sex offender public
notification provision from both objective and subjective viewpoints.1 57
According to the preamble of the statute, the legislature's intent for public
notification was to protect the public from the "'danger of recidivism posed
by sex offenders."' 158 Furthermore, the preamble also states that public
notification would help authorities in their quest to investigate, apprehend
and prosecute sex offenders if they return to their prior devious activities.
53
Thus, according to the court, the preamble revealed a subjective nonpunitive
intent for the public notification provision.160 While the court accepted the
preamble's regulatory intent for public notification, it had no doubt that the
legislature also intended to punish convicted sex offenders a second time.
161
In finding the legislative intent clearly punitive, the court had to look no
further than the debate minutes of the New York Legislature when it passed
the Sex Offender Registration Act in July of 1995. r62 Commenting on sex
offenders who have molested children, a member of the assembly stated,
"[w]e are talking about ... the lowest of the low .... [w]e are telling those
who act like that, .... that we in New York have had it. We are coming out
to get them and it's going to stop."' 63 Another speaking out to opponents of
the legislation stated "[d]on't give the protection to the animals, don't give it
to the people exploiting children, protect the children."' 164 And another
speaking on the effects of public notification proclaimed "a sex offender
who is [coming] out after serving his time might rethink as to where he is
going to relocate.., one of the results of this legislation might be that this
guy is going to go out of town, out of state, and that's very good for us."'
165
Finally, another member of the assembly equated repeat sexual offenders
with "the human equivalent of toxic waste." 166 In addition to making broad
characterizations about sex offenders, some legislators also stated that
because sex offenders had committed such reprehensible crimes, they
deserved any negative treatment that they would receive from the
156. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 620.
157. Id. at 621.
158. Id. (quoting N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168 (McKinney Supp. 1996)).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 621.
162. N.Y. CoRRECT. LAW § 168 (McKinney Supp. 1996).
163. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 621 (emphasis omitted).
164. Id. (emphasis omitted).
165. Id. (emphasis omitted).
166. Id. at 622. (emphasis omitted).
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communities. 167 Such thinking, combined with broad generalizations about
sex offenders, clearly demonstrated a punitive intent for the statute,
according to the court.1
68
In its analysis of the legislature's design of the public notification
provision, the court concluded that the legislation did not do enough to limit
the public dissemination of information about convicted sex offenders.1
69
Although the state tried to limit both public notification and public access to
personal data about registered sex offenders, the state's protective measures
were still too excessive and abusive.170 First, the Sex Offender Registration
Act covered too many people; the statute not only pertained to first time
sexual offenders, but to people who engaged in consensual sexual relations
with another person who was not a spouse, as well as others who did not
even engage in any sexual activity at all.'7 ' Even though the Act only
applied to people who engaged in illegal criminal activity, clearly some
circumstances covered by the Act did not warrant public notification,
according to the court.
172
Secondly, the court found that subjecting even low risk sexual offenders
to community notification indicated a punitive design for the statute.
73
Unlike other states such as Washington and New Jersey, which do not allow
for community notification or public access to information regarding all sex
offenders, New York allows for some public disclosure for all registered sex
offenders. 74 Under the Act, information regarding all sex offenders is
available through a special sex offender directory or through a "900"
telephone number. 175 Authorities, however, do attempt to control the public
access to information about sex offenders in several ways.176  A person
requesting information about a sex offender through the "900" line must first
167. Id.
168. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 622.
169. Id. at 624.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 623-24. The Act covers some 36 offenses, including seven misdemeanors.
A 21-year-old who engages in sexual intercourse with a consenting 16-year-old is subjected to
the legislation. In addition, the Act covers people who engage in incest, as well as, someone
who "restrains another person," so long as the victim is under the age of 17, even if no sexual
conduct is involved. Id. at 624. (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.05 (McKinney 1987)).
172. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 624.
173. Id.
174. Id; see State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 1070 (Wash. 1994); see also W.P. v. Poritz,
931 F. Supp. 1199, 1204 (D.N.J. 1996) (noting only disclosure to law enforcement officials is
allowed with regard to sex offenders who were deemed a low risk of recommitting a sexual
offense).
175. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 624.
176. Id. at 623.
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identify himself or herself to the authorities. Next, the person must provide
the authorities with some identifying information about the sex offender
before the requested information will be disseminated. 177 As for the special
sex offender directory, information will only be given out after a request in
writing. 178 Despite the state's efforts, the court was convinced that the Act
was overly broad and suggestively punitive. 1
79
Analyzing whether community notification is similar to historical forms
of punishment, the Pataki court looked at two traditional measures of
punishment: stigmatization and banishment.180  The use of public
humiliation as a form of punishment dates back to Biblical times, while
excluding people from society because of their crimes began in Colonial
England. According to the court, the New York Sex Offender
Registration Act's community notification provision was similar to such
historical punishments as stocks, pillories, and branding.18 2 Yet, instead of
branding sex offenders or placing them in stocks to inflict public humiliation
and shame, authorities today designed a "900" phone line, published a sex
offender directory, and used mass mailings to notify the public of a sex
offender's presence in a community.18 3 Like its historical counterparts, the
court found that community notification aimed to help sex offenders mend
their ways. 1
4
Advocates of the Sex Offender Registration Act argued that community
notification was a way to protect society, as opposed to a way of publicly
humiliating sex offenders for their wrongdoing. 85 However, the court did
not buy this argument, nor was the court persuaded by the comparison of
community notification laws to wanted posters seen in post offices across
the country.18 6  The difference between public notification and wanted
posters, according to the court, was that convicted sex offenders have
already paid their debt to society, while wanted fugitives still need to be
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 624. The Act also permitted law enforcement authorities to "disseminate
'relevant information' to 'any entity with vulnerable populations."' Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at
624. Authorities can then disclose information about sex offenders to others "at their
discretion." Id. The court found that this factor, combined with the other means of public
notification and disclosure, suggested a punitive design for the statute. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 624-26.
182. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 625.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 625-26; see W.P. v. Poritz, 931 F. Supp. 1199, 1217 (D.N.J. 1996).
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apprehended and prosecuted. 187 Furthermore, the court noted that the state's
comparison of sex offenders to outlaws further suggested the punitive nature
of the community notification provision.
1 88
Along with being analogous to historical forms of public humiliation,
the public notification provision of the New York statute was also
comparable to historical banishment.18 9  According to the court, sex
offenders subjected to community notification are often forced to move from
town to town, or from state to state. 190 Because physical banishment was
considered a harsher punishment than the public humiliation measures,
colonials designed banishment for those criminals who were most likely to
repeat their crimes.191 Similarly, legislators approved the community
notification laws to prevent sex offenders from recommitting their crimes
and to effectively banish them from society.192 Because the court found
many similarities between community notification and historical forms of
punishment, the court deemed public notification a form of punishment.
19 3
Nevertheless, of all the elements that the court looked at-intent,
design, and history-the court found that the effects of community
notification overwhelmingly made the provision punitive. 194 Undoubtedly,
the harsh results to sex offenders as a result of community notification both
in New York and other states, influenced the court in finding public
notification punitive. 195 In New York, school officials sent out information
to all residents of the school district, informing them of a sex offender's
presence in the community.196 Officials gave residents the sex offender's
name and specific address. As a result, the sex offender lost his job, and his
family members were tormented after receiving numerous harassing phone
calls. Moreoever, someone even attempted to break into a sex offender's
home. 197 In another case, a local newspaper published information about the
release of a "sexually violent predator" into the community. 98  Law
enforcement officials notified the public, releasing the sex offender's name,
street address, and photograph.199 The community branded the sex offender
187. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 626.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 621, 626.
193. Id. at 626.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 608-11, 627.
196. Id. at 609.
197. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 609.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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as a child molester, notwithstanding the fact that he committed his crime
against an adult woman.00
Some of the most extreme cases of vigilantism occurred in New Jersey.
After being released from prison, a convicted sex offender was forced out of
town due to the public's reaction to his presence in the community.2 1 News
reporters and the Guardian Angels, a community anti-crime organization, set
up a twenty-four hour stake-out in front of the sex offender's residence.20 2 In
addition to publicly threatening the sex offender and his family, the
Guardian Angels placed wanted posters throughout the community.20 3 Local
politicians also objected to the sex offender's presence. As a result, both the
sex offender and his mother were forced to move elsewhere. 204 In another
case, the sex offender's landlord locked him out of his apartment after
authorities notified the public of the convicted child molester's presence in
the community. In addition, the sex offender on multiple occasions, was
physically attacked.20 5 Finally, in another extreme incident, members of a
community broke into the home of a sex offender and mistakenly beat-up
and severely injured a visitor to the home, not the convicted sex offender. 20 6
Incidents of vigilantism have also occurred in Washington. After
disclosing to the public that a convicted child rapist would soon be released
from prison, the sex offender's home was burnt down.207 Upon moving to
another state, Washington authorities informed his new neighbors of his
presence. As a result, the sex offender had to move once more. In another
situation, a sex offender had become the target of community harassment.
After moving to another community, he was forced to move again because
local citizens distributed fliers that contained his photograph. 209 The sex
offender finally moved to another state, having lost three jobs since the
public was informed of his presence in the community.210 As a result of
community notification, sex offenders in several states have reportedly lost
their jobs, found it difficult to obtain employment, suffered damage to their
property, have been forced to move, and have been victimized by public
threats and acts of violence.2
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 609.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 610.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 608-12.
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Even though the court was influenced by the negative consequences of
community notification, evidence suggested that community notification
may have also saved children from the hands of child molesters.212 For
example, after learning that a released convicted sex offender lived near the
school where she worked, a New Jersey teacher's aid informed authorities
that the offender had come into contact with a child. Such contact violated
the conditions of the sex offender's parole.213 Further investigation revealed
that the sex offender attended another child's birthday party and asked yet
another child to come into his home to have some ice cream.214 Similar
situations in which convicted sex offenders violated conditions of their
parole, by being in the presence of children, have also been reported thanks
to community notification. 1
In a report published by the Oregon Department of Corrections in
January of 1995, fewer than ten percent of sex offenders subjected to
Oregon's community notification law experienced forms of vigilantism or
public harassment. Overall, the report concluded that the results of
community notification were positive and advocated that public notification
should continue to be used.217 In California, as in New York, authorities use
a directory and a "900" telephone service to provide the public with
information about convicted offenders, and have received few complaints.218
Between 1994 and 1996, the California Department of Justice had not
received any information from law enforcement officials that the public
disclosure of information about a sex offender led to harassment,
discrimination, or criminal acts against registered sex offenders.219
Despite evidence of some positive results from the use of community
notification, the unlimited negative consequences of public notification
outweighed the positive, according to the court.220  Through community
notification, states impose a public stigmatization on sex offenders which
"'pervades into every aspect of an offender's life."' 22' Defending
community notification, the defendants argued that neither the state, nor the
212. Patad, 940 F. Supp. at 609-10.
213. Id. at 609.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 609-10.
216. Id. at611.
217. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 611. The report indicated that communication within the
community had improved as a result of community notification. Also, the report noted that
community notification has motivated many sex offenders to more actively participate in
treatment. Id.
218. Id. at610.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 627.
221. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 627.
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community notification provision itself, could be blamed for the "private
reactions" by members of the community.222 The defendants argued that
information regarding sex offenders is already available to the public at
courthouses and other government buildings.2 3 Not persuaded by the
defendants' argument, the court pointed out that there was a huge difference
between diligently searching through government files for a sex offender's
criminal history and having someone summarize the information for you in a
simple and organized fashion.224
According to the court, another indication of the community
notification's punitive nature was the fact that it prevents sex offenders from
being able to effectively rehabilitate.225 Upon their release from prison or
treatment facilities, sex offenders are expected to find employment, a place
to live, and attempt to reintegrate into society. 226 However, according to the
court, with community notification in place, offenders have had a difficult
time doing all three. Thus, because community notification laws make it
more difficult for sex offenders to rehabilitate and reintegrate into society,
the court found that the provision increases the punishment on sex
offenders.228 Therefore, the provision violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.229
In its final point, the Pataki court noted that community notification
served the three traditional goals of punishment-deterrence, retribution, and
incapacitation. 23 New York's Sex Offender Registration Act was designed
to deter future criminal conduct, inflict punishment through public ostracism
and humiliation, and incapacitate sex offenders by preventing them from
effectively re-entering society.231  According to the court, community
notification results in the banishment of sex offenders from society.232 Thus,
the court concluded that the legislative intent, design, historical treatment,
and, most importantly, the Act's negative effects, all revealed that the
community notification provision was a form of punishment.233 Therefore,
the court entered judgment for the plaintiffs and permanently enjoined the
retroactive enforcement of the Act's community notification provisions.234
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 628.
226. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 628.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 63 1.
230. Id. at 629.
231. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 629.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 631.
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IX. LEE V. STATE
With the decisions in Pataki, Roe, and Myers, it seemed that the courts
began to side with convicted sex offenders, as least in finding retroactive
application of community notification laws unconstitutional under an ex post
facto analysis. However, this momentum was short lived. Starting with Lee
v. State,23 other courts have shifted the momentum, ruling for legislatures
and communities who believe they are entitled to know if a convicted sex
offender is living in their midst.
The plaintiff, Edward Lee, had been convicted for his indecent behavior
with a child in 1988, and was sentenced to five years in prison.236 Less than
two years later, a court found the plaintiff guilty of child molestation and
sentenced him to another eight-year prison term.237  Yet in 1994, Lee
received a reduced sentence due to good behavior.38 At the time of his
release, Lee brought suit against the State of Louisiana, seeking a temporary
restraining order against the enforcement of the state's sex offender laws. 9
Lee contended that he could not be subjected to the state's sex offender
statutes,240 since the state legislature passed the laws after he had committed
his crimes. Thus, he argued that the United States Constitution's Ex Post
Facto Clause protected him from being subjected to the state's sex offender
statutes.
241
In a rather bizarre twist to the decision, the Lee court found Louisiana's
retroactive application of its sex offender registration law, not its community
notification provision, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.242 In contrast
most states' sex offender registration laws have been upheld against many
constitutional challenges, including ex post facto, due process, and double
jeopardy.243 Courts have found that the registration laws are similar to other
constitutionally permissible consequences that go along with criminal
convictions, such as denying a convicted criminal the right to vote, the right
to own a gun, or the right to enter certain areas of employment. 2 " In
Louisiana, convicted sex offenders released from prison because of parole or
from receiving reduced sentences due to good behavior must register with
235. 681 So. 2d 1020 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
236. Id. at 1021.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:542, 15:574.4([) (West 1995).
241. Lee, 681 So. 2d at 1021.
242. Id. at 1023.
243. Gibeaut, supra note 10, at 36.
244. Id.
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state authorities.245 Upon release, sex offenders must register with local
sheriffs of the community where they plan to reside.246 In addition, they
must notify certain people in their community about their criminal history,
and also provide them with their names and addresses. 247 Failure to comply
with the state's registration requirements could result in such penalties as a
fine, imprisonment, or both. 248 The court concluded that such penalties
impose a greater penalty upon the plaintiff than his original sentence for
indecent sexual behavior toward a minor. 249 Thus, the court found that the
registration requirement violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.2 10 Consequently,
the court refused to enforce the statute's registration requirements.25'
However, according to the court, if a sex offender, who was released for
good behavior or paroled, fails to comply with the state's notification
provision, he or she is not subjected to a new penalty.25 2 Rather, failing to
comply with public notification only results in the loss of parole or good
behavior time, thereby forcing the sex offender to return to prison to serve
out the remainder of his or her sentence. 25 3 Thus, noncompliance with the
state's community notification provision does not impose a second form of
punishment. 4 Therefore, the court found no ex post facto violation with
regard to the state's public notification provision.
Although the holding in Lee is limited, in that it only applies to sex
offenders released for parole or for good behavior, the ex post facto
decisions that followed were much broader and more persuasive.
X. DOE V. WELD
Prior to Massachusetts's passage of its own version of "Megan's
Law, '256 the plaintiff in Doe v. Weld 257 pled guilty to four counts of indecent
assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen.258 Because it was
the plaintiffs first offense, he received a sentence of four months
245. Lee, 681 So. 2d at 1022.
246. Id. at 1021.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 1023.
249. Id. at 1022.
250. Lee, 681 So. 2d at 1022.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1023.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Lee, 681 So. 2d at 1023.
256. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 6, § 178C-1780 (West Supp. 1997).
257. 954 F. Supp. 425 (D. Mass. 1996).
258. Id. at 429.
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probation.25 9 At the time of the guilty plea, plaintiff's counsel informed him
that juvenile court proceedings were confidential and that they were only
available to the public with court authorization.2O Four months later, the
plaintiffs probation expired, he turned eighteen, and he planned to attend
college. 261 However, shortly after the state's enactment of "Megan's Law"
in August of 1996, the plaintiff was informed that he was required by law to
register as a convicted sex offender, and that information about his juvenile
delinquency would be accessible to the public.
262
Massachusetts's version of "Megan's Law" applies to a person who has
been "'convicted of a sex offense or who has been adjudicated as a youthful
offender or as a delinquent juvenile by reason of a sex offense.., on or after
August first, nineteen hundred and eighty-one.' '263 The law creates a
statewide computerized sex offender directory which provides authorities
with information about Massachusetts's registered sex offenders.264  in
addition, like other states, Massachusetts's sex offender law has three levels
for community notification which allow the public to receive information
about a sex offender's name, home address, and place of employment, as
well as physical characteristics including a photograph of the sex offender.265
Established by Massachusetts's "Megan's Law," the Sex Offender Registry
Board determines a sex offender's designation as a level one, level two, or
level three sex offender, depending on the likelihood that the offender will
recommit a sexual crime.266 In classifying the risk level of sex offenders, the
Board considers the age of the sex offender at the time he or she committed
the sexual crime. 267 In addition, the Board considers evidence submitted on
behalf of sex offenders, as well as testimony from their victims. 268
Under the more extreme notification levels, levels two and three,
authorities are required to inform the public about released offenders and
their presence in the local community. Schools, child day care centers,
religious and youth groups, sports leagues, and other organizations that may
come in contact with a convicted sex offender, may receive information from
police.270  Level three notification goes even further in that it allows
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Weld, 954 F. Supp. at 429.
263. Id. at 427 (quoting MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 178C (1996)).
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Weld, 954 F. Supp. at 428.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 428.
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authorities to notify particular individuals, in addition to organizations, who
may encounter the convicted sex offender.271 Moreover, sex offenders
classified under level two and three may challenge their assessment in
superior court, unlike those classified under level one.272
Unlike level two and level three sexual offenders, police do not notify
the public that a level one, low risk of reoffense, sex offender lives or works
nearby.273 However, information about level one sex offenders is still
available to the public under limited circumstances.2 74 In order for a member
of the public to receive information about a registered level one offender, a
person must be at least eighteen years old and request the information in
27person at a local police department. z s  After presenting proper
identification, the person must then fill out a special "record of inquiry"
form, which remains confidential.276 Those requesting information about sex
offenders must also provide their name and address, a geographical vicinity
or specific person that is the subject of the inquiry, and the reason for the
277inquiry. Furthermore, before disseminating registry information,
authorities must warn inquirers that if the information received is used to
further criminal activity or discrimination toward registered sex offenders,
the inquirers will be subject to criminal penalties.278
The plaintiff in the present case, who was deemed a class one sexual
offender, brought suit seeking an ex parte temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction from being subjected to Massachusetts's "Megan's
Law. 279 According to the plaintiff, the application of "Megan's Law" to
juvenile sex offenders violated his constitutional rights. 280
The central issue before the court in Weld dealt with whether
Massachusetts's version of "Megan's Law" inflicted punishment upon
juvenile sex offenders. 28' Looking for an appropriate test to employ in its
punishment analysis, the court looked to the decisions of W.P. v. Poritz, Doe
v. Pataki, Roe v. Office of Adult Probation, as well as the United States
Supreme Court's decisions in Ursery and Mendoza-Martinez.282 The court
in Weld finally decided that the considerations utilized by the United States
271. Id. at 429.
272. Weld, 954 F. Supp. at 429.
273. Id. at 428.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Weld, 954 F. Supp. at 428.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 429.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 431.
282. Weld, 954 F. Supp. at 431-32.
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Supreme Court in Ursery would be most helpful in deciding whether
"Megan's Law" is punitive.283  Thus, the Weld court analyzed: 1) the
legislative intent of the Massachusetts's Legislature in passing "Megan's
Law;" 2) the practical effects of the legislation; 3) the purpose of the statute;
and 4) analogous historical precedents. 284 The court concluded that these
factors were utilized by most courts in deciding the constitutionality of state
sex offender laws.285
According to the court, the legislative debates prior to the approval of
Massachusetts's "Megan's Law" indicated a nonpunitive intent for the
legislation.8 6 Unlike the New York State Legislature's debates discussed in
Pataki, there was no evidence of name calling by Massachusetts
legislators.287 According to the court in Weld, there was no indication from
the record that Massachusetts's legislators referred to sex offenders as
"animals" or "toxic waste."288  In fact, at least one legislator showed
particular concern for juvenile sexual offenders in stating:
I'm disappointed that there is no language here addressing
juveniles who are arrested for sex offenses... [T]hey will be
subject to this law. Some 750 youths have gone through treatment
in DYS [Department of Youth Services]. There has not been one
who has gone back. They should have their confidentiality
protected. We want juveniles punished but we also should give
them the opportunity [to] become productive citizens. They have
long lives?89
According to the court, because the legislature took the time to include
juveniles in "Megan's Law," the legislature indicated a nonpunitive motive
of protecting children and others from the potential harm caused by repeat
sex offenders.290 Despite the plaintiff s argument that the statute's level one
community notification provision leads to punitive results, the court
concluded that the provision is nothing but remedial in both form and
283. Id. at 432.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 433.
287. Weld, 954 F. Supp. at 433.
288. Id.; see also Doe V. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603, 621-22 (S.D.N.Y 1996) (finding the
New York State Legislature revealed a punitive intent for New York's version of "Megan'.,
Law" because of the remarks made during the legislature's debate prior to the approval of the
statute).
289. Weld, 954 F. Supp. at 433 (citation omitted). These comments were made by State
Representative Paulsen on July 30, 1996. Id.
290. Id.
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effect. 29' Not persuaded by the evidence of vigilantism and prejudice
presented in the Pataki decision, the court found there was no evidence in
the record to support a finding that the public accessibility to the plaintiff's
criminal past has a punitive effect on him.292 Furthermore, the court noted
that the statute was effectively designed to limit both those who may receive
information about sex offenders, and the amount of information disclosed.293
Not only must the inquirers be at least eighteen-years-old and make the
inquiry in person, they must also sign a statement acknowledging that they
are aware of the criminal penalties for misuse of the information.
According to the court, information pertaining to level one registered sex
offenders is only given to community members concerned for the protection
of themselves and their children.295 The statute's precautionary measures
enable the public to receive just enough information about registered sex
offenders to take steps to prevent future sexual crimes, and nothing more.296
The plaintiff further argued that juvenile sex offenders are punished
under "Megan's Law" because their juvenile criminal records no longer
remain confidential.297 Without a doubt, the court was troubled by the
application of "Megan's Law" to juveniles who committed their sex crimes
many years before the law's enactment and who are unlikely to recommit a
sexual crime.298 Nonetheless, the court found that the plaintiff had not
shown how the disclosure of confidential juvenile records would lead to
punishment under constitutional analysis. 29) The court reiterated that the
level one notification provision is rationally designed to limit the disclosure
of information so that only those who may be susceptible to sex crimes can
protect themselves.300 Thus, the court found that the application and the
effects of minimal level one public disclosure would not be so great as to be
deemed a form of punishment.30 ' In finding the retroactive application of
"Megan's Law" to juvenile sex offenders constitutionally sound, the court
denied the plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction.
291. Id. at 434-35.
292. Id. at 435.
293. Weld, 954 F. Supp. at 434-35.
294. Id. at 435.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Weld, 954 F. Supp. at 435-36.
299. Id. at 436.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 427.
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XI. IOWA V. PICKENS
According to the Supreme Court of Iowa in Iowa v. Pickens, °3 Iowa's
sex offender registration statute3°4 was presumed constitutional unless sex
offenders could successfully negate every reasonable basis for its
existence. 05  Thus, the plaintiff in the case faced a difficult task in
convincing the court that Iowa's retroactive application of the statute
violated the United States Constitution's ex post facto provision. °6 The
defendant Randall Wayne Pickens, argued that the law aimed to punish him
a second time for sexually assaulting a minor.30 7 Backed by the presumption
of constitutionality, the State countered Pickens's contention claiming
Iowa's community notification law does not aim to punish, but to insulate
people from being harmed by dangerous sex offenders. °8 According to the
State, any harm caused to the lives of sex offenders is a product of their own
sexual crimes, not a result of sex offender registration and notification
laws. 3 9 Needless to say, one of the first ex post facto decisions of 1997 fell
in favor of the state and community notification.
Unlike the courts in Pataki and Weld, which were aided by records of
legislative debates, the court in Pickens was not as fortunate to have such
clear evidence of the Iowa Legislature's intent for its notification statute.310
Because the court lacked proof of the legislature's intent for its notification
law, the court used the Mendoza-Martinez test to determine if the provision
was punitive in nature.
31
However, the State conceded the third and fifth elements of the
Mendoza-Martinez test-whether community notification comes into play
303. 558 N.W.2d 396 (Iowa 1997).
304. IoWA CODE AN. § 692A. (West Supp. 1997).
305. Pickens, 558 N.W.2d at 398.
306. Id. at 396.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 398.
309. Id. at 397.
310. Pickens, 558 N.W.2d at 398.
311. Id. In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, the United States Supreme Court stated that
the Mendoza-Martinez factors should be used to determine if a law is punitive only when there
is no conclusive evidence of the legislature's purpose for a statute. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). The Mendoza-Martinez test includes: 1) whether the sanction
involves an affirmative disability or restraint; 2) whether it has historically been regarded as
punishment; 3) whether it comes into play on a finding oficienter; 4) whether its operation
will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution or deterrence; 5) whether the
behavior to which it applies is already a crime; 6) whether the sanction's alternative purpose
to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it; and 7) whether it appears
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. Id. (citations omitted).
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on a finding of scienter and whether community notification applies to
behavior that is already a crime.1 On the other hand, the defendant did not
argue that Iowa's community notification law appeared excessive in relation
to the State's alternative purposes of public notification and public safety. 13
Arguing that registration and notification laws place an affirmative disability
upon a sex offender, Pickens contended that the law stigmatizes sex
offenders, resulting in a form of punishment.314 Responding to Pickens's
allegations, the State informed the court that information regarding sex
offenders is only disseminated to the public on a limited basis.315
According to Iowa's version of "Megan's Law," sex offender registry
information is mainly restricted to government and criminal justice agencies
who conduct background checks and informational studies about convicted
sex offenders.316 In addition, a person may request information about an
alleged sex offender only by writing to his or her local sheriff and providing
the sheriff with his or her own name and address, the alleged sex offender's
name and address, and a reason for requesting the information.317
Authorities are required to keep a record of the people who have requested
information about registered sex offenders.318 The statute allows for
community-wide notification of a sex offender's presence under limited
circumstances and only when necessary to protect the public.
319
Finding that Iowa's sex offender statute does not provide for extensive
dissemination of information, and noting that a sex offender's conviction
record and criminal history is already a matter of public record, the court
found that Iowa's statue did not impose an affirmative disability on the life
of a convicted sex offender.320 The court further ruled that Iowa's version of
"Megan's Law" could neither be viewed as a historical form of punishment
nor as serving the traditional goals of punishment-deterrence and
retribution. 321 According to the court, the purpose of the statute was to help
law enforcement agencies protect the general welfare.322 Although the court
found that public dissemination provisions are "unpleasant consequences" of
sexual offenses, the court found that such negative consequences did not
312. Pickens, 558 N.W.2d at 399.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Pickens, 558 N.W.2d at 399.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 400.
322. Pickens, 558 N.W.2d at 400.
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make the statute punitive.323 Thus, concluding that the statute was rationally
connected to its purpose of protecting the public, and that it did not
unconstitutionally increase the punishment of convicted sex offenders
subjected to retroactive application of Iowa's sex offender law, the court
upheld the statute.324
XII. DOE v. GREGOIRE
Like New Jersey, which enacted legislation in response to the outrage
following the tragic death of Megan Kanka, Washington passed its version
of "Megan's Law," the Washington Community Protection Act,325 following
the brutal sexual assault of a young boy at the hands of a previously
convicted sexual predator, Earl Shriner.3  Before being released from
prison, authorities were aware of Shriner's dangerous potential to commit
future sexual crimes.327 He often spoke of his ongoing fantasies about
molesting and killing children. 328 Shortly after his release, Shriner forced a
boy from his bicycle, raped and stabbed the boy, and then cut off the child's
penis.329 Fortunately, the boy lived to identify Shriner as his aitacker and
helped convict him.
The Washington Community Protection Act forces criminals convicted
of sex offenses to register with authorities in the county where they intend to
reside within twenty-four hours of their release from prison or treatment
facilities. 31 Sex offenders must provide authorities with their name, date of
birth, address, employment address, conviction history, aliases, and social
security number.332 In addition, offenders must provide their local sheriff
with a recent photograph and fingerprints.333 Those sex offenders convicted
of first-degree rape and other class A sexual felonies can petition the court to
relieve them of their duty to register. In order to be relieved of the
requirements of the Community Notification Act, offenders must convince
the court, through clear and convincing evidence, that registration will not
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. WASH. REv. CoDEANN. § 9A.44.130 (West Supp. 1990).
326. See Sheila A. Campbell, Battling Sex Offenders: Is Megan's Law an Effective
Means ofAchieving Public Safety?, 19 SETON HALL LEGIs. J. 519, 527 (1995).
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Idl at n.40.
330. Id.
331. WASH. REV. CODEANN. § 9A.44.130(1) (West Supp. 1990).
332. Id. at § 9A.44.130(2).
333. Id. at § 9A.44.130(5).
334. Campbell, supra note 326, at 529 n.58.
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serve its intended purpose.335 Those convicted of first-degree incest, second-
degree rape, second-degree statutory rape, and other class B sexual felonies,
will no longer be subjected to the Community Protection Act if they
maintain a clean criminal record for a period of fifteen years following their
336release from prison. Those convicted of class C sexual felonies, which
include third-degree rape, second-degree incest, and statutory rape, must not
have any new criminal convictions for a period of ten years in order to be
relieved of the requirements of the state's Community Protection Act.337
Once registered as a sex offender, authorities can release the registry
information to the public when necessary for public safety reasons.
Similar to "Megan's Law" in New Jersey, the Washington Community
Protection Act has three levels of notification, which depend on a sex
offenders risk of committing future crimes.339 At the first level, which is the
lowest risk level, only the police receive information about the sex offender,
not the general public. 340 At level two, where there is a greater likelihood of
recidivism, police inform community organizations, school districts,
universities, and governmental officials and entities.34 Finally, at the third
level of notification, where there is the highest risk of recidivism, authorities
notify the general public, as well as the news media.342 Authorities provide
the public and the media with a photograph of the sex offender, the
offender's name, age, birth date, vicinity of current address, history of past
crimes, as well as a statement that the offender is likely to recommit a sexual
crime.343 Although authorities are not required to obey these guidelines for
community notification, most police departments in Washington do abide by
the statute's guidelines.344
Upon the plaintiffs release from prison, authorities classified him as a
class three sexual offender, deeming him as a high risk for recidivism.345
The Washington Department of Corrections first notified the police of the
plaintiff's release. 34' Accompanying the notification were details of the
plaintiffs violent rape of an adult woman in 1985, and details of other
335. Id.
336. Id. at 529.
337. Id.
338. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.550(1) (West Supp. 1998).
339. Doe v. Gregoire, 960 F. Supp. 1478, 1481 (W.D. Wash. 1997).
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. See Campbell,supra note 326, at 530.
345. Gregoire, 960 F. Supp. at 1482
346. Id.
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crimes in which the plaintiff was never charged. 47 The notification
characterized the plaintiff as an untreatable, violent sex offender who was
extremely likely to commit another brutal sexual crime against a woman, and
who also had the potential for homicide.348 Unless the court granted the
plaintiff an injunction, both the media and the community at large were to be
notified about the plaintiff and his potential for violent sexual behavior.
349
According to the plaintiff, at the time he committed his crimes, the
Washington Community Protection Act did not provide for the release of
information about a sex offender's alleged crimes, nor did it allow
authorities to give an appraisal of the offender's propensity to commit future
crimes.350 In addition, the Act did not allow for the release of a sex
offender's address or place of employment, nor a detailed description of a
sex offender's criminal history.3 51 Thus, based on the Ex Post Facto Clause,
the plaintiff contended that the additional circulation or disclosure of such
information increased his punishment.352 Therefore, he argued that the
dissemination of additional information was unconstitutional.35
The court in Gregoire recognized a huge difference between informing
the public about a sex offender through public dissemination laws, and
allowing the public to carefully search for the information themselves in
county archives and courthouse file rooms. 354 Regardless of whether the
information disseminated was a matter of public record, the court found that
broadcasting information about sex offenders to communities imposed an
affirmative disability or restraint upon sex offenders.355
Noting that there was no bright line test to employ in deciding whether
Washington's Community Protection Act imposes punishment upon sex
offenders in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause, the court in Gregoire
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Gregoire, 960 F. Supp. at 1482.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 1483. According to the court in Gregoire, the United States Supreme Court
in Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. 749, 764 (1989), found a
difference between a state keeping information in an open file available to the public on the
one hand, and broadcasting that information to the public on the other. Gregoire, 960 F.
Supp. at 1483. The court in Gregoire stated that through public dissemination laws, states
provide information about sex offenders to everyone in the community; such laws not only
provide the information to those likely to search through public records, but to others who will
have no use for the information at all. Id. (citing Artway v. Attorney Gen., 876 F. Supp. 666,
689 (D.N.J. 1995), vacated inpart, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996)).
355. Id. (citing Artway v. Attorney Gen., 876 F. Supp. 666, 689 (D.N.J. 1995)).
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looked to the persuasive authority of Doe v. Pataki, as well as ex post facto
cases heard by the United States Supreme Court.356 Using the Supreme
Court's decision in Lynce v. Mathis,357 the court in Gregoire concluded that
the legislative intent behind Washington's sex offender community
notification law was but a small factor in the analysis of whether the law
unconstitutionally punished sex offenders.358 Rather, the greater focus of
analysis, according to the court, was whether the consequences of the
community notification measure disadvantages sex offenders to the extent of
increasing their punishment.
359
Despite the legislature's intentions of protecting society from sex
offenders who pose a high risk of recidivism, the court concluded that the
adverse effects of Washington's community notification law warranted a
finding that the law was clearly a punitive measure. 360  The plaintiff
effectively persuaded the court by introducing news clippings as evidence
which described the harassment and persecution that sex offenders received
as a result of community notification laws.361 According to the articles, gun
shots were fired into sex offenders' homes, others were threatened by
firebombs, and another sex offender even had his house burnt to the ground
by angry neighbors. 62 Furthermore, as a result of community notification,
sex offenders were fired from their jobs, evicted from their apartments, and
ultimately, had nowhere to hide from the public outcry.
363
Attempting to rebut the evidence of vigilantism, the state unsuccessfully
argued that such cases of harassment are infrequent and mild. Furthermore,
the state claimed that it had taken steps to prevent the harassment of sex
offenders by warning the public against retaliation, by holding emergency
356. Id. The court first looked at the factors addressed in Doe v. Pataki: 1) legislative
intent; 2) design of the statute; 3) historical treatment of community notification laws; and 4)
the effects of the law. See id.; see Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). The
court then turned to United States v. Ursery. Gregoire, 960 F. Supp. at 1483. Finally, the
court looked to the Supreme Court's decision in Lynce v. Mathis. Id.
357. 117 S. Ct. 891 (1997). In Lynce, a state awarded a prisoner early release credits
under a statute designed to reduce the overcrowding of prisons. Id. at 896. Subsequently,
pursuant to a later statute, the state canceled those credits and forced the man to return to
prison. Id. The Court held that the state's action violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id.
However, the Court noted that both sides to the case placed too much emphasis on the
legislature's intent in granting the early release credits, instead of looking at the consequences
of their revocation. Id.
358. Lynce, 117 S. Ct. at 896.
359. Gregoire, 960 F. Supp. at 1483.
360. Id. at 1485.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id.
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community meetings, stressing that harassment would not be tolerated, and
informing the public that any acts of violence toward sex offenders could
result in the revocation of the Washington Community Protection Act.3'6 In
spite of the state's rebuttal that private citizens, not the government,
tormented sex offenders, the court found that the intolerable consequences of
community notification were both inevitable and punitive in nature.3
65
Finally, the court also criticized the state's classification of the plaintiff
as a level three sexual offender.366 Pointing out that the plaintiff committed
his offenses against his wife and other women whom he had met in parking
lots and bars the court found that community-wide notification was
unwarranted.367 Although the court deplored the plaintiff's conduct, the
plaintiff s criminal history did not reveal signs of pedophilia or that he posed
a high risk of danger to his neighbors.368 According to the court, authorities
should only notify such groups as schools, parks and recreation departments,
libraries, and the public at large when a sex offender could legitimately be
considered a threat to the entire community.3 69  Informing such a wide
variety of people, including the media and community organizations,
suggested that the notification provision aimed to punish the sex offender,
not protect the public. 370 Furthermore, according to the court, because the
state could not legally impose community notification laws on other
criminals such as burglars or shoplifters, who also have the potential to
recommit their crimes, the state could not legally place the burden of
community notification on sex offenders either.37 Therefore, since the court
viewed the Washington Community Protection Act's community notification
provision as a punitive measure, it enjoined the state from enforcing the
provision on those sex offenders whose crimes were committed before the
Act's effective date.372 Regardless of the sex offenders' unpopularity and
reprehensible sexual crimes, the court ruled that the Ex Post Facto Clause
protects the rich and the poor, sex offenders, as well as saints.373
364. Gregoire, 960 F. Supp. at 1485.
365. Id. at 1486.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Gregoire, 960 F. Supp. at 1486; see State v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062, 1069-70
(Wash. 1994) (holding that the authorities must have some evidence of an offender's future
dangerousness, must disclose the information when necessary, and must use a geographical
scope of dissemination rationally related to the threat posed by the registered offender).
370. Gregoire, 960 F. Supp. at 1486.
371. Id. at 1486.
372. Id.
373. Id. (citing Lynce v. Mathis, 117 S. Ct. 891, 895 (1997)).
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XIII. DOE v. KELLEY
By the end of March of 1997, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Michigan had its own ex post facto challenge to the
public disclosure provision of the Michigan Sex Offender Registration Act
374
on its hands.375 Effective April 1, 1997, the statute provided for public
access to information about convicted sex offenders, including those who
committed sexual crimes before the statute's effective date.376 Upon visiting
local police or sheriff departments, the public could learn of a sex offender's
name and any alias, his or her physical description, address, date of birth,
and also receive detailed information about an offender's sexual crimes.
377
Although the statute does not allow authorities to notify the public on a
grand scale of a sex offender's presence in the community, the plaintiffs in
Kelley, three convicted sex offenders, argued that public accessibility to sex
offender information results in punishment.378  Thus, according to the
plaintiffs, retroactive application of the statute violated the Ex Post Facto
Clause of the Constitution.379
Strapped for a universal test to help decide whether the Michigan Sex
Offender Registration Act imposed punishment upon convicted sex
offenders, the court in Kelley looked to several of the decisions previously
discussed for guidance. 380  Looking to the decisions in United States v.
Ursery, W.P. v. Poritz, Doe v. Weld, as well as Roe v. Office of Adult
Probation to determine whether the retroactive application of Michigan's
sex offender statute constituted punishment, the Kelley court finally adopted
the test employed in Doe v. Pataki.38 1 Therefore, the court considered the
totality of the circumstances behind the statute's public accessibility
provision, including the: 1) legislative intent; 2) design or purpose of the
statute; 3) historical treatment of similar measures; and 4) effects or results
of the legislation.382
Unlike many of the other courts which dealt with the retroactive
application of state sex offenders laws, the Kelley court lacked evidence of
the Michigan Legislature's intentions for passing the statute.383 Without
374. MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 28.721 (West 1996).
375. Doe v. Kelley, 961 F. Supp. 1105 (W.D. Mich. 1997).
376. Id. at 1107.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Kelley, 961 F. Supp. at 1108.
381. Id. at 1108-10.
382. Id. at 1108; see Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); W.P. v.
Poritz, 931 F. Supp 1199, 1209 (D.N.J. 1996).
383. Kelley, 961 F. Supp. at 1108-09.
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having any evidence clearly demonstrating either a remedial or punitive
intent for the statute, like the Pataki court had in the debate minutes of the
New York Assembly, the court turned to the statute's design in an attempt to
determine the legislators' intentions for approving the measure. 384 The
Michigan Sex Offender Registration Act forces police to keep a
computerized data base of information pertaining to state registered sex
offenders. 38 5 Any person residing in the State of Michigan who has been
convicted of a sexual offense must register with authorities and provide them
with his or her name and any aliases, address, physical description, birth
date, and a list of the offenses committed.8 6 Among the sexual offenses
included in the statute are: 1) accosting, enticing, or soliciting a child for
immoral purposes; 2) the production, distribution, promotion, or possession
of child pornography; 3) indecent exposure; 4) pandering or enticing a
female to become a prostitute; and 5) various forms of criminal sexual
conduct.387 Once the state police compile the sex offender data base, the
registry information is then passed on to local law enforcement agencies
who, in turn, must make the information available to the public.
3 88
Arguing against the constitutionality of the statute, the plaintiffs
contended the Act was overly broad, in that it allowed for public access to
information about all registered offenders, regardless of the seriousness of
the offense or registrant's risk of future danger.3 89 In addition, they argued
that anyone could access the registry, including those who would have no
use for the information or be at risk of harn. 390 According to the plaintiffs,
the broad public disclosure scheme suggested a punitive intent for the
statute.3 11 Despite the court's agreement that the statute was broad, the court
found the provision rationally related to its intended purpose of making
information about persons in the community who have engaged in sexually
predatory or indecent conduct easily accessible to the public.
According to the court, the public notification provision saves the
public from having to rummage through court files to find out information
about sex offenders.393 It imposes no undue burden upon the life of a
convicted sex offender. 4 Authorities make the information available to the
384. Id.
385. Id. at 1108.
386. Id. at 1108-09.
387. Id.
388. Kelley, 961 F. Supp. at 1109.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 1110.
393. Kelley,961 F. Supp. at 1109.
394. Id.
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public so that the public can take lawful precautions to prevent from
becoming victims of sexually violent and obscene crimes. 95 Because of the
high recidivism rates and risk of danger posed by serious sexual offenders,
the statute allows for the release of information pertaining to those
individuals only after an offense has been committed. However, others
who have committed nonviolent sexual crimes are subjected to the law's
public disclosure scheme only after multiple offenses.3 97 Thus, according to
the court, the perceived risk of danger justifying public disclosure is
supported by the offender's own history of repetitive criminal behavior and
an inability to conform to the requirements of the law.398 Therefore, the
court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the statute was overly broad and
punitive, and instead found that the provision served a protective purpose.3 99
Turning to the historical treatment of public notification laws, the court
held that the Michigan Sex Offender Registration Act's notification
provision had no historical counterpart. 400 Although access to information
about sex offenders may lead to such historical forms of punishment as
public humiliation and ostracism, the court found such results were not
inevitably caused by the statute itself.401 At best, public notification laws
could best be compared to governmental warnings about dangerous
people.402 Yet, according to the court in Kelley, no court has ever considered
such warnings to be a form of punishment.0 3
Although the court did not dispute that sex offenders are often targets of
violence and harassment, and experience loss of employment and eviction,
the court was not satisfied that public access and community notification
laws were the cause of these negative consequences. 40 4 While other courts,
including Pataki and Roe, found a strong connection between such laws and
harsh effects on the lives of sex offenders, the Kelley court considered the
connection to be slight.40 5 According to the court, in order for the negative
effects of such laws to be deemed punishment, the state must have intended
to "chastise, deter or discipline" sex offenders.4 °6 However, the public's
reaction, whether lawful or criminal, to sex offenders did not prove that the
395. Id.
396. Id. at 1110.
397. Id.
398. Kelley, 961 F. Supp. at 1110.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 1110-11.
402. Id. at II 11.
403. Kelley, 961 F. Supp. at 1111.
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. Id.
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legislature purposely tried to punish sex offenders by passing the Michigan
Sex Offender Registration Act.40 7  Even if evidence of harassment and
vigilantism directed towards sex offenders was the direct result of the
statute's public access provision, such evidence would not have persuaded
the court into finding the law punitive in nature.40 8 According to the court,
the legislation served remedial, not punitive, objectives.40 9 Therefore, the
court upheld the Michigan Sex Offender Registration Act, thereby allowing
authorities to retroactively apply the statute's public access provision to all
convicted sex offenders.
4r °
XIV. CONCLUSION-HENDRICKS DECISION COMES TO THE AID OF
COMMUNITIES ACROSS AMERICA?
Although the United States Supreme Court has yet to come down with a
definitive ruling of whether community notification of a sex offender's
presence constitutes punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause, the
highest Court's decision in Hendricks v. Kansas4" is a positive indication of
how the Court might view some states' methods for dealing with convicted
sex offenders.
In Hendricks, the Court found that states can keep violent sexual
predators locked up for an indefinite period of time, even after they have
fulfilled their sentences, without violating the Constitution's prohibition of
ex post facto laws or its ban on double jeopardy.412 Ruling 5-4 in the case of
an admitted pedophile from Kansas, the Justices stated that people could be
held in prison if they are considered mentally abnormal and likely to engage
in new sexual crimes in the future.413 Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that
although a simple finding of dangerousness alone would not be enough to
justify the extended confinement, a finding that a sexual offender poses a
danger to the public health and safety, along with additional proof of a
"mental abnormality" or "personality disorder," would enable authorities to
407. Id.
408. Kelley, 961 F. Supp. at 1111-12.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 1112.
411. 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
412. Id. at 2075-76. The Constitution prohibits double jeopardy. Generally, the
Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits a second prosecution for the same offense. The United
States Supreme Court has further interpreted double jeopardy as preventing states from
punishing twice, or attempting a second time to punish criminally for the same offense. Id. at
2085 (citing Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389 (1995)).
413. Id. at 2077, 2079.
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prevent a person from being released back into the community.414 The
extended confinement, the Court noted, was intended to protect society,
rather than to punish sexual offenders a second time for their crimes. "
Therefore, the Court held that such confinement does not punish a sex
offender a second time and, thus, does not violate the Constitution's Ex Post
Facto Clause.416
The Kansas Legislature enacted the Sexually Violent Predator Act4 17 to
deal with the sexual offenders whom the legislature believed were more than
likely to repeat their acts of sexual violence and for whom the prognosis for
rehabilitation was poor.418 Thus, the legislature passed the statute so that the
state could indefinitely confine sexually violent predators until they no
longer were a threat to themselves or, more importantly, to others.419
Convicted of taking "indecent liberties" with two thirteen-year-old boys
in 1984, the plaintiff, Leroy Hendricks, served nearly ten years in prison.
Nearly thirty years before this conviction, Hendricks indecently exposed
himself to two young girls.42' In 1957, Hendricks was convicted of lewdness
involving another young girl.422 After serving a brief jail term, Hendricks
went to work for a carnival where he later molested two young boys.
423
Upon his release from prison, the repeat offender was arrested again, this
time for molesting a seven-year-old child.424
After receiving treatment at a state psychiatric hospital for his aberrant
sexual behavior, Hendricks was considered safe to re-enter society.425
Shortly after his discharge, however, Hendricks returned to prison in 1967
for performing oral sex on an eight-year-old girl and fondling an eleven-
year-old boy.4 6 After being diagnosed as a pedophile, Hendricks abandoned
his treatment regiment, concluding he could not be helped.427 According to
Hendricks, death would be the only thing that could prevent him from
sexually abusing children in the future.428 Before conditionally releasing
414. Id. at 2080.
415. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2083.
416. Id. at 2085.
417. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994).
418. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2077.
419. Id. at 2077.
420. Id. at 2078.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2078.
424. Id.
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2078.
[Vol. 22:585
117
: Nova Law Review 22, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1998
DIabik
Hendricks from prison in 1994, the State of Kansas filed a petition in Kansas
state court attempting to keep him civilly confined because of his status as a
sexually violent predator.429 Fortunately, a jury agreed with the State and the
court ordered Hendricks committed to the custody of the Secretary of Social
and Rehabilitation Services.430
Giving deference to the state legislature's nonpunitive purpose for the
statute-public safety-the plaintiff in the case had an enormous obstacle to
overcome.431  In order to find the statute an unconstitutional form of
punishment, Leroy Hendricks, a criminal with a long history of sexually
molesting children, needed to demonstrate that the challenged statute
provides "'the clearest proof' that 'the statutory scheme [is] so punitive
either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention to deem it
civil. 43  Hendricks contended that extended civil confinement for an
indefinite period of time demonstrated the state's punitive intent for the
measure.433 Furthermore, he claimed that civil confinement was a new form
of punishment for his prior sexually deviant conduct.434 Thus, Hendricks
argued that by civilly confining him after he already served out his original
prison sentence, the state violated the United States Constitution's Ex Post
Facto Clause.435 Needless to say, the Court rejected Hendricks' argument.436
Using elements in its analysis gathered from such cases as Ursery and
Mendoza-Martinez, the Court found that the extended confinement of sexual
offenders did not serve the traditional goals of punishment-retribution or
deterrence.437 According to the Court, a sexual offender was not subjected to
additional confinement because of his or her prior criminal history, but
rather, prior criminal conduct was used by the state to help show that the
offender had the potential to commit such sexual crimes again."3
Furthermore, because those subjected to the extended confinement have
mental disabilities/disorders, the Court found that the probability of the sex
offenders to be deterred by confinement was extremely low.439 Finally, the
Court concluded that the state had a legitimate, nonpunitive governmental
429. Id. at 2079.
430. Id.
431. Id. at 2082.
432. Id. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)).
433. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2083.
434. Id. at2081.
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. Id. at 2082.
438. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082.
439. Id.
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objective to detain mentally unstable people, such as sex offenders, who
pose a dangerous risk to the community." 0
Without a doubt, the holding in Hendricks sheds some light on how the
Court will decide the constitutional muster of state sex offender community
notification laws. If holding someone in prison after they have served their
criminal penalty is not considered by the United States Supreme Court a
form of punishment, then how could it be unconstitutional to allow a sex
offenders to live free while informing neighbors about their past? If
detention for the purpose of protecting the community from harm does not
constitute punishment, then certainly neither does notifying the public that a
sex offender is in the midst. Although advocates of community notification
are undoubtedly praising the decision, the Court's split decision could
indicate a different result for sex offender public notification provisions.
Nonetheless, at the very least, the decision makes overturning states'
community notification provisions much more difficult.
Using the United States Supreme Court's analysis in Hendricks to
determine whether retroactive community notification laws impose
punishment upon convicted sex offenders, such laws should pass
constitutional analysis. Similar to the nonpunitive legislative intent for
Kansas's civil confinement laws, community notification statutes are also
designed to protect the public from the potential harm caused by convicted
sex offenders. As stated in Hendricks, the Court will only disregard the
legislature's stated intent when the party challenging the statute provides
convincing evidence that the statute is "so punitive in either purpose or
effect as to negate the State's intention."" 1 Because the Court ordinarily
gives deference to the legislature's stated intent, the United States Supreme
Court should find that in passing community notification laws, legislators
intended to provide people with a means of protection against sex offenders,
as opposed to punishing convicted sex offenders for their prior crimes.
Although sex offenders lack credible evidence of a punitive purpose for
community notification, opponents of community notification laws suggest
such laws lead to punitive effects.
It is undisputed that upon release from prison or treatment facilities,
many sex offenders are discriminated against, experience difficulties finding
suitable places to live, and in some cases, are subjected to acts of violence
and vigilantism. Furthermore, some contend that community notification
makes it impossible for sex offenders to find and maintain employment.
Nevertheless, wouldn't any reasonably competent and adept employer
research an applicant's background and inquire about an applicant's criminal
history? Community notification laws simply help assure that sex offenders
440. Id. at 2083.
441. Id. at2082.
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tell the truth; they don't necessarily prevent sex offenders from gaining
employment. Although sex offenders experience unfortunate results after
serving time, there is no proof that community notification laws such as
"Megan's Law" are to blame for the harassment, discrimination, and
violence. Rather, crimes of rape, murder, sexual assault, child sexual
molestation, sexual abuse, as well as other heinous sexual acts, cause the
public outcry and hostile reaction to sex offenders, not the community
notification laws themselves. Any negative treatment directed toward sex
offenders is a result of their atrocious sexual offenses, not the public
notification laws.
In many cases, the public receives word of a sex offender's presence in
the community, not through public notification laws, but from newspaper
stories and television broadcasts which both recount a sex offender's
criminal past and warn about their potential for repeat violence.
Unfortunately, it took the tragic murder of a seven-year-old girl, Megan
Kanka, for both the media and the public to heighten the awareness of the
risks posed by repeat sexual offenders. Regardless of whether the media or
the state notifies the public about the existence of sex offenders in the
community, the information disseminated through community notification
laws is a matter of public record. It is not as if the government is breaking
into the confidential sex offender files and spreading lies about sex
offenders. Through community notification laws, states are merely telling
the public the truth in an effort to help protect them from falling victim to
those sex offenders who may commit sexual crimes again.
Despite the negative impact that community notification laws allegedly
have on the lives of sex offenders, providing the public with information
contained in police reports and court proceedings cannot be deemed a form
of punishment. Community notification laws simply enable states to
research a sex offender's criminal past and present location of residence,
then make that information more accessible to the public. Sex offenders
have no right to blame community notification laws for their hardships.
They can only blame themselves. Because there is no legitimate causal
connection between community notification laws and punitive effects on the
lives of sex offenders, challengers of such provisions will likely fail in
satisfying their difficult burden of proving legislators' punitive intentions.
The United States Supreme Court will likely adopt legislators' remedial,
nonpunitive public safety intentions for community notification laws.
Opponents of community notification laws further contend that
legislatures passed such provisions out of response to political and public
pressure to impose retroactive legislation to harm and punish sex offenders,
an undoubtedly unpopular group. According to these opponents, the
Framers designed the United States Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause to
shield people, like sex offenders, from such laws passed out of strong
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passion and emotion.442 Certainly in some instances legislators have
responded to the public's passion, pain, and anger by passing sex offender
legislation that is overly broad, too inclusive, and excessive. Such overly
broad and all encompassing community notification legislation, like
Kansas's Sex Offender Registration Act, leaves sex offenders susceptible to
public violence and vigilantism, and needs to be redrafted to meet
constitutional scrutiny. In order be found constitutional, state community
notification legislation must be narrowly tailored to apply only to those sex
offenders who are deemed a danger to society and pose a risk of committing
another sexual crime.
However, other legislators have analyzed the data indicating sex
offenders' likelihood of recommitting their sexual crimes and have carefully
crafted constitutionally sound community notification laws in order to
protect the public, not to subject sex offenders to criminal acts of
vigilantism. Legislators in New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and
California, among other states, demonstrated that the laws can be designed to
both reduce the potential for repeat sexual crimes, as well as to minimize
acts of vigilantism directed toward sex offenders. First, many states use
procedural safeguards and have different levels of public notification to help
reduce the laws' negative effects. According to the Kansas Sexually Violent
Predator Act discussed in Hendricks, a sex offender will only be civilly
confined if, after a clinical evaluation and a jury trial, the sex offender is
deemed a sexually violent predator.443 Similarly, before notifying the public
of a sex offender's presence, authorities evaluate a sex offender's risk of re-
offense by looking into such factors as: 1) a sex offender's criminal history;
2) physical conditions such as age or debilitating illness; 3) psychological
evaluations; 4) recent behavior; 5) expressions of intent to commit future
crimes; and 6) success in responding to treatment.444 After analyzing such
factors, authorities will then classify sex offenders based on their risk of
recidivism. 45 Only after a sex offender is deemed a true risk of recidivism is
the sex offender subjected to community notification laws. Secondly, before
notifying the public many states also warn the public against the misuse of
the information received through community notification laws and provide
stiff penalties for those who use the information to pursue acts of violence
against registered sex offenders. Thus, many states have narrowly structured
442. See Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see also Cummings v.
Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 322 (1866) (holding that the Framers adopted the Ex Post
Facto Clause because they wanted to protect themselves and the people of the United States
"from the effects of those sudden and strong passions to which men are exposed").
443. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2077.
444. See Boland, supra note 12, at 194.
445. Id. at 193.
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laws aimed at limiting the negative impact on sex offenders' lives, while at
the same time providing the public with the important information it needs
for protection. Therefore, the United States Supreme Court will likely find
that in passing community notification laws, state legislators intended to
protect, not punish.
As with Kansas's civil confinement statute addressed in Hendricks,
community notification laws do not embroil the two objectives of criminal
punishment, retribution and deterrence. Community notification laws do not
punish sex offenders for their prior sexual offenses. Instead, authorities use
sex offenders' criminal pasts to determine a sex offender's likelihood of re-
committing a sexual crime and help predict future behavior. Thus,
community notification does not seek retribution for sex offenders' prior
sexual exploits.
Moreover, community notification laws are not intended to deter sexual
offenders from committing future sex crimes. Such laws neither punish for
past behavior nor deter future behavior, but rather give the public the chance
to take precautions and protect themselves. In Hendricks, the Court noted
that sex offenders committed under Kansas's civil confinement statute suffer
from mental or personality disorders.446 Therefore, the Court stated that
those suffering from such disorders were unlikely to be deterred by the threat
of civil confinement. 447 Similarly, community notification will not deter sex
offenders who, according to statistics, have high rates of recidivism.448
According to a fifteen-year study in California, twenty percent of convicted
sex offenders were later arrested again for committing another sexual
crime.449 A similar study conducted in Maryland found forty percent of sex
offenders were arrested for another sex offense within three years of being
released from prison. 450 And, other studies reveal sex offender recidivism
rates as high as seventy-five percent.451 Jesse Timmendequas, the killer of
Megan Kanka, and Leroy Hendricks, the plaintiff in Hendricks, both
committed multiple sexual crimes. Furthermore, there is yet to be
conclusive evidence showing that the treatment of sex offenders is
successful in preventing them from recommitting sexual crimes. 2 Given
446. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082.
447. Id.
448. See Robert Tier & Kevin Coy, Approaches to Sexual Predators: Community
Notification and Civil Commitment, 23 NEw ENG. J. ON CRim. & CIV. CONFIEMENT 405
(1997).
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. Id.
452. Feldman, supra note 18, at 1104. Unlike other criminals, a sex offender's
propensity for recommitting sexual crimes does not decrease as the sex offender gets older.
Id. at 1105.
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the statistics and evidence of recidivism among sex offenders, it is highly
unlikely that sex offenders will be deterred by threats of community
notification. If extended periods of imprisonment, institutionalization, and
treatment do not deter sex offenders from committing future sexual offenses,
then how could community notification laws possibly function as a
deterrent? Although the community notification provision of New Jersey's
"Megan's Law" would unlikely have deterred Jesse Timmendequas from
killing little Megan Kanka, if in place, the provision would at the very least
have helped Megan's parents and neighbors ensure that Megan and other
children in the neighborhood steered clear of the Timmendequas residence.
Thus, community notification laws cannot be characterized as a criminal
form of punishment, but rather as an effective means of protecting innocent
children.
It is further argued in Hendricks that the Kansas Sexually Violent
Predator Act's indefinite duration of confinement is evidence of the statute's
punitive intent.453 However, the Court found that such involuntary and
potentially indefinite confinement does not suggest a punitive purpose for
the legislation.454 Under the law, a person may be civilly committed until the
person's mental or personality disorder no longer causes them to be a threat
to society.455 Thus, the duration of confinement could last from one year till
one's lifetime.456 Unlike the civil commitment statute, most sex offender
registration and notification laws require convicted sex offenders to register
with authorities and be subjected to community notification for specific
periods of time, depending upon an offender's risk of danger.
457
Furthermore, sex offenders in many states are given the opportunity to
petition courts to terminate the registration and public notification
provisions, after demonstrating that they have not committed another sexual
crime within a specific period of time following their release from prison.458
Given the proven statistics of recidivism among sex offenders, most states
will not allow sex offenders to petition the courts for at least ten to fifteen
years.459 Petitioners must show that they no longer pose a threat to the safety
of others.460 Since sex offenders are only subjected to registration and
453. Hendricks v. Kansas, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2083 (1997).
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. Boland, supra note 12, at 191.
458. See Campbell, supra note 326, at 538-39. According to some state laws, if, after a
hearing, the court finds by the preponderance of the evidence that the sex offender is
rehabilitated, the court may grant an order relieving the sex offender of the duty to further
register with authorities as a convicted sex offender. See Boland, supra note 12, at 192 n.42.
459. Id. at 191.
460. Id. at 191-92.
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community notification until they are no longer considered dangerous to
society, the United States Supreme Court will likely uphold the provisions as
nonpunitive measures, just as it did with Kansas's civil commitment
provision in Hendricks.
Finally, community notification laws are less stringent than Kansas's
civil confinement provision of its Sexually Violent Predator Act. Community
notification laws do not force sex offenders to be detained in prison or
treatment facilities after serving out their sentences. In an effort to help the
public protect itself from sexual offenders, community notification laws
enable states to inform the public that a sex offender is living or working
nearby. Thus, because community notification is less of a burden on sex
offenders than spending additional time in prison or treatment facilities, the
United States Supreme Court will unlikely require a link between a finding
of dangerousness, with proof of a mental or personality disorder, in order to
be subjected to community notification. Nonetheless, this link will be
satisfied in the cases of extremely violent sex offenders, such as pedophiles
and child molesters, who have nearly doubled the recidivism rates of sex
offenders who target adults.461
Without a doubt, in order to be most effective, community notification
statutes must apply to both sex offenders who committed sexual offenses
prior to the law's enactment as well as to those who committed sexual
offenses since the laws came into effect.462 Eventually, the United States
Supreme Court will have to decide the ex post facto issue, even though in
due time it will disappear as sex offenders convicted before the passage of
community notification provisions pass away. However, with the 1994
passage of President Clinton's Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children
and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act 4 63 also known at the Violent
Crime Control Act all states must pass both sex offender registration and
community notification provisions by September 13, 1997, in order to
qualify for the maximum amount of federal funds for law enforcement.4
The Violent Crime Control Act allows law enforcement officials to publicly
release information about sex offenders as necessary to protect the public.465
Inevitably, as more and more states come in compliance with the Violent
Crime Control Act by passing sex offender community notification laws,
more and more ex post facto constitutional challenges will be brought.
461. See Tier & Coy, supra note 448.
462. Josephine Sacco, New York's Megan's Law: Retroactive Application Determines
the Fate, 13 N.Y.L. Sc-. J. HUM. RTs. 179, 219 (1996).
463. 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071 (West Supp. 1995).
464. Id. § 14071(f). States may be granted an additional two years as long as the state is
making a legitimate, good faith effort to pass such laws. Id.
465. Id. § 14071(d)(3).
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Finally, to some, allowing authorities to anticipate crimes of sex
offenders before they occur and penalizing them before they have been
committed is a frightening precedent for courts to set. However, allowing
sexually dangerous and violent predators to secretly live in communities
where innocent people work and play is an even more horrifying scenario.
Community notification laws do not punish convicted sex offenders a second
time. Yet, without community notification laws, communities across
America are the ones who would be punished by the villainous acts of repeat
sexual predators. Therefore, in the interest of public safety, the United
States Supreme Court should uphold community notification laws, by
finding that such laws aim to protect, not punish, thereby satisfying the
requirements of the United States Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause.
Charles J. Dlabik
ADDENDUM
E.B. V. VERNIERO
W.P. v. Poritz466 was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals,
Third Circuit in the case of E.B. v. Verniero.467 In Verniero, the court agreed
with the lower court that the community notification requirement of
"Megan's Law" did not impose an unconstitutional second form of
punishment under ex post facto analysis.4 68 However, the court reversed the
lower court's ruling and remanded the case to be decided on a due process
issue.
4 69
In determining that "Megan's Law's" notification provisions were not
punitive under the Ex Post Facto Clause, the court was undoubtedly
persuaded by a January 1995 study conducted by the Oregon Department of
Corrections, which analyzed the impact of sex offender community
notification provisions. 47 The study concluded that less than ten percent of
sex offenders in Oregon subjected to the state's community notification law
were victims of public vigilantism or harassment. 471 Although there were
reports of sex offenders being subjected to name calling, graffiti, toilet
papering, and minor property vandalism, there were only two extreme cases
466. 931 F. Supp. 1199 (D.N.J. 1996).
467. 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 1997).
468. Id. at 1081.
469. Id.
470. Id. at 1089-90.
471. Id. at 1090.
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of vigilantism reported during the fourteen-month study.472 In addition to
finding that sex offenders were subjected to some forms of harassment, the
study also found that community notification made it more difficult for sex
offenders to find places to live and work upon being released from prison.
473
Nevertheless, the court did not view community notification laws as
imposing an unconstitutional second form of punishment on sex offenders.
In its analysis of determining whether "Megan's Law's" community
notification law was punitive, the court adopted the three-prong test derived
in Artway v. Attorney General:474 1) the actual purpose of the community
notification provision; 2) the community notification's objective puTose;
and 3) the punitive effects of the community notification provisions.4 5 In
its ex post facto analysis, the court also looked to the United States Supreme
Court's recent decision in Kansas v. Hendricks,476 for guidance. In
Hendricks, the Court held that the involuntary confinement of a previously
convicted sex offender for an indefinite period of time, after he had already
served his orison sentence, did not constitute punishment under ex post facto
analysis.477 The court in Verniero agreed that Hendricks "provide[d] a new
and important 'fixed point' that is of great utility in determining on which
side of the punitive/nonpunitive line to place [sex offender] community
notification [laws]."' 478
Under the first prong of the Artway test, the court in Verniero found
that the purpose of such laws was to identify potential repeat sexual
offenders and warn the public when necessary for public safety. Thus, the
court found the community notification provisions of "Megan's Law"
satisfied the "actual purpose" test.
480
In its analysis of the community notification provision's "objective
purpose," the court used a reasonable legislator test: "If a reasonable
legislator motivated solely by the declared remedial goals could have
believed the means chosen were justified by those goals, then an objective
observer would have no basis for perceiving a punitive purpose in the
adoption of those means."'481 The court concluded that the notification of
people who are likely to come into contact with potential repeat sexual
472. Verniero, 119 F.3d at 1090.
473. Id. at 1090.
474. 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996).
475. Verniero, 119 F.3d at 1093.
476. 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
477. Verniero, 119 F.3d at 1094-95.
478. Id. at 1096.
479. Id. at 1097.
480. Id.
481. Id. at 1098.
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offenders is reasonably related to "Megan's Law's" nonpunitive goals.4 82 In
addition, because the community notification laws do not subject all
registered sex offenders to public dissemination of their personal
information, the court found such laws did not impose too great a burden on
sex offenders to be deemed punitive in nature.4 83 "Megan's Law" provides
for the dissemination of sex offender information only to those people who
are "reasonably certain" to come into contact with the registered sex
offender.4 84 The dissemination of truthful information that is a matter of
public record about a sex offender's prior criminal activities and potential
risk for recidivism "has never been regarded as punishment when done in
furtherance of a legitimate governmental interest."'485 Therefore, the court
found that the objective purpose of "Megan's Law" was certainly not a
486punitive one.
Under the third prong of the Artway test, in order for the effects of
community notification laws to be deemed "punishment," the effects of the
provisions must be "extremely onerous.",4 8P According to the court, the
"deprivation of one's livelihood is not sufficiently onerous."4 88 The court
noted that "Megan's Law" has neither deprived registered sex offenders of
living and working in a community and relocating to other parts of the state
or country, nor has the law deprived sex offenders of governmental
benefits. 4 99 Thus, according to the court, the direct effects of the "Megan's
Law" community notification provisions are not punitive in nature.
490
Nevertheless, what did concern the court in deciding that the community
notification provisions were not unconstitutionally punitive, were the
indirect effects of community notification.
The indirect effects of being subjected to sex offender community
notification laws include: 1) injury to reputation; 2) difficulty in finding
employment; 3) difficulty in finding housing; 4) the destruction of personal
relationships; and 5) vandalism and retributive assaults directed toward sex
offenders by private citizens.491 Despite these indirect effects of community
notification, the court concluded that the public notification provided for in
482. Verniero, 119 F.3d at 1098.
483. Id. at 1098-99.
484. Id. at 1098.
485. Id. at 1099-1100.
486. Id. at 1101.
487. Verniero, 119 F.3d at 1101.
488. Id.
489. Id. at 1102.
490. Id.
491. Id. at 1104.
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"Megan's Law" did not constitute punishment for the purposes of the Ex
Post Facto Clause.
492
Looking to Hendricks, the court concluded that remedial legislation
may damage one's reputation and cause severe individual hardship, but may
nevertheless avoid triggering the Ex Post Facto Clause. According to the
court, the state's interest in protecting the public from repeat sexual
offenders justified the potential damage to the sex offender's reputation.493
Moreover, the court agreed with the lower court that the risk of private
violence is rare and is most likely attributable to a sex offender's past
criminal behavior, not from community notification laws themselves.49 " In
addition, the court noted that many states, including New Jersey, have taken
steps to warn the public against the misuse of the disseminated information
and to discourage the exercise of private vengeance.495 Finally, the court
concluded that community notification satisfied the Artway test and that the
burden imposed by community notification "pales by comparison to the civil
commitment of sex offenders sanctioned in Hendricks.'
4 96
Although the court in Verniero concluded that community notification
was not punishment under ex post facto analysis, the court reversed the
District Court's decision on procedural due process grounds.
497
DOE V. PATAKI
After the Doe v. Pataki498 decision, state agencies and officials
appealed the district court's ruling that New York's version of "Megan's
Law," specifically, the retroactive application of its notification provisions,
was punitive in nature, thereby violating the United States Constitution's Ex
Post Facto Clause. Fortunately for state officials and the public-at-large, the
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, reversed this decision and
ruled that neither the registration nor public notification provisions of New
York's sex offender law imposed "punishment" under ex post facto
analysis. 499 Thus, the court of appeals concluded that the provision could be
imposed upon sex offenders convicted before the law's effective date. 500
492. Verniero, 119 F.3d at 1104.
493. Id.
494. Id.
495. Id.
496. Id. at 1105.
497. 119 F.3d at 1105-11.
498. 940 F. Supp. 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
499. Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1265-66 (2d Cir. 1997).
500. Id. at 1265.
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In determining whether New York's version of "Megan's Law"
imposed punishment for purposes of ex post facto analysis, the district court
looked at four categories: 1) legislative intent; 2) statutory design; 3)
historical analogies; and 4) punitive effects of the statute. 50 1 Applying these
four factors to the state's sex offender community notification law, the
district court ruled that community notification increased the form of
punishment on previously convicted sex offenders.
502
In addressing the district court's four-part analysis, the court of appeals
focused mainly on two questions in determining whether New York's
version of "Megan's Law" was unconstitutionally punitive in nature: 1)
whether the legislature intended the provisions to be criminal or civil in
nature; and 2) whether community notification is so punitive in form and
effect as to render it criminal despite the legislature's intent to the
contrary.
50 3
Of the four factors addressed by the district court in determining
whether the law was punitive, the district court was heavily persuaded by the
New York Legislature's intent in enacting the statute. Specifically, the
district court pointed to several statements made by legislators during floor
debates that exhibited a desire to punish sex offenders for their prior
crimes. 504 In concluding that the legislature's motivation for community
notification was a desire to punish sex offenders, the district court was
undoubtedly convinced that the legislator's comments revealed a degree of
animosity directed toward sex offenders. 50 5 The court of appeals rather
"decline[d] to rely on these isolated statements to characterize the
legislature's intent as punitive."'506 The court of appeals observed that a
legislature's floor debates provide little assistance in determining a
legislature's intent in enacting a statute.
5 0 7
In sum, the court of appeals accepted the view that the legislature
intended to retroactively apply its sex offender notification law to protect
communities and the general public from potentially dangerous sexual
offenders. 50 8 The court accepted the view that the regulation's goal was to
"afford concerned citizens with the ability to access information which may
ultimately provide significant protection to their family."509 According to
the court, the text of the community notification statute itself reasonably
501. Id. at 1271.
502. Id. at 1271-72.
503. Id. at 1274; see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
504. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 604-05.
505. Id. at 621-22.
506. Pataki, 120 F.3d at 1277.
507. Id.
508. Id.
509. Id. (citation omitted).
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addressed its nonpunitivel oal of protecting the public and facilitating future
law enforcement efforts.
For example, the court of appeals pointed out that New York's version
of "Megan's Law" had several features which manifested its nonpunitive
purpose: 1) the extent of notification depends on the sex offender's
perceived risk of recidivism-the greater the likelihood of recidivism, the
broader and more detailed notification to the public; 2) the extent of
notification is carefully controlled by classifying sex offenders based on
their risk of recidivism-low risk, moderate risk, and high risk; 3) the fact
that the notification provision contains many procedural safeguards to
prevent the misuse of registration information; and 4) that it provides for the
punishment of the unauthorized release of any information."' Therefore,
according to the court, the legislation's text and structure convincingly
supported the legislature's stated regulatory and nonpunitive intent for the
statute.
512
Turning to the second prong that the court of appeals addressed in its
determination of whether community notification is punitive-whether
community notification is so punitive in form and effect as to render it
criminal, despite the legislature's -intent to the contrary-the court was
unpersuaded by the plaintiffs description of numerous instances in which
sex offenders have suffered harm in the aftermath of notification.513 Despite
evidence of public ostracism, picketing, loss of employment, eviction,
threats of violence, physical attacks, and arson, the court of appeals did not
agree that "these detrimental consequences suffice to transform the
regulatory measure of community notification into punishment." 
514
Although the court of appeals noted that community notification is the
"but for" cause of some of these incidents, according to the court, they are.. . ... 515
not consequences imposed by the community notification provision.
According to the court, these acts of violence, ostracism, and discrimination
are caused by private third parties and result from information, most of
which was publicly available, though a bit more difficult to obtain, prior to
the passage of New York's version of "Megan's Law;" the sex offender's
underlying conviction or criminal act itself prompts some people to take
unlawful action against the convicted sex offender.
510. Id.; see N.Y. CORREcr. LAW § 168-1(5) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
511. Pataki, 120 F.3d at 1278.
512. Id
513. Id at 1279.
514. Id.
515. Id. at 1280.
516. Pataki, 120 F.3d at 1279.
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Furthermore, the court noted that numerous other statutes imposing
exceedingly harsh consequences and disabilities have been upheld against ex
post facto challenges. 517 According to the court, "consequences as drastic as
deportation, deprivation of one's livelihood, and termination of financial
support have not been considered sufficient to transform an avowedly
regulatory measure into a punitive one."'518 As a result, the court of appeals
concluded that whatever personal and societal burdens placed upon
convicted sex offenders that arose from community notification are not "so
disproportionately severe and so inappropriate to nonpunitive ends" as to
constitute punishment. 519  Therefore, the court held that the notification
requirements of New York's "Megan's Law" did not constitute punishment
for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause.
ROE V. OFFICE OF ADULT PROBATION
In Roe v. Office of Adult Probation, 52 the district court in Connecticut
ruled that the community notification provisions were punishment for ex
post facto purposes. Nevertheless, on appeal, the court of appeals held that
public notification pursuant to Connecticut's sex offender community
notification statute was not punishment for purposes of ex post facto
analysis.
521
Using the same two-prong analysis used by the court in Doe v.
Pataki522 and by the United States Supreme Court in Kansas v.
Hendricks,52 3 the court of appeals in Roe rejected the plaintiffs ex post
facto challenge and declared the community notification law constitutionally
sound under ex post facto analysis.
524
Looking to the specific language of the Office of Adult Probation's
community notification policy, the court of appeals concluded that the
primary purpose of the notification provision was to protect society from
potentially dangerous sex offenders and probationers under its
supervision. 525  The Guidelines state: "Information on convicted sex
517. Id.; see, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2086 (1997) (finding the civil
commitment of sex offenders with "mental abnormality" and who pose a threat to society did
not constitute punishment under ex post facto analysis).
518. Pataki, 120 F.3d at 1279.
519. Id. at 1280.
520. 938 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Conn. 1996).
521. Roe v. Office of Adult Probation, 125 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1997).
522. 120 F.3d 1263, 1274-75 (2d Cir. 1997).
523. 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2081-82 (1997).
524. Roe, 125 F.3d at 53-55.
525. Id. at 53.
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offenders will be provided to police, victims and other relevant individuals
and organizations in order to enhance public safety and awareness."
526
Moreover, the court was satisfied that another goal of community
notification was to make sure sex offenders get through their period of
probation without recommitting a crime and go on to have long-term
rehabilitative effects. 52 7 Thus, the court concluded that the Office of Adult
Probation's community notification policy was promulgated to serve dual
nonpunitive goals.
528
Turning to the second prong of its analysis, the court of appeals stated
that the plaintiff bears the "heavy burden" of overcoming the regulatory or
remedial purpose served by community notification.529 According to the
court, the plaintiff's burden of proving the community notification law
unconstitutional could only be sustained by the "clearest proof' that
notification was so punitive "in form and effect" as to render it punitive
despite the Office of Adult Probation's prospective, regulatory intent.
53 0
The court of appeals pointed to several factors which indicated that the
plaintiff's burden could not be met.
531
First, citing Pataki, the court of appeals explained that the Office of
Adult Probation's public dissemination policy consisted of a limited
dissemination to selected members of the community.53 2 Moreover, the
information provided to these members of the community was already
publicly available.5 33  Second, according to the court, the community
notification provision was not excessive in relation to its purpose of
enhancing public awareness and preventing recidivism.534 For instance,
only seven crimes can trigger public dissemination of information, only
persons deemed a high risk of recidivism are subjected to notification, and
only those individuals potentially endangered by the sex offender's
proximity will be notified through the state's sex offender policy.535 Third,
the court found no evidence that community notification was intended to
serve a retributive purpose.3 6 The court noted that deterrence of repeating
sexual crimes while on probation was not indicative of punitiveness.
537
526. Ia
527. Id
528. Id.
529. Roe, 125 F.3d at 54; see Hendricks v. Kansas, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2082 (1997).
530. Roe, 125 F.3d at 54; see United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2148 (1996).
531. Roe, 125 F.3d at 54.
532. Id.
533. Id.
534. Id at 55.
535. Id.
536. Roe, 125 F.3d at 55.
537. Roe, 125 F.3d at 55.
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Fourth, again citing Pataki, the court of appeals concluded that modem day
community notification measures are not analogous to historical forms of
punishment in that they "serve vastly different purposes than those served by
historical punishments, operate without the physical participation by the
offender, and lack the general social significance accompanying traditional
shaming and banishment penalties.,
5 3 8
Finally, unlike most community notification laws in effect, including
the New York version upheld in Pataki, the Office of Adult Probation's sex
offender notification law incorporates the clinical assessment of a sex
offender by a mental health counselor directly into the determination of
whether notification will occur for each potential subject of notification. 539
The critical responsibility of determining whether notification will occur
rests with an expert in the field of sex offender behavior and treatment, who
must make a prospective determination after an individualized examination
and assessment of the sex offender. 54  Because of this special feature
unique to Office of Adult Probation's community notification law, combined
with the other limitations imposed by the statute, the court concluded that
the measure was not punitive in character.
541
538. Id.
539. Id.
540. Id.
541. Id.
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When Does the Loser Pay under Florida's Offer of
Judgment Laws? The Combination of Legislative and
Judicial Authority on Offers of Judgment has Undermined
the Goal of Facilitating Settlement
I. NTIRODUCTION
An offer of judgment is a simple concept that was created to encourage
litigants to settle their cases before going to trial in order to help relieve an
already jammed court system.' The offer of judgment allows a party on
either side of an existing suit to offer a settlement to the adverse party before
trial.2 This mechanism encourages settlement because the offeree may end
up paying the offeror's costs and attorneys' fees if the offer is rejected under
certain conditions.3 Thus, the offer of judgment provides parties with an
additional incentive to settle before trial. However, accomplishing the goal
of easing the court system's load of cases through the offer of judgment
process in Florida has been a difficult task. This is primarily because there
are multiple sources of law governing offers ofjudgment
In Florida, three sources of law govern offers of judgment that can
come into play when an offer of judgment is made by eitherparty: sections
768.79' and 45.06 16 of the Florida Statutes, and Rule 1.442 of the Florida
1. Lesley S. Bonney, et al., Rule 68: Awakening a Sleeping Giant, 65 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 379, 379-80 (1997).
2. Id at 382.
3. Id.
4. Clinton A. Wright HI, Note, Confusion in Florida Offer of Judgment Practice:
Resolving the Conflict Between Judicial and Legislative Enactments, 43 FLA. L. REv. 35, 39
(1991).
5. The 1997 version of section 768.79 provides:
(1) In any civil action for damages filed in the courts of this state, if a
defendant files an offer of judgment which is not accepted by the plaintiff
within 30 days, the defendant shall be entitled to recover reasonable costs and
attorney's fees incurred by her or him or on the defendant's behalf pursuant to
a policy of liability insurance or other contract from the date of filing of the
offer if the judgment is one of no liability or the judgment obtained by the
plaintiff is at least 25 percent less than such offer, and the court shall set off
such costs and attorney's fees against the award. Where such costs and
attorney's fees total more than the judgment, the court shall enter judgment
for the defendant against the plaintiff for the amount of the costs and fees,
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less the amount of the plaintiff's award. If a plaintiff files a demand for
judgment which is not accepted by the defendant within 30 days and the
plaintiff recovers a judgment in an amount at least 25 percent greater than the
offer, she or he shall be entitled to recover reasonable costs and attorney's
fees incurred from the date of the filing of the demand. If rejected, neither an
offer nor demand is admissible in subsequent litigation, except for pursuing
the penalties of this section.
(2) The making of an offer of settlement which is not accepted does not
preclude the making of a subsequent offer. An offer must:
(a) Be in writing and state that it is being made pursuant to this section.
(b) Name the party making it and the party to whom it is being made.
(c) State with particularity the amount offered to settle a claim for
punitive damages, if any.
(d) State its total amount.
The offer shall be construed as including all damages which may be awarded
in a final judgment.
(3) The offer shall be served upon the party to whom it is made, but it
shall not be filed unless it is accepted or unless filing is necessary to enforce
the provisions of this section.
(4) An offer shall be accepted by filing a written acceptance with the
court within 30 days after. Upon filing of both the offer and acceptance, the
court has full jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement.
(5) An offer may be withdrawn in writing which is served before the date
a written acceptance is filed. Once withdrawn, an offer is void.
(6) Upon motion made by the offeror within 30 days after the entry of
judgment or after voluntary or involuntary dismissal, the court shall
determine the following:
(a) If a defendant serves an offer which is not accepted by the plaintiff,
and if the judgment obtained by the plaintiff is at least 25 percent less than
the amount of the offer, the defendant shall be awarded reasonable costs,
including investigative expenses, and attorney's fees, calculated in
accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Supreme Court, incurred
from the date the offer was served, and the court shall set off such costs in
attorney's fees against the award. When such costs and attorney's fees total
more than the amount of the judgment, the court shall enter judgment for the
defendant against the plaintiff for the amount of the costs and fees, less the
amount of the award to the plaintiff.
(b) If the plaintiff serves an offer which is not accepted by the defendant,
and if the judgment obtained by the plaintiff is at least 25 percent more than
the amount of the offer, the plaintiff shall be awarded reasonable costs,
including investigative expenses, and attorney's fees, calculated in
[Vol. 22:645
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accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Supreme Court, incurred
from the date the offer was served.
For purposes of the determination required by paragraph (a), the term
"judgment obtained" means the amount of the net judgment entered, plus any
postoffer collateral source payments received or due as of the date of the
judgment, plus any postoffer settlement amounts by which the verdict was
reduced. For purposes of the determination required by paragraph (b), the
term "judgment obtained" means the amount of the net judgment entered,
plus any postoffer settlement amounts by which the verdict was reduced.
(7)(a) If a party is entitled to costs and fees pursuant to the provisions of
this section, the court may, in its discretion, determine that an offer was not
made in good faith. In such case, the court may disallow an award of costs
and attorney's fees.
(b) When determining the reasonableness of an award of attorney's fees
pursuant to this section, the court shall consider, along with all other relevant
criteria, the following additional factors:
1. The then apparent merit or lack of merit in the claim.
2. The number and nature of offers made by the parties.
3. The closeness of questions of fact and law at issue.
4. Whether the person making the offer had unreasonably refused to
furnish information necessary to evaluate the reasonableness of such offer.
5. Whether the suit was in the nature of a test case presenting questions
of far-reaching importance affecting nonparties.
6. The amount of the additional delay cost and expense that the person
making the offer reasonably would be expected to incur if the litigation
should be prolonged.
(8) Evidence of an offer is admissible only in proceedings to enforce an
accepted offer or to determine the imposition of sanctions under this section.
FLA. STAT. § 768.79 (1997).
6. The 1997 version of section 45.061 provides:
(1) At any time more than 60 days after the service of a summons and
complaint on a party but not less than 60 days (or 45 days if it is a
counteroffer) before trial, any party may serve upon an adverse party a written
offer, which offer shall not be filed with the court and shall be denominated
as an offer under this section, to settle a claim for the money, property, or
relief specified in the offer and to enter into a stipulation dismissing the claim
or to allow judgment to be entered accordingly. The offer shall remain open
for 45 days unless withdrawn sooner by a writing served on the offeree prior
to acceptance by the offeree. An offer that is neither withdrawn nor accepted
within 45 days shall be deemed rejected. The fact that an offer is made but
not accepted does not preclude the making of a subsequent offer. Evidence of
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an offer is not admissible except in proceedings to enforce a settlement or to
determine sanctions under this section.
(2) If, upon a motion by the offeror within 30 days after the entry of
judgment, the court determines that an offer was rejected unreasonably,
resulting in unnecessary delay and needless increase in the cost of litigation, it
may impose an appropriate sanction upon the offeree. In making this
determination the court shall consider all of the relevant circumstances at the
time of the rejection, including:
(a) Whether, upon specific request by the offeree, the offeror had
unreasonably refused to furnish information which was necessary to evaluate
the reasonableness of the offer.
(b) Whether the suit was in the nature of a "test-case," presenting
questions of far-reaching importance affecting nonparties.
An offer shall be presumed to have been unreasonably rejected by a defendant
if the judgment entered is at least 25 percent less than the offer rejected, and
an offer shall be presumed to have been unreasonably rejected by a plaintiff if
the judgment entered is at least 25 percent less than the offer rejected. For the
purposes of this section, the amount of the judgment shall be the total amount
of money damages awarded plus the amount of costs and expenses reasonably
incurred by the plaintiff or counter-plaintiff prior to the making of the offer
for which recovery is provided by operation of other provisions of Florida
law.
(3) In determining the amount of any sanction to be imposed under this
section, the court shall award:
(a) The amount of the parties' costs and expenses, including reasonable
attorneys' fees, investigative expenses, expert witness fees, and other
expenses which relate to the preparation for trial, incurred after the making of
the offer of settlement; and
(b) The statutory rate of interest that could have been earned at the
prevailing statutory rate on the amount that a claimant offered to accept to the
extent that the interest is not otherwise included in the judgment.
The amount of any sanction imposed under this section against a plaintiff
shall be set off against any award to the plaintiff, and if such sanction is in an
amount in excess of the award to the plaintiff, judgment shall be entered in
favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff in the amount of the excess.
(4) This section shall not apply to any class action or shareholder
derivative suit or to matters relating to dissolution of marriage, alimony,
nonsupport, eminent domain, or child custody.
(5) Sanctions authorized under this section may be imposed
notwithstanding any limitation on recovery of costs or expenses which may
be provided by contract or in other provisions of Florida law. This section
shall not be construed to waive the limits of sovereign immunity set forth in s.
768.28.
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(6) This section does not apply to causes of action that accrue after the
effective date of this act.
FLA. STAT. § 45.061 (1997).
The 1997 version of Rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
(a) Applicability. This rule applies to all proposals for settlement
authorized by Florida law, regardless of the terms used to refer to such offers,
demands, or proposals, and supersedes all other provisions of the rules and
statutes that may be inconsistent with this rule.
(b) Time Requirements. A proposal to a defendant shall be served no
earlier than 90 days after service of process on that defendant; a proposal to a
plaintiff shall be served no earlier than 90 days after the action has been
commenced. No proposal shall be served later than 45 days before the date
set for trial or the first day of the docket on which the case is set for trial,
whichever is earlier.
(c) Form and Content of Proposal for Settlement.
(1) A proposal shall be in writing and shall identify the applicable
Florida law under which it is being made.
(2) A proposal shall:
(A) name the party or parties making the proposal and the party or
parties to whom the proposal is being made;
(B) identify the claim or claims the proposal is attempting to resolve;
(C) state with particularity any relevant conditions;
(D) state the total amount of the proposal and state with particularity all
nonmonetary terms of the proposal;
(E) state with particularity the amount proposed to settle a claim for
punitive damages, if any;
(F) state whether the proposal includes attorney fees and whether
attorney fees are part of the legal claim; and
(G) include a certificate of service in the form required by rule 1.080(f).
(3) A proposal may be made by or to any party or parties and by or to
any combination of parties properly identified in the proposal. A joint
proposal shall state the amount and terms attributable to each party.
(d) Service and Filing. A proposal shall be served on the party or
parties to whom it is made but shall not be filed unless necessary to enforce
the provisions of this rule.
(e) Withdrawal. A proposal may be withdrawn in writing provided the
written withdrawal is delivered before a written acceptance is delivered.
Once, withdrawn, a proposal is void.
(f) Acceptance and Rejection. A proposal shall be deemed rejected
unless accepted by delivery of a written notice of acceptance within 30 days
after service of the proposal. The provisions of rule 1.090 (e) do not apply to
1998]
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Rules of Civil Procedure. Generally, an offer of judgment allows for a
plaintiff or defendant to recover attorneys' fees and costs from the date the
offer was made.8 That is, if a plaintiff makes an offer to settle and the
defendant rejects the offer, the plaintiff can then recover costs and fees if
there is a judgment in favor of the plaintiff that is twenty-five percent more
than the plaintiff's original offer to settle.9 Conversely, the defendant may
recover fees and costs if the plaintiff rejects the defendant's offer, and there
this subdivision. No oral communications shall constitute an acceptance,
rejection, or counteroffer under the provisions of this rule.
(g) Sanctions. Any party seeking sanctions pursuant to applicable
Florida law, based on the failure of the proposal's recipient to accept a
proposal, shall do so by service of an appropriate motion within 30 days after
the entry of judgment in a nonjury action, the return of the verdict in a jury
action, or the entry of a voluntary or involuntary dismissal.
(h) Costs and Fees.
(1) If a party is entitled to costs and fees pursuant to applicable Florida
law, the court may, in its discretion, determine that a proposal was not made
in good faith. In such case, the court may disallow an award of costs and
attorney fees.
(2) When determining the reasonableness of the amount of an award of
attorney fees pursuant to this section, the court shall consider, along with all
other relevant criteria, the following factors:
(A) The then-apparent merit or lack of merit in the claim.
(B) The number and nature of proposals made by the parties.
(C) The closeness of questions of fact and law at issue.
(D) Whether the party making the proposal had unreasonably refused to
furnish information necessary to evaluate the reasonableness of the proposal.
(E) Whether the suit was in the nature of a test case presenting questions
of far-reaching importance affecting nonparties.
(F) The amount of the additional delay cost and expense that the party
making the proposal reasonably would be expected to incur if the litigation
were to be prolonged.
(i) Evidence of Proposal. Evidence of a proposal or acceptance thereof
is admissible only in proceedings to enforce an accepted proposal or to
determine the imposition of sanctions.
(j) Effect of Mediation. Mediation shall have no effect on the dates
during which parties are permitted to make or accept a proposal for settlement
under the terms of the rule.
FLA. R .CIv. P. 1.442.
8. FLA. STAT. § 768.79(1) (1993).
9. Id.
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is either a judgment of no liability or the judgment rendered is at least
twenty-five percent less than the defendant's offer.
10
The notion of providing an incentive for parties to settle through fee
shifting enactments is not new. Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, governing offers of judgment, was adopted in 1938 "to lessen the
burden on an already taxed justice system."'" The first offer of judgment
rule in Florida, Rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure,12 which
was modeled after the federal provision, was adopted by the Supreme Court
of Florida in 1972, and became effective January 1, 1973.15 Since the
adoption of rule 1.442 in 1972, the Florida Legislature responded by creating
sections 768.79 and 45.061 of the Florida Statutes to try and fill in the gaps
left by the original procedural rule.
14
At this point there were three provisions "with varying applicability,
sanctions, and procedural requirements.1 5  Thus, the Supreme Court of
Florida felt the need to come to the rescue of rule 1.442 in order to achieve
greater uniformity and therefore revised the rule to include attorneys' fees
along with costs. 6 This version of rule 1.442 also, for the first time, made
an offer of judgment accessible to both plaintiffs and defendants. 17 Even
though the 1990 version of rule 1.442 included selected requirements in
either section 45.061 or 768.79, of the Florida Statutes, the revision failed to
clear up the confusion.
18
Thus the Florida Legislature introduced subsection six of section
45.061 which prohibits section 45.061 from being used for all causes of
action accruing after October 1, 1990.19 Reducing the number of legal
10. See id. Note that a defendant was not able to recover attorney's fees under the 1989
version of section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes when the court entered a judgment of no
liability in favor of the defendant. In other words, a defendant could only recover attorney's
fees when a judgment of some amount was entered in favor of the plaintiff. See Johnson v.
Fye, 654 So. 2d 1233, 1234 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
11. Bonney, supra note 1, at 380.
12. The original version of rule 1.442 did not provide for attorneys' fees as a sanction
and could only be utilized by defendants. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442 (1972).
13. William VanDercreek, Civil Procedure: 1992 Survey of Florida Law, 17 NOVA L.
RFv. 96, 126 (1992).
14. Wright, supra note 4, at 39.
15. Id. at39.
16. In re Amendments to the Fla. Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1.442, 550 So. 2d 442,
443 (Fla. 1989).
17. Id.
18. See VanDercreek, supra note 13, at 126.
19. FLA. STAT. § 45.061(6) (1991).
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sources aids in reaching uniformity in Florida's offer of judgment practice.2°
21In Timmons v. Combs, in another attempt to achieve uniformity, the
Supreme Court of Florida changed rule 1.442.22 In Timmons, the court
stated:
The legislature has now repealed section 45.061 with respect to
causes of action accruing after October 1, 1990. Ch. 90-119, § 22,
Laws of Fla. This leaves section 768.79 as the only statute on the
subject for new causes of action. Because the statute does contain
procedural aspects which are subject to our rule-making authority,
we hereby adopt the procedural portion of section 768.79 as a rule
of this Court effective as of the date of this opinion.23
Thus, for the period between the Timmons decision in 199224 and the recent
enactment of the new version of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure
1.442 by the Supreme Court oT Florida, the only provision available to
practilioners was section 768.79 for causes of action that accrued after
1990. 2
However, the Supreme Court of Florida has decided to enter the fray
once again. The Civil Procedure Rules Committee of the Florida Bar
recently recommended a new version2Ff rule 1.442 which was adopted, in
part, by the Supreme Court of Florida. The idea behind the new version of
the rule is to harmonize the differences between the rule and the existing
statutes, namely sections 768.792' and 45.061.30
Despite the concerted efforts of the legislative and judicial branches to
simplify the process, the mystery surrounding offers of judgment still exists.
The reason is because the procedural requirements of section 768.7931 and
rule 1.442 are different.32 Therefore, the existence of two different sources
20. Scott Distasio, Offers of Judgment-Wading Through the Confusion, 68 FLA. B.J 65
(1994).
21. 608 So. 2d I (Fla. 1992).
22. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442. In Timmons, the court decided to give deference to section
768.79 of the Florida Statutes by stating: "Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 is hereby
repealed as of the date of this opinion." Timmons, 608 So. 2d at 3.
23. Timmons, 608 So. 2d at 3.
24. Id.
25. See In re Amendments to Fla. Rules of Civil Procedure, 682 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1996).
26. FLA. STAT. § 768.79 (1990).
27. VanDercreek, supra note 13, at 126.
28. In re Amendments to Fla. Rules of Civil Procedure, 682 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1996).
29. FLA. STAT. § 768.79 (1993).
30. FLA. STAT. § 45.061 (1990) (repealed by Fla. Laws 1990, c. 90-119, § 22).
31. FLA STAT. § 768.79(2)-(6) (1997).
32. FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.442(A)-(H) (1997).
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with conflicting procedures leaves one wondering which section to utilize in
order to make a proposal for settlement successfully. In an efficient judicial
system one should not have to wonder what statute and or procedural rule
will govern when one is considering the option of making a proposal for
settlement.
Because Florida's offer of judgment provisions differ in their approach,
confusion has been created among practitioners amd courts on which
provision to apply and how to apply its intricate parts. Further, in a given
year that a cause of action accrues, amendments to the statutes and the rule
can create substantive and procedural difficulties such that the delicate
balance of the separation of powers between the legislative and judicial
branches may come into conflict. -4  Consequently, Florida's offer of
judgment laws do not achieve the goal of alleviating the judicial system's
caseload because the interplay among the existing sources results in
prolongeQ itigation to determine whether attorneys' fees and costs should be
awarded. In fact, a recent opinion by the Fourth District Court of Appeal,
stated: "We regret that this case is just one more example of the offer of
judgment statute causing a proliferation of litigation, rather than fostering its
primary goal to 'terminate all claims, end disp tes, and obviate the need for
further intervention of the judicial process."' Additionally, practitioners
have been inclined to present an offer under all three provisions perhaps to
increase their client's chances of being award," which, in effect,
sacrifices the court's efficiency in deciding disputes.
Although there are several areas that have caused confusion in Florida's
offer of judgment laws this article focuses on two key areas that have created
the most confusion. The first issue discusses the distinction between
situations where an amendment to the statute or procedural rule can apply
retroactively and situations where an amendment does not apply
retroactively. The second issue discusses the element of reasonableness and
how it may effect the amount awarded in a particular case.
I1. ATTEMPTING TO ACHIEVE UNIFORMITY
33. See TGI Friday's, Inc. v. Dvorak, 663 So. 2d 606, 610-13 (Fla. 1995) (comparing
sections 45.061 and 768.79 of the Florida Statutes, and Rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure).
34. See Leapai v. Milton, 595 So. 2d 12, 14 (Fla. 1992).
35. See Security Prof'Is, Inc. v. Segall, 685 So. 2d 1381, 1384 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1997).
36. Id. at 1381 (quoting Unicare Health Facilities, Inc. v. Mort, 553 So. 2d 159, 161
(Fla. 1989)).
37. VanDercreek, supra note 13, at 126.
38. Segall, 685 So. 2d at 1384.
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A. Confusion May Result When Substantive and Procedural
Considerations Affect the Outcome
Generally, the power to create substantive rights rests in the legislative
branch while the power to create procedural rules rests in the judiciary.39
The Supreme Court of Florida has always maintained the position that the
right to collect attorneys' fees and costs is a substantive right and thus the
legislature has the power to create an entitlement tofees.
However, under section 768.7941 or 45.061 of the Florida Statutes,
the procedural requiremenltf of the statutes differ with the procedural
requirements of rule 1.442. The difficulty that arises is determining what
guidelines will apply when a question exists as to whether or not a particular
requirement creates a substantive right or whether the requirement is viewed
as procedural in nature. In this situation, a problem may arise resulting in a
potenial infringement on the court's capacity to implement procedural
rules. The substantive and procedural distinction bears importance when a
situation arises where a determination needs to be made on what version of a
rule will apply where a cause of action accrues before an amendment to the
rule has been made.
In Twiddy v. Roca, the Second District Court of Appeal held that the
defendants were not entitled to attorney5' fees because the 1987 version of
section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes" did not allow for the recovery of
fees and cos$s where a judgment of no liability was entered on behalf of
defendants. However, the amended version of section 768.79 in effect at
the time the offer was made does allow for costs and fees for a defendant
who receives a verdict of no liability. This amendment was based on the
reasoning that the plaintiff should not be in a better position because they
lost the entire case as opposed to the defendant being able to recover if the
39. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2.
40. See TGI Friday's, Inc. v. Dvorak, 663 So. 2d 606, 611 (Fla. 1995). But see Wright,
supra note 4, at 35 (standing for the proposition that Florida's legislative enactments
concerning offers of judgment are an unconstitutional infringement on the Supreme Court of
Florida's procedural rule-making authority).
41. FLA. STAT. § 768.79 (1997).
42. FLA. STAT. § 45.061 (1997).
43. FLA. R. CIv. P. 1.442.
44. See Hanzelik v. Grottoli, 687 So. 2d 1363, 1365 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
45. 677 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
46. Id. at 388.
47. Id. In Twiddy, the appellate court reversed an award of attorney's fees granted to
the defendant by holding that the 1987 version of section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes
applied.
48. FLA. STAT. § 768.79.
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plaintiff received a verdict of some amount.49 The Twiddy court stated: "An
award of attorney's fees pursuant to section 768.79 is controlled by the
statute k effect when the cause of action accrued, not when the offer was
made."" Thus, the defendant in this case was not entitled to fees and costs,
because the old version of the statute did not provide an eijitlement. The
defendant could have recovered had the new version a?,plied.
However, in Dynasty Express Corp. v. Weiss, the Fourth District
Court of Appeal rejected the defendant's argument that the version of the
rule in effect at the time the action accrued will g 'ern rather than the
version of the rule in effect when the offer was made. This appears to be
in direct conflict with the reasoning of Twiddy. However, it is not. The
reason is because a subsequent amendment to a statute or rule will only
apply retroactively if the controversy in the case concerns a procedural
matter. In Weiss, the controversy centered around the effect of a withdrawal
of an offer-which is a procedural matter.
In Weiss, the defendant made an offer which was accepted by the
plaintiff for damages resulting from an automobile acc ent which allegedly
caused the plaintiff to quit his practice as a physician. Upon reaching an
impasse in mediation on April 4, 1995, the defendant made ap.5offer on April
5, 1995, pursuant to section 44.102 of the Florida Statutes Defendant's
offer was made under section 44.102, which allows an offer of judgment to
be made under section 768.79 or 45.061 of the Florida Statutes after an
49. See Timmons v. Combs, 608 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1992).
50. Twiddy, 677 So. 2d at 388.
51. Id. at 388. See also Brodose v. School Bd. of Pinellas County, 622 So. 2d 513, 515
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Metropolitan Dade County v. Jones Boatyard, Inc., 611 So. 2d
512, 514 (Fla. 1993).
52. 675 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
53. Id. at 238.
54. Id. at 237.
55. Id. at 238. Section 44.102(6) of the Florida Statutes provides:
(6)(a) When an action is referred to mediation by court order, the time periods
for responding to an offer of settlement pursuant to s. 45.06 1, or to an offer or
demand for judgment pursuant to s. 768.79, respectiviely, shall be tolled until:
1. An impasse has been declared by the mediator, or
2. The mediator has reported to the court that no agreement was reached.
(b) Sections 45.061 and 768.79 notwithstanding, an'offer of settlement or
an offer or demand for judgment may be made at any time after an impasse
has been declared by the mediator, or the mediator has reported that no
agreement was reached. An offer is deemed rejected as of commencement of
trial.
FLA. STAT. § 44.102 (1996). See Knealing v. Puleo, 675 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1996).
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impasse in mediation has been reached.56 One year later, on April 6, 1996,
after the offer was made and accepted, the defendant was made aware that
the plaintiff testified in an unrelated suit in 1994 that he never intended to
end his 5purgical practice due to any disability but instead gave other
reasons. Upon Pis finding, the defendant orally withdrew the offer made
on April 5, 1995. The defendant's position was that a verbal withdrawal
was sufficient, while the plaintiff argued that the withdrawal had to be in
writing.
The district court summed up its approach by stating: "[t]hese contrary
positions depended upon which version of the statute and/or1 rule was
determined to be dispositve." The provisions of section 768.79 enter tlq
picture because the Supreme Court of Florida ruled in Knealing v. Puleo
that section 768.79 is applicable to offers made under section 44.102.63 The
defendant based its position on the fact that "[t]he 1989 version of section
768.79, which was in effect in 1990 when the cause of action accrued in th"
case, did not dictate any method for withdrawing 
an offer of judgment." 'j
However, the 1990 version of section 768.79 expressly s~ted that in order
for an offer to be properly withdrawn it must be in writing.
The Weiss court rejected the defendant's argument that the reasoning of
Metropolitan Dade County v. Jones Boatyard, Inc. should apply
"[b]ecause the right to collect fees is supstantive in nature, in this regard the
statute would not apply retroactively." In Jones Boatyard, the court held
that section 768.79 "does not apply to offers of judgment where the
underlying cause of action accrued prior to its effective date. 68 Thus, the
rule appears to be that if the controversy surrounding an offer of judgment
56. See § 44.102.
57. Weiss, 675 So. 2d at 237.
58. Id. at 238.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. FLA. STAT. § 768.79 (1990).
62. 675 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1996).
63. Id. at 593.
64. Weiss, 675 So. 2d at 238.
65. FLA. STAT. § 768.79(5) (1991). The statute reads as follows: "An offer may be
withdrawn in writing which is served before the date a written acceptance is filed. Once
withdrawn, an offer is void." Id. In Weiss, the court concluded that "[t]his version, which
indicates that a withdrawal must be in writing, has remained in effect since the 1990
amendment." Weiss, 675 So. 2d at 238.
66. 611 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 1993).
67. Weiss, 675 So. 2d at 238.
68. Jones Boatyard, 611 So. 2d at 513 (citing Mudano v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 543 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989)).
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deals with the substantive right to collect fees and costs, then an amendment
to a rule disturbing this right will not apply retroactively.
Therefore, the court in Weiss relied on the reasoning of State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Laforet,69 which stated that: "[t]he
general rule is that a substantive statute will not operate retrospectively
absent clear legislative intent to the contrary, but that a procedural or
remedial statute is to operate retrospectively." By this reasoning, the
Weiss court found that the amended version of section 768.79 that required
all withdrawals be in writing applied retroactively to the defendant, because
a retracion is determined to be a procedural matter rather than a substantive
matter. Therefore, the court held that because the defendant's offer was
not retracted in writing, an oral retraction was ineffective. Additionally,
the court pointed out that the procedural requirement of a written withdrawal
in section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes did not conflict with Rule 1.442 of
the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure because the Supreme Court of Florida's
decision in TimNons incorporated the procedural portions of section 768.79
into rule 1.442.
The Weiss decision reached an undesirable result in the sense that the
plaintiff may recover an oqir of settlement that may have been induced by
fraudulent representations. Fortunately, a separate issue in the Weiss
decision did grant an evidentiary hearing on the issue of the truthfulness of
plaintiff's representations.
It is important to illustrate here that normal contract principles do not
apply to offers ofjutgment because the process is solely governed by statute
or procedural rule. The defendant in Weiss argued that common law
principles of contract should apply and allow a verbal withdrawal because
the 1989 version of 768.79 does not mention anything about the procedure
for withdrawing an offer." The court did not address this argument directly,
but it would be safe to assume that the court would most likely read any
69. 658 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 1995).
70. Id. at 61 (citations omitted).
71. Weiss, 675 So. 2d at 238.
72. Id. at 239.
73. Id. (citing Timmons v. Combs, 608 So. 2d 1, 1 (Fla. 1992)).
74. Id. ("Thus the procedure of section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1991), as incorporated
by rule 1.442, governed and required that the withdrawal be in writing").
75. Weiss, 675 So. 2d at 240. The court determined that there was enough evidence
presented by the defendant that the plaintiff fraudulently induced the offer made by the
defendant and that "[g]iven the legal standards set out above ... it is clear that the motions in
this case sufficiently alleged conduct that would warrant an evidentiary hearing." Id.
76. Id. at 239.
77. Id.
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implications concerning contract doctrines into the statute instead of actually
applying contract principles.
Accordingly, practitioners should be forewarned that when considering
an offer of judgment it is imperative to first, look when the cause of action
accrued and second, make a determination as to whether or not a substantive
versus a procedural issue may arise. Then it should be more clear as to what
version of a particular offer ofjudgrnent provision should be utilized.
B. The Element of Reasonableness: Should it Apply to the Amount
Awarded or the Consideration of Entitlement?
Generally, once it has been decided that a party is entitled to costs and
fees the judge then has the discretion to determine whether or not the amount
awarded is reasonable.78 Thereafter, the judge can make any adjustments to
the amount awarded that are deemed necessary. After the Supreme Court of
Florida's decision in Timmons v. Combs, Rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure adopted the procedural portions of section 768.79 so that all
causes Qf action accruing after July 9, 1992, will be interpreted under section
768.79. "  Thus, from the date of the Timmons decision to the present,
section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes and Rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure approach the element of reasonableness in an identical
fashion. 0 Therefore the uniformity between section 768.79 and rule 1.442
should provide a more stable approach in applying the element of
reasonableness. 8 1 However, section 45.061 remains unique in its approach
to the element of reasonableness and how it is applied in a proposal of
settlement.
For purposes of clarity, it is important to examine how each provision
presently deals with reasonableness side by side.
Paragraph two of the 1997 version of section 45.061 of the Florida
Statutes provides:
If upon a motion by the offeror within 30 days after the entry of
judgment, the court determines that an offer was rejected
unreasonably, resulting in unnecessary delay and needless increase
in the cost of litigation, it may impose an appropriate sanction upon
the offeree. In making this determination the court shall consider
78. See, e.g., § 768.79 (7)(b) (1997).
79. Timmons v. Combs, 608 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1992).
80. See id. and In re Amendments Fla. Rules of Civil Procedure, 682 So. 2d 105 (Fla.
1996).
81. See, David L. Kian, The 1996 Amendments to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.442 Reconciling a Decade of Confusion, 71 FLA. B.J. 32, 35 (1997).
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all of the relevant circumstances at the time of the rejection
including:
(a) Whether, upon specific request by the offeree, the offeror
had unreasonably refused to furnish information which was
necessary to evaluate the reasonableness of the offer...
An offer shall be presumed to have been unreasonably rejected
by a defendant if the judgment entered is at least 25 percent greater
than the offer rejected, and an offer shall be presumed to have been
unreasonably rejected by a plaintiff if the judgment entered is at
least 25 percent less than the offer rejected.
82
Paragraph (h), titled "Costs and Fees" of the 1997 version of the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.442 provides:
(1) If a party is entitled to costs and fees pursuant to applicable Florida
law, the court may, in its discretion, determine that a proposal was not made
in good faith. In such case, the court may disallow an award of costs and
attorney fees.
(2) When determining the reasonableness of the amount of an award of
attorney fees pursuant to this section, the court shall consider, along with all
other relevant criteria, the following factors:
(A) The then-apparent merit or lack of merit in the claim.
(B) The number and nature of proposals made by the parties.
(C) The closeness of questions of fact and law at issue.
(D) Whether a party making the proposal had unreasonably refused to
furnish information necessary to evaluate the reasonableness of the proposal.
(E) Whether the suit was in the nature of a test case presenting questions
of far-reaching importance affecting nonparties;
(F) The amount of the additional delay cost and expense that the party
making the proposal reasonably would be expected to incur if the litigation
were to be prolonged.
(i) Evidence of Proposal. Evidence of a proposal or acceptance thereof is
admissible only in proceedings to enforce an accepted proposal or to
determine the imposition of sanctions.
(j) Effect of Mediation. Mediation shall have no effect on the dates during
which parties are permitted to make or accept a proposal for settlement under
the terms of the rule.
83
82. FLA. STAT. § 45.061 (1997).
83. FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.442 (amendment by In re Fla. Rules of Civil Procedure, 682 So.
2d 105 (Fla. 1996)).
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Likewise, section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes provides:
7(a) If a party is entitled to costs and fees pursuant to the provisions of this
section, the court may, in its discretion, determine that an offer was not made
in good faith. In such cases the court may disallow an award of costs and
attorney's fees.
(b) When determining the reasonableness of an award of attorney's fees
pursuant to this section, the court shall consider, along with all other relevant
criteria, the following additional factors:
1. The then apparent merit or lack of merit in the claim.
2. The number and nature of offers made by the parties.
3. The closeness of questions of fact and law at issue.
4. Whether the person making the offer had unreasonably refused to furnish
information necessary to evaluate the reasonableness of such offer.
5. Whether the suit was in the nature of a test case presenting questions of far-
reaching importance affecting nonparties.
6. The amount of the additional delay cost and expense that the person
making the offer reasonably would be expected to incur if the litigation
should be prolonged.
At one point, both statutes 45.061 and 768.79 of the Florida Statutes
and procedural rule 1.442 contained a different outlook on reasonableness
and how it was to be used in determining whether attorney's fees would be
awarded and/or how much would be granted.84 Each source of law was
worded differently' so that the interplay between them could create
conflicting results. Before the Timmons decision the 1990 version of rule
1.442 provided a combination of sections 45.061 and 768.79 of the Florida
Statutes in its treatment of how reasonab eness affects whether an award of
costs and attorneys' fees will be granted. The 1990 version of rule 1.442
required a finding of both an unreasonable rejection of an offer and that the
judgment be either twenty-five percent more or less than the offer rejected,
depending on whether the offeror is the plaintiff or the defendant. On the
other hand, section 45.061 of the Florida Statutes only requires that an offer
be unreasonably rejected; the tweiy-five percent factor only provides a
presumption of unreasonableness. Thus a party, with the judge's
84. Compare, FLA. STAT. § 45.061 (2) (1987), FLA. STAT. § 768.79 (7) (1990), and FLA.
R. Civ. P. 1.442 (1990). Note, the latest version of FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442 does not include any
reference to the notion of the determination of the reasonableness of the rejection of an offer.
See In re Amendments to Fla. Rules of Civil Procedure, 682 So. 2d 105, 106 (Fla. 1997).
85. See, TGI Friday's v. Dvorak 663 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1995).
86. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.442(h) (1991).
87. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Malmberg, 623 So. 2d 755, 757 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1993) (citing Leapai v. Milton, 595 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1992) for the contention that "the
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discretion, may recover fees and costs even if the judgment does not meet
the twenty-five percent disparity between the offer and the judgment.
8 8
Section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes, however, creates an automatic
entitlement to attorneys' fees and costs withot making a determination on
whether a rejection of an offer was reasonable. The only way an award of
fees and costs will be disallowed under section 768.79 is if the judge
determines that the offer was not made in good faith.90 Further, under
section 768.79, the court can only make a determination of reasonablenes~las
applied to the amount awarded, not as applied to the rejection of an offer.
Thus, when an offer is made under all three provisions simultaneously,
courts are forced to pick through a pile of hay to find a needle in order to
impose sanctions of costs and fees on the offeree. This is illustrated by the
following analysis between two cases where a party made an offer under all
three provisions.
In Buchanan v. Allstate Insurance CO.,92 the defendant insurance
company was awarded attorneys' fees on appeal under section 45.061 of the
Florida Statutes when the plaintiffs rejected an offer of $10 000, and the
jury returned a verdict of no liability in favor of the defendant. 4 The offer
by the defendant was made under sections 768.79 and 45.061 of the Florida
Statutes and Rule 1.442 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. The
court applied the facts of this case to each statute in turn to reach its
conclusion.
Because the version of section 768.79 in effect at the time the cause of
action accrued did not allow a defendant to recover fees where a judgment of
no liability i4rendered, the court denied the defendant attorney's fees under
this section. Likewise, the court found that because rule 1.442 had been
interpreted to not allow the defendant to recover attorney's fees when a
judgment of no liability was entered the defendant was prevented from
recovering fees under this rule as well. 9
key to the operation of the statute is the unreasonable rejection of an offer of settlement")
(emphasis in original).
88. FLA. STAT. § 45.061(2) (1991).
89. See Schmidt v. Fortner, 629 So. 2d 1036, 1040 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
('Turning to the substance of section 768.79 itself, we conclude that the legislature has
created a mandatory right to attorney's fees, if the statutory prerequisites have been met.").
90. FLA. STAT. § 768.79 (7)(a) (1997).
91. Id.
92. 629 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
93. FLA. STAT. § 45.061(2)(b) (1991).
94. Buchanan, 629 So. 2d at 992.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 993.
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However, the court concluded that the defendant could recover
attorney's fees under section 45.061 on the basis that "the operative events
that trigger the provisions of section 45.061 are the making of an offer and a
rejection thereof."98 More specifically, the court pointed out that because
section 45.061(2)(b) provides a presumption of unreasonableness when the
plaintiff rejects an offer that is at least twenty-five percent less than the
judgment rendered, the defendant is entitled to attorney's fees. Thus the
court held: "[B]ecause the Buchanans rejected Allstate's $10,000 offer and
a judgment was entered for Allstate upon the jury's zero verdict, Allstate
was entitled to attorney's fees as a sanction for the Buchanans' unreasonable
rejection of the offer."
Accordingly, had the defendant made an offer under only section
768.79 or rule 1.442, the defendant would not have recovered anything. This
is somewhat of an absurd result considering the fact that all three provisions
were enacted for the same purpose, yet the purpose would have been
defeated had the defendant not made an offer under section 45.061. In the
future it is unlikely that there will be much litigation concerning section
45.061 because the Florida Legislatur 'epealed this section as to causes of
action accruing after October 1, 1990.
The Supreme Court of Florida took a different approach in awakging a
plaintiff attorney's fees and costs in TGI Friday's, Inc. v. Dvorak. The
plaintiff made three different offers of judgment, one under each statute and
procedural rule, before trial and the defendant restaurant rejected each one in
turn. The jury awarded the plaintiff a verdict well in excess of plaintiff's
offer to settle, but the trial court frfused to award plaintiff attorney's fees
under both statutes and rule 1.442.
The trial court denied the plaintiff's request under sections 768.79 and
45.061 on the grounds that both statutes were an unconstitutional
infringement on the Supref4e Court of Florida's authority to adopt all
relevant rules of procedure. Also, the trial court denied the plaintiff fees
and costs under rule 1.442 because the judge determined that "1.442
provided no authority for the award of attorney's fees to Dvorak because the
rule, which was enacted after Dvorak's cause of actior?05ccrued, was
substantive in nature and could not be applied retroactively."
98. Id. at 993 (citing Leapai v. Milton, 595 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1992)).
99. Buchanan, 629 So. 2d at 993.
100. Id.
101. FLA. STAT. § 45.061(6) (1991).
102. 663 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1995).
103. Id. at 610.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's
denial of attorneys' fees under section 45.061 and rle 1.442 but reversed the
trial court's denial of fees under section 768.79. The Supreme Court of
Florida, on review, established: "We approve each of the fE " distinct
holdings of the district court and adopt its reasoning as our own."
Concerning the issue of reasonableness the district court held "whether
TGI Friday's had unreasonably rejected Dvorak's offer of judgment had no
bearing on whether Dvorak was entitled to an award of attorney's fees under
section 768.79 .... [The statute] does not require that aufferee's rejection
be unreasonable as a prerequisite to an award of fees." More precisely,
the district court stated: "[S]ection 768.79 does not give the trial court
discretion to deny attorney's fees, once the prerequisites of the statute have
been fulfilled, except if the court detennineso~der section 768.79([2])(a)
that 'an offer was not made in good faith."' '  In Dvorak, the jMjpreme
Court of Florida also rel1?il on the interpretation of section 768.79 given
in Schmidt v. Former, which explained that the sta 14e created an
entitlement to fees once the statutory prerequisites were met.
After it has been determined that an offer was made in good faith, there
are only two requirements necessary iRder section 768.79 to be entitled to an
award of attorneys' fees and costs. First, an offer or demand must be
made and subsequently rejected, and second, the judgment rendered must be
at least twenty-five percent more or less than the demand or offer.
114
The only discretion the judge has in awarding attorneys' fees and costs
under section 768.79 applies to th reasonableness of the amount awarded
under all relevant circugpdtances upon a finding that a qualifying offer
was made in good faith. Section 768.79 creates an entitlement to fees and
costs once the two prerequisites are met, apli then the court may consider
whether the amount awarded is reasonable. Thus, under section 768.79
106. IA at 609 (note that the court also found that sections 768.79 and 45.061 were
constitutional).
107. Dvorak, 663 So. 2d at 611.
108. Id. at 610.
109. Id. (quoting Dvorak v. TGI Friday's, Inc., 639 So. 2d 58, 59 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1993)).
110. FLA. STAT. § 768.79 (1991).
111. 629 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
112. Dvorak, 663 So. 2d at 611 (but see id. at 614 (Wells, J., dissenting)).
113. See Schmidt, 629 So. 2d at 1039.
114. Dvorak 663 So. 2d at 611.
115. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Malmberg, 623 So. 2d 755, 758 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
116. Dvorak 663 So. 2d at 611.
117. FLA. STAT. § 768.79 (1990).
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and rule 1.442, unlike section 45.061, the question of reasonableness only
applies to the amount awarded and not to the reasonableness of the rejection.
The Supreme Court of Florida summed it up nicely when it stated: "[T]he
wording of [section 768.79] the statute as a whole leaves no doubt that the
reasonablenes 8 of the rejection is irrelevant to the question of
entitlement."
In comparing the differences between section 45.061 and section
768.79 of the Florida Statutes, it is clear that section 45.061 grants the
judiciary more discretion in awarding fees and costs. Perhaps this is part of
the reason why the Supreme Court of Florida recommended that the
legislature change section 768.79.119 The recommended change would give
the court discretion to determine the entitlement to attorneys' fees and costs
which would include the reasonableness of a rejection of an offer as a
determinative factor of entitlement. 120 The supreme court stated:
We believe that it would advance the goals of justice and fairness
to empower the trial court with the discretion to decide the
entitlement to attorney fees based upon the criteria set forth in
Section 768.79 plus the recommended factor (A) in addition to the
discretion to decide the reasonableness of the amount of an award
of attorney fees.'21
However, the court did not adopt the recommendation by the Rules
Committee to give the court discretion through rule 1.442 to determine a
party's entitlement to fees and costs because the court "must respect the
legislative prerogative to enact substantive law.' 122 If the court had adopted
the recommended version of rule 1.442 presented by the Rules Committee,
the effect would essentially bestow the power upon the court to determine
the entitlement of an award of attorneys' fees based on several factors,
including the reasonableness of the rejection of an offer. 123 The power of the
court to determine the entitlement of fees was expressly forbidden in Dvorak
118. Dvorak, 663 So. 2d at 613.
119. In re Amendments to the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 682 So. 2d 105, 106
(1996).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 106.
123. The Civil Procedure Rules Committee of the Florida Bar recommended that rule
1.442(h)(2) be amended to read: "'When determining the entitlement to and the
reasonableness of the amount of an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to this section, the court
shall consider, along with all other relevant criteria, the following [additional] factors... '(A)
whether the proposal was reasonably rejected."' Id. at 105 (emphasis provided by the court).
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on the basic fact that only the legislature can create the substantive right to
attorneys' fees.
124
In summary, the present state of the law regarding the element of
reasonableness is that once it is determined that a party is entitled to an
award of fees and costs the judge can only alter the amount awarded in
accordance with the factors listed in section 768.79(7)(b) and rule
1.442(h).2 5
I][. CONCLUSION
Presently, the law regarding proposals for settlement in Florida is in
better shape than it was in the late eighties and the early nineties. There are
two reasons why the process is improved: section 768.79 and rule 1.442 are
in agreement with respect to the approach of the element of reasonableness
and how it applies to the amount awarded and secondly, the number of
sources directly governing a proposal for settlement has been reduced
because section 45.061 is no longer applicable to causes of action that accrue
after October 1, 1990. Reducing the number of sources directly governing
proposals for settlement and achieving uniformity regarding the element of
reasonableness reduces confusion and thus provides a more efficient judicial
system. However, there are two areas that, if modified, can further enhance
the proposal for settlement process in the future.
First, there are procedural portions of section 768.79 that are in conflict
with rule 1.442 that need to be rectified and second, the legislature should
follow the advice of the Supreme Court of Florida by allowing the judiciary
to apply the standard of reasonableness to the entitlement to fees and costs.
Currently, "[r]ule 1.442 differ[s] from corresponding provisions of
768.79 in several significant ways: the time for service of a 'proposal for
settlement'... ; the form and content of a proposal; the acceptance or
rejection of a proposal; and the effect of mediation on the time requirements
for proposals. 126 The Florida Legislature can easily solve this discrepancy
by deleting the remaining sections of the statute that conflict with the
procedural rule. In addition, the legislature could expressly refer a party to
rule 1.442 for the procedure required for a proper proposal. In the mean
time, section (a) titled "Applicability" under rule 1.442 insures that any
procedural difference, mainly concerning the time frame for filing an offer
of judgment and the form of the offer, with section 768.79 will result in
124. Dvorak, 663 So. 2d 606. But see id. at 614 (Wells, J., dissenting).
125. Compare FLA. STAT. § 768.79(7)(b) (1997) and FLk. R. CIV. P. 1.442 (h) (1997).
126. David L. Klan, The 1996 Amendments to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442:
Reconciling a Decade of Confusion, 71 FLA. B.J. 32, 35 (1997). Compare FLA. STAT. §
768.79(1)-(6) (1997) and FLA- R. Civ. P. 1.442(b)-(g) (1997).
19981
154
Nova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol22/iss2/1
Nova Law Review
conflict. The undesirable effect of this is that practitioners who are deceived
by the procedural requirements of section 768.79127 may make an offer that
conforms with the statute but does not conform with rule 1.442. Therefore, a
party that should be awarded fees and costs may be denied simply because of
the deceptive procedural requirements of the statute.
Accordingly, the legislature should limit section 768.79 to the relevant
sections that create an entitlement to attorneys' fees and costs128 and refer
the offering party to rule 1.442 for the necessary criteria for a properly
drafted offer of judgment.
Furthermore, if the Florida Legislature adopts the recommendations of
the Supreme Court of Florida, with respect to the issue of reasonableness,
the fairness of the proposal for settlement process will be enhanced. The
reason is because the existing twenty-five percent threshold that creates an
automatic entitlement to fees and costs, assuming that the proposal was made
in good faith, is somewhat arbitrary. The current process would deny a party
fees and costs if a verdict is one penny short of coming within the twenty-
five percent threshold. For example, if a party offered to settle a case for
$100 and the opposing party rejected the offer, the current system would
deny the offering party fees and costs if the verdict is returned in the amount
of $124.99. Although this example consists of a small amount of money the
consequences are much worse when the verdict is much larger.
Thus, section 45.061 of the Florida Statutes provides the most suitable
approach to the issue of reasonableness because the twenty-five percent
element is viewed as a presumption of unreasonableness and not as a
determinative factor. 2 9 The point is the judge, in most circumstances, has
been with the case since day one and is in the best position to decide whether
or not an offer was reasonably or unreasonably rejected. Therefore, the
Florida Legislature should incorporate the spirit of 45.061 regarding the
statute's approach to the reasonableness of a rejection of an offer in to
section 768.79.
In closing, the current process is better off than it was in the past decade
but efforts to refine the process must continue. Until then, the proposal for
settlement process will unnecessarily remain another complex area of the
law.
Jason R. Himschoot
127. FLA. STAT. § 768.79(2)-(5) (1997).
128. FLA. STAT. § 768.79(6)-(8) (1997).
129. FLA. STAT. § 45.061(2) (1997).
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and dozens of commendations, including seven from the American Bar
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regular panelist on Inside Washington, the weekly syndicated public-affairs
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Totenberg's ground-breaking report about University of Oklahoma Law
Professor Anita Hill's allegations of sexual harassment forced the Senate
Judiciary Committee to re-open the hearings on the Supreme Court
nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas. Totenberg anchored NPR's Peabody
Award-winning gavel-to-gavel coverage of the congressional confirmation
that captured the attention of the nation.
Totenberg also broke the story of Judge Douglas Ginsburg's use of
marijuana. In doing so, she raised important questions of changing social
values and credibility. Her efforts were recognized when she received the
1988 Alfred I. DuPont-Columbia University Silver Baton for her coverage of
Supreme Court nominations.
A frequent contributor to The New York Times, Harvard Law Review, The
Christian Science Monitor, and Parade and New York magazines, Totenberg
is the recipient of the Long Island University George Polk Award for
excellence in journalism, the Sigma Delta Chi Award from the Society of
Professional Journalists for investigative reporting, and the Joan S. Barone
Award for excellence in Washington-based national affairs/public policy
reporting.
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